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This thesis comprises several studies investigating the validity of a neural-
based overlap model for irrelevant information processing. The second chap-
ter contains the experiments that gave the initial impetus to our “neural over-
lap hypothesis”, as well as a number of experiments to rule out alternative
accounts for the effects obtained. In a third chapter, we report experiments
that employ a different type of stimuli but also support the neural overlap
hypothesis. In Chapter 4 however, I gathered a series of studies that are
not congruous with the notion of neural overlap. Finally, in a last chapter I
will give an overview of the work done and discuss the viability of the neural
overlap hypothesis as it is introduced in Chapter 2.
Because I do not want to repeat myself endlessly, it is not my intention
to give a long in-depth introduction to the neural overlap hypothesis in this
section. For specific details about the neural overlap hypothesis I refer to the
second chapter, where it is discussed in greater detail. For now, I will try to
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give a rough sketch of attention theories, focusing the way they encompass
the processing of irrelevant information in particular. First, we will take a
look at some of the earliest modern theories of attention. While these do
not all deal with the problem of irrelevant information processing primarily,
at least they do so implicitly. Second, I will talk about stimulus response
compatibility theories, some of which touch explicitly on the fate of irrelevant
information. Third, I will introduce some historical precursors of the neural
overlap hypothesis, before I outline the scope of this thesis.
1.1 Theories of attention
“Everyone knows what attention is . . . ” (James, 1890). This phrase is
probably the most frequent utilized quote in order to introduce the subject
of attention. When James said that everyone knows what attention is he
probably meant to say that each one of us intuitively can grasp the idea
of what attention can mean to us. If you ask first year psychology students
how they conceive attention, very often you get examples like “it allows us to
stay awake during boring lectures”, or “it helps me to spot my boyfriend in a
crowded railway station”, or else “it makes our eyes dwell to the icon in the
bottom right corner of our computer screen when a blinking icon reminds us
that a new message has arrived”. Although we all have a subjective feeling
of what attention is, it is difficult to give a precise definition encompassing
all its different aspects.
It is clear though that attention is not a unified concept but manifests it-
self in a number of different forms of attention. According to LaBerge (1995),
attention serves three main functions, namely preparing the system for ex-
pected changes, selecting essential information above irrelevant information
and exercising vigilance.
Another important distinction that is made in the literature when talk-
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ing about attention, is whether attention is under voluntary control (active
attention) or beyond the control of the human processing system (for in-
stance when attention is “automatically” oriented towards sudden events)
(Kok, 2004). The active form of attention entails directing attention from
within to the outside world. All sorts of stimuli, like sounds or images, can
be the subject of active attention (although most theories of attention refer
to visual attention). Somehow, actively attended stimuli are more apt to
further processing while the processing of irrelevant or distracting stimuli is
attenuated or even blocked.
Active attention mechanisms are further divided into two categories. On
the one hand, it is possible to attend to different stimuli or tasks simulta-
neously by distributing attention over all those stimuli that need to be pro-
cessed (divided attention). It is assumed that the amount of simultaneously
attended stimuli or tasks depends on the available resources or processing
capacity available. Selective attention on the other hand refers to our abil-
ity to process one stimulus while ignoring or inhibiting irrelevant material.
Theories describing active selective attention typically contain a structural
bottleneck in one or the other. This bottleneck is used for selecting the
stimulus of interest for further processing, while putting a halt to further
processing the irrelevant material. We will now discuss two different types
of theories: Bottleneck theories, which can be placed in the active selec-
tive attention corner, and capacity sharing theories, which highlight active
distributed attention.
1.1.1 Structural bottleneck theories
A recurring topic in theories of active selective attention concerns the ques-
tion at what point in the information-processing flow the actual act of selec-
tion takes place. Is it at a moment relatively early after sensory information
arrives in our system, or alternatively, does it take place relatively late there-
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after?
Different views emerged on this topic during the history of cognitive psy-
chology. At the opposite ends of the point-of-selection continuum, two ex-
treme views can be found: the early selection theory and the late selection
theory. Both viewpoints emerged during the 1950s and 1960s and inspired
a great deal of work done afterwards. Although these theories are nowa-
days considered to be past their best, it is still essential to introduce them
because they motivated a lot of research on attention during the last forty
years. Therefore, the spirit of many studies is hard to grasp without knowing
something about them (Pashler, 1998).
Early selection
The filter theory of Broadbent (1958) is one of the best-known modern the-
ories of attention. Of paramount importance for this theory is the selective
filter which constitutes a filtering device pointing out which stimuli need
further processing based on simple physical attributes. Importantly, this fil-
tering device was conceived to be capable of handling only one stimulus at
a time. This means that all stimuli entering the attentional system are pro-
cessed up to the point where a coarse physical analysis takes place. Then,
based on the representations of these physical attributes one of the stimuli is
selected for further processing and is subsequently identified. It is clear that
according to this theory, irrelevant information is not likely to be identified or
even represented beyond the level of simple physical characteristics because
selection takes place in a processing stage relatively early after the stimuli
entered the system.
Late selection
As opposed to the early selection theories, late selection theories assume that
selection only takes place after all stimuli perceived simultaneously are com-
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pletely analysed and identified. This idea was adhered by multiple theories
of attention (e.g. Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Norman, 1968; Duncan, 1980)
all sharing the same basic idea that recognition of familiar objects initially
takes place unselectively and without capacity limitations. This means that
in contrast with theories supposing early selection this account does not pose
a limit to the number of items that can be processed simultaneously. The
number of stimuli entering the system does not affect the extent by which
these are analysed, nor does it have an impact on the time needed to analyse
these items. However, once all stimuli are properly analysed and catego-
rized, selective processing which is liable to capacity limitations does pursue.
Furthermore, as Pashler (1998) pointed out, the assertion of late selection
theories that stimuli are analysed independent of attention or capacity limita-
tions does not necessarily mean that stimuli are identified without exception.
Rather it should be understood that voluntary control will have no effect on
whether or not foveal stimuli are identified. As pointed out before, late se-
lection theories assume that all information entering the sensory system is
processed and identified, including information that is irrelevant for the task
at hand. This means that the selection process is based upon a consideration
between the identity representations of both relevant and irrelevant stimuli.
1.1.2 Capacity sharing theories
Capacity sharing theories depart from two assumptions. First, they assume
that the available amount of processing capacity is finite. Our system is
limited in the amount of information that it can handle at once. Second,
they also assume that available amount of processing resources is shared
between the information units that need to be processed. In other words,
capacity sharing theories start from the assumption that each unit entering
the processing system receives some part of the available processing capac-
ity. However, because the amount of processing capacity available is limited,
6 Chapter 1
processing two items simultaneously will take longer compared to processing
just one stimulus. As such, capacity theories of attention assign interference
to a shortage of unspecified resources. This means that two tasks will in-
terfere if their combined claim for resources exceeds the available capacity
(McLeod, 1977).
Strictly spoken, the aforementioned bottleneck theories are also capacity
theories because they imply structural restrictions on the amount of infor-
mation that gets processed at once (be it early or late in the course of pro-
cessing). However, the implementation of capacity limitations in bottleneck
theories is implicit (the filter selects a stimulus and from that moment all
resources are attributed to the selected one), while it is explicitly assumed
in capacity theories.
A theory of attention related to the capacity sharing point of view is
the filter-attenuation theory of Treisman (1960). According to this theory,
rejected stimuli are not simply locked out from further processing but the
resources spent on these are attenuated. This means that it is harder for
unattended stimuli to be recognized, because their activity accumulates very
slowly, making it difficult to be picked up by specific detector units. However,
according to Pashler (1998) the implications of this filter-attenuation theory
were never really clear. For instance, this theory provided no answers to
questions like whether attending to multiple stimuli at the same time leads
to the same amount of attenuation for all stimuli, regardless if they are
relevant or irrelevant.
Capacity sharing theories do not explicitly handle the topic of irrelevant
information. Resources are shared between items that need attention. As
such, they all assume divided attention and not selective attention and they
do not address the question if rejected stimuli also take capacity or not.
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1.2 Stimulus response compatibility models
of information processing
The attention theories discussed so far do not tell us much about the mutual
relations between stimuli and responses. Stimuli are attended and selected
according to the specific goal that is set, but typically they do not explicitly
provide a forum for stimuli and responses to “communicate”. The first to
recognize the importance of this stimulus-response relation were Fitts and
Seeger (1953) who showed that human performance is not only affected by the
characteristics of the stimulus set and response set used in a task, but also by
the combination of the two. In their 1953 study, Fitts and Seeger showed that
responses were faster and more accurate when the response-set arrangement
corresponded to that of the stimulus-set (e.g. they were both horizontally
oriented) compared to when this was not the case (e.g. stimuli were presented
horizontally whereas response had to be given diagonally). Moreover, in 1954,
Fitts and Deininger only employed circular stimulus and response sets, and
varied the mapping between the stimulus and response sets. What they
found was faster and more accurate responses for spatial compatible S-R
mappings, than for spatially non-corresponding S-R mappings. Since then,
the effect of overlapping features between stimulus and response was called
the stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect.
A crucial moment in the history of SRC research was the finding of the
Simon-effect which showed that correspondences between the stimulus and
the response can affect performance even if this relation is completely irrele-
vant for the task at hand (see Simon, 1990 for a review). In a typical “Simon”
experiment subjects have to respond to a non-spatial feature of a left or right
presented stimulus by pressing left or right. The Simon effect is reflected in
the finding that responding to (for instance) the colour of a stimulus that is
presented on the left hand side will be faster using a left sided response com-
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pared to a right sided response even though the position of the stimulus is
completely irrelevant. From an information-processing perspective, this find-
ing is peculiar. Why would information that is task-irrelevant be processed
in such a way that it influences performance? A first attempt to explain this
phenomenon was put forward by Simon himself (1969). He suggested that
the tendency to respond towards the stimulus is the driving force behind this
effect. Attention is forced into the direction of the stimulus, making it easier
to make a corresponding response. This attentional perspective was quickly
followed by a coding view. Coding accounts are different because they ex-
plain the whole range of SRC effects by considering the way how stimuli and
responses are coded and how these code representations interact during the
transition from stimulus to response (e.g. Wallace, 1971, 1972). With regard
to the example that was given previously for the Simon effect this means that
both the irrelevant stimulus position and the response are coded as “right”.
This facilitates performance because the response expected for the relevant
stimulus attribute corresponds with the code associated with the irrelevant
stimulus position. No such facilitation or even interference is expected how-
ever when the irrelevant stimulus position points to a code different from the
expected response.
In the beginning, SRC studies primordially aimed at localizing the stage in
the information-processing stream at which compatibility effects emerge. The
three stages considered were (a) the perceptual stage responsible for stimulus
processing, (b) the stimulus-response (S-R) translation stage that uses the
output of the perceptual stage to activate the corresponding response, and
(c) the response stage taking care of action control; e.g. Meyer & Kieras,
1997; Pashler, 1994; Sanders, 1980; Sternberg, 1969; Welford, 1952).
From the nineties on, however, SRC research saw some major changes
(Hommel & Prinz, 1997). Instead of concentrating on the locus of com-
patibility effects, more energy was put in specifying the mechanism behind
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them. One of the most influential models that came out of this period was
the dimensional overlap model of Kornblum, Hasbroucq, and Osman (1990).
1.2.1 Kornblum’s dimensional overlap model
In 1990, Kornblum et al. introduced the dimensional overlap model. This
model was constructed to provide a unified account and taxonomy for stimu-
lus-stimulus (S-S) and stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility effects.
The key concept behind this model is that the way and the speed by
which a stimulus is translated into a response depends on the relation be-
tween the dimensions of stimulus and response. More specifically, compat-
ibility effects are caused by dimensional overlap between the stimulus and
the response sets, and/or mutual dimensional overlap between relevant and
irrelevant stimulus components. Of course, the assumptions made by the
dimensional overlap model completely depend on what is understood by di-
mensional overlap. After the initial introduction of the model in 1990, Korn-
blum (1994) defined dimensional overlap as the degree to which the mental
representations of relevant and/or irrelevant stimulus sets are perceptually,
conceptually, or structurally similar to the response set codes and/or to each
other. Later, Kornblum and colleagues mentioned that although similarity
is a continuously varying quantity, it is treated discretely (see Kornblum,
Stevens, Whipple, & Requin, 1999, footnote 1). This means that, although
in essence similarity is a parametric property, it is considered as a discrete
one in the context of the dimensional overlap model. Either the stimulus
and/or response sets dimensionally overlap, or they do not. Of course, this
does not take into account on what point on the similarity continuum no
overlap is turned into a complete overlap. Additionally, the theory does not
provide parametric measures to predict the sizes of the compatibility effects
Of peculiar importance for the dimensional overlap model is the explicit
role of irrelevant information. From the processing assumptions behind it
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Figure 1.1: Selection of dimensional overlap ensembles specified by the dimen-
sional overlap taxonomy. Dimensional relationships between the relevant stimuli,
irrelevant stimuli and the responses are indicated by a line joining the overlapping
sets. Adapted from Kornblum and Stevens (2002).
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follows that dimensional overlap influences performance, irrespective if the
dimensions involved are irrelevant or not. For example, if the irrelevant
stimulus dimension overlaps with the response, this congruency results in
facilitated responses (e.g. the Simon effect).
In total, the dimensional overlap taxonomy consists of eight S-R ensem-
bles, each resembling one of the possible dimensional overlap combinations
between the relevant stimulus, the irrelevant stimulus and the response (See
Figure 1.1 for a subset of examples). These different ensembles simplified the
way how to address different types of S-R relations. For instance, under this
taxonomy Type 2 ensembles denote simple SRC events with compatibility
between the relevant stimulus and the response. In another example, the
Simon effect is categorized under the Type 3 denominator.
The reason for this is that the S-R relations for the Simon effect are
restricted to dimensional overlap between the irrelevant stimulus and the
response only (S-R consistency). There is no overlap between the relevant
stimulus and the response (S-R congruency), nor overlap between the relevant
and irrelevant stimulus attributed (S-S consistency)1.
There are some manifest advantages associated with adopting the dimen-
sional overlap taxonomy. Not only does it provide a simple terminology and
system for describing stimulus-response compatibility effects like the Simon
effect, but it also allowed researchers to develop new predictions for compat-
ibility effects between stimulus and response sets that were previously not
considered. One of the main assets, however, of this taxonomy was that it
provided a prominent role for irrelevant information in the S-R translation
process.
1In Kornblum and Lee (1995) the idea was proposed to use congruency when the
relevant stimulus and response dimensions overlap, as opposed to consistency which should
be used when the irrelevant stimulus and response dimensions overlap.
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1.2.2 Dual Route model
The underlying basis of the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum et al.,
1990) consists of two pathways, each connecting respectively relevant and ir-
relevant information with the response. Furthermore, the dimensional over-
lap model implies that a stimulus is automatically mapped onto its corre-
sponding response code, at least if the stimulus information dimensionally
overlaps with the response.
Hasbroucq and Guiard (1991) questioned the necessity for an automatic
activation account. Based on the results of a series of irrelevant SRC exper-
iments they refuted an automatic response priming account driven by the
irrelevant stimulus code. Instead, they inferred that congruency effects at
the stimulus level could explain effects of irrelevant spatial SRC. However,
this vision was rebuted by De Jong, Liang, and Lauber (1994) on the basis of
distributional analyses and event-related brain potentials. More specifically,
their results showed that correspondence effects within a spatial S-R pro-
cessing context consist of two qualitatively different components, both rep-
resented in their dual-route model. That is to say, following the dual-route
model two routes are activated upon the onset of the stimulus display. One
unconditional route projects fast and automatically from the stimulus to the
response independent of the primary task. Another conditional route is un-
der voluntary control and reflects task-defined transformations from stimulus
information to spatial response codes. If both the conditional and uncondi-
tional route point to the same response this will speed up performance. If,
on the other hand, both routes project to a different response, it takes time
to resolve this conflict and hence the overall response time will be slower
(De Jong et al., 1994). To illustrate this, one could think of the Simon effect
in which the irrelevant position is automatically and rapidly transformed into
its corresponding spatial response. If this response is in concordance with
the response that is initiated by the relevant stimulus information this al-
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lows for a quick response. If however both activated response codes are in
conflict with each other this will hamper performance because the response
code associated with the irrelevant stimulus part needs to be inhibited.
1.3 Precursors of the neural overlap hypoth-
esis
Besides theories that use a coding or attention perspective to account for com-
patibility and interference effects, some models in the history of experimental
psychology started from the more adventurous neurobiological assumption
that interference and compatibility are tightly linked with the cortical rela-
tion of the tasks or attributes involved. Early adopters of this vision were
Kinsbourne and Hicks (1978) who proposed a model of functional cerebral
space. This model tried to account for the limited performance encountered
when doing a dual task by explicitly referring to the cerebral localization of
the control centers called upon. More specifically, they assumed that simul-
taneous active cognitive programs can influence each other through spread
of activation and the magnitude of this mutual influence depends on the
functional and cortical distance between the loci where both programs are
processed. The closer the processing loci are the more they will influence
each other. Furthermore, Kinsbourne and Hicks (1978) assumed that the
way programs influence each other depends on their comparability. If both
programs are comparable, they will facilitate each other. If they are not com-
parable however, they will interfere with each other. Moreover, according to
this model, programs are considered “comparable” not only when they uti-
lize identical patterns of muscular contraction, but also when these patterns
are conceptually similar. For instance, programs used for tapping a pattern
with the hand and foot are considered to be comparable only if the rhythm
tapped is the same, although the muscular contractions associated with each
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movement are different.
At first sight, the proposition that distant comparable programs will fa-
cilitate each other more than distant ones seems rather vague. However,
Kinsbourne and Hicks (1978) provided some examples to support this idea.
For instance, they argued that controlling different responses with one hand
and the opposite sided foot (controlled by different hemispheres) results in
less interference compared to when using the foot and hand at the same
side of the body, which are controlled by the same hemisphere (e.g. Briggs
& Kinsbourne, 1978). Of course, most attempts to explore the concept of
functional cerebral space employed the hemispheres as units of functional
proximity. This means that in the examples they provided, programs were
considered to be close when they were situated in the same hemisphere, while
distant programs resided in opposite hemispheres.
One decade later, Posner, Sandson, Dhawan, and Shulman (1989) elab-
orated on the idea that performance of cognitive operations is governed by
cortical and functional distance. They did so to study if the attentional sys-
tem involved in a shadowing task is a unitary system subserving a variety of
tasks, or if this type of attention is part of a fractioned attention system of
which each component operates in different tasks.
To make predictions about the conditions under which repeating back
(shadowing) auditory words would interfere with common visual priming
tasks like spatial cueing or visual word priming, they used localization data
acquired earlier in positron emission tomography (PET) studies of visual and
auditory word processing (Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988;
Posner, Petersen, Fox, & Raichle, 1988). They predicted and ultimately
found that the shadowing task interferes with shifts of visual attention in-
duced by the direction of a peripheral cue. At the neuro-anatomical level it
is known from the PET studies that both require common attentional opera-
tions localized in the medial frontal lobe. On the other hand, shadowing did
Introduction 15
not interfere with operations involved in the priming of a visual word form,
which relies on areas of the ventral occipital lobe not involved during shad-
owing. Finally, both shadowing and semantic priming involve the anterior
attention system and thus they found these to interfere.
The results were thus in favor of a commonly employed attention system.
But more important for our case however was that their strategy proved
was fruitful. The use of existing localization data made it possible to make
predictions about interference based on the principle of cortical distance.
1.4 Scope of this thesis
I have now given a broad overview to reveal the context in which our research
has been taken place. The aim of this thesis was to investigate the validity of
the “neural overlap hypothesis” which is a neural-based account for irrelevant
information processing. In Chapter 2, a study is presented that cannot be
fully explained by the dimensional overlap model as defined by Kornblum et
al. (1990). To be able to account for our results we suggested that besides
dimensional overlap, neural overlap should also be taken into account. By
neural overlap we mean functional and cortical relatedness of the processes
involved in stimulus and response processing. Therefore the neural overlap
hypothesis is conceived as the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum et al.,
1990) extended by principles used in the functional cerebral space model of
Kinsbourne and Hicks (1978).
To study neural overlap effects, a similar strategy will be employed as
the one used in Posner et al. (1989). First, we will consequently review the
literature in search for two sets of tasks or attributes. One set of irrelevant
attributes that relies on similar neural processing regions as the relevant task
and another irrelevant set that does not show this kind of neural overlap.
Moreover, to define if sets of stimuli or tasks neurally overlap, we will always
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make use of the relatively well know distinction between the ventral and
dorsal processing pathway (e.g. Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale,
1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). If the selected attributes are both
processed within the same pathway (dorsal or ventral), they are considered
to overlap at the neural level, whereas tasks and attributes that are not
processed within the same pathway are considered not to overlap neurally.
Chapter 2
Effects of irrelevant digits on
the relevant task depending on
the overlap of neural circuits1
1This chapter is partly based on and adapted from Fias, Lauwereyns, and Lammertyn
(2001) published in Cognitive Brain Research, Volume 12 and Lammertyn, Fias, and
Lauwereyns (2002), published in Cortex, Volume 38
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2.1 Part I — The origin of the neural overlap
hypothesis
Efficient behaviour requires selection of information. In the domain of vision,
the information acting upon our retinas is too abundant to be processed
all to the same degree during the conversion of sensory input into goal-
oriented behavioural output. Attentional mechanisms provide a means to
give privilege to a subset of the available information (LaBerge, 1995; Van
der heijden, 1992). Selection can be accomplished on the basis of a particular
area in space (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980), a certain object (Duncan, 1984;
Vecera & Farah, 1994; Yantis, 1992) or a particular visual feature (Corbetta,
Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1990, 1991; Lauwereyns et al.,
2000). In this paper we focus on feature-based attention.
Single-unit studies (McAdams & Maunsell, 2000; Treue & Trujillo, 1999)
and functional imaging studies (Chawla, Rees, & Friston, 1999; Corbetta
et al., 1990, 1991; Pinsk, Kastner, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 2000) indicate
that feature-based attention modulates visual processing in specific areas of
neocortex depending on which feature is being attended. Thus, feature-based
attention operates as a localized neural adaptation to the task at hand. In
line with this view, it is possible that the quality of feature-based selection
depends on the extent to which relevant and irrelevant information are active
in the same neural structures. That is to say, interference from irrelevant
information on feature-based attention would be stronger if the relevant and
the irrelevant feature are processed by the same neural structures than if
both features pass through different neural structures.
To test this hypothesis, we devised a behavioural paradigm in which we
varied the relevant information while keeping irrelevant information constant.
As irrelevant information we used digits. Functional imaging (e.g. Chochon,
Cohen, Moortele, & Dehaene, 1999; Pesenti, Thioux, Seron, & De Volder,
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2000), electrode recordings (Abdullaev & Melnichuk, 1996) and patient stud-
ies (e.g. Dehaene & Cohen, 1995) convergently demonstrate the involvement
of superior and inferior parietal areas in the semantic processing of the nu-
merical magnitude of digits. The pre-semantic physical identity of digits is
processed in inferior extrastriate cortical areas (Allison, McCarthy, Nobre,
Puce, & Belger, 1994; Pesenti et al., 2000). Behavioral studies suggest that
magnitude-related information is autonomously activated, as witnessed by
effects of number magnitude on processing times in tasks for which a mere
visual analysis of the digit suffices (Dehaene & Akhavein, 1995). As relevant
information we used either contour-based 2D shape, color, or orientation.
These features are processed to a different degree by parietal areas. Parietal
involvement in the processing of shape and color is very restricted, whereas it
is more extensive in the case of orientation processing (Eacott & Gaffan, 1991;
Faillenot, Sunaert, Van Hecke, & Orban, 2001; Faillenot et al., 2001; Fias
et al., 2000; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Shikata et
al., 2001; Taira, Kawashima, Inoue, & Fukuda, 1998; Walsh & Butler, 1996),
not only in visually-guided motor tasks (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Murata et
al., 2000) but also in associative visuo-motor transformation tasks like the
two-choice manual response task adopted here (Faillenot et al., 2001; Fias et
al., 2000; Shikata et al., 2001; Taira et al., 1998). Accordingly, we expected
that semantic interference from number would be observed with attention to
orientation, but not or to a lesser degree with attention to color or shape.
Semantic processing of digits can be evaluated in a binary manual re-
sponse task. Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux (1993) first showed an association
between numerical value and the side of the response and labeled this effect
the SNARC effect (spatial numerical association of response codes). Partic-
ipants were asked to press one of two keys in response to an even number
and the other key to an odd number. Smaller numbers were responded to
faster with the left hand than with the right hand. The reverse happened for
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larger numbers. Additional control experiments confirmed that the SNARC
effect originates from accessing a numbers semantic magnitude representa-
tion, which is conceived of as a position on a left-to-right oriented mental
number line (Brysbaert, 1995; Dehaene et al., 1993) such that there is con-
gruity between small numbers and left-hand responses and between large
numbers and right-hand responses. Therefore, we used the SNARC effect as
a marker for semantic access. By having subjects direct attention away from
the digit and asking them to perform a two-choice manual response task,
we can evaluate the extent to which the unattended digit is processed as a
function of the kind of processing being performed attentively.
2.1.1 Experiments 1–5
Materials & methods
Participants Sixty-eight Dutch-speaking subjects participated in the stu-
dy. All participants had normal or corrected vision, and reported to be neu-
ropsychologically healthy. Experiments 1-2 and 3-4 were each tested on the
same sample (each 24 participants), in which case the order of experiments
was counterbalanced. Subsamples were composed comparably in terms of
age (Experiments 1-2: 19.3; Experiments 3-4: 18.3; Experiment 5: 24.2),
sex (number of male participants: Experiments 1-2: 7; Experiments 3-4: 4;
Experiment 5: 11), handedness (number of right-handed participants: Ex-
periments 1-2: 20; Experiments 3-4: 20; Experiment 5: 16) and education
(all participants were students or recent graduates in psychology).
Stimuli The numbers used ranged from 0 to 9 (except for Experiment 5
which used numbers 1 to 9) and were presented centrally on a black back-
ground as Arabic digits in Borland C’s simplex font (VGA card in graphics
mode). The digit subtended an area of 18×38 mm. In the colour condition,
the digit was coloured in standard red or green (Experiment 2) as standardly
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defined in Borland C’s library, or lightcyan and cyan (Experiment 3). In all
other experiments, the digits were presented in white with a visual stimulus
superimposed in the centre. In Experiment 1 this stimulus was a triangle
pointing upward or downward (subtending 18×18 mm). In Experiment 4
an oriented line segment (18×1 mm) was superimposed on the digit and in
Experiment 5 a circle or a square (18×18 mm) was used.
Procedure Participants had to press one of two response keys, depending
on the relevant feature (Experiment 1: triangle pointing upward or down-
ward; Experiment 2: red or green; Experiment 3: light or dark cyan; Ex-
periment 4: horizontal or vertical line; Experiment 5: circle or square). Key
assignment was counterbalanced across participants. Before the actual ex-
periment the participants took part in a training session, consisting of 20
trials with letters instead of numbers. In the training session an auditory
feedback buzz was given when the participant pressed the wrong key. In the
actual test session, each number was presented a fixed number of times (32
in Experiments 1, 2 and 5; 24 in Experiments 3 and 4): half of the times with
the one relevant feature, the other half of the times with the other relevant
feature. The whole set of trials was presented in randomized order with a
different randomization for each subject.
Each trial started with the symbol “#” as fixation point (18 mm×50 mm)
presented at the center of the screen for 1000 ms. The subjects were asked to
fixate this point, but eye position was not monitored. Thereafter, the screen
was erased and immediately followed by the stimulus. The stimulus remained
on until a response was made, which was registered to the nearest millisecond
from stimulus onset. A blank screen followed for 500 ms, after which the next
trial started. The response box was connected to a PC-compatible Pentium
and was placed at a comfortable position in front of the subject. The two
response buttons were separated by ∼30 cm. The eyescreen distance was plus
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or minus 70 cm. Both speed and accuracy were stressed in the instructions,
and the interval of numbers used was explicitly mentioned.
Data-analysis Trials with an RT shorter than 150 ms or longer than
1000 ms were discarded from all analyses. The cut-off value of 1000 ms
fell well outside the grand average plus three standard deviations. This way,
less than 1.5% of the data are excluded.
The presence of a SNARC effect was evaluated by means of a regression
analysis of repeated measures data as described by Lorch and Meyers (1990).
The advantages of using this method are reported elsewhere (Fias, Brysbaert,
Geypens, & d’Ydewalle, 1996). In a first step, for each subject the median
RT of the correct responses was computed for each number, separately for left
and right responses. On the basis of these medians, differences in RT (dRTs)
were computed by subtracting the median RT for the left hand from the me-
dian RT for the right hand. If there is an association between response side
and number magnitude, we expect a negative correlation between number
magnitude and dRT: relatively small numbers should elicit faster left re-
sponses, resulting in positive dRTs, whereas relatively large numbers should
elicit faster right responses, and thus negative dRTs. Therefore, in a second
step, a regression equation was computed per subject with number magni-
tude as predictor variable. In a third step t-tests were performed to test
whether the regression weights of the group deviated significantly from zero.
Since only a negative slope is expected theoretically, all reported p-values are
one-tailed.
Results & discussion
Experiment 1: orientation, triangle pointing upwards or down-
wards Participants had to determine the orientation of a triangle superim-
posed on a digit (ranging from 0 to 9). Participants had to indicate whether
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Figure 2.1: Experiment 1, differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand
responses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit in orientation
discrimination (triangle pointing up or down). Circles indicate the observed dRTs.
The continuous line depicts the predicted dRTs on the basis of the regression
analysis.
the triangle was pointing upwards or downwards. A triangle was chosen as
task relevant feature because it is perceptually salient and can be easily seg-
regated from the digit background, in terms of Gestalt laws on the basis of
good continuation and closure. Lesions of inferior parietal cortex have been
shown to impair the discrimination of rotated shapes in the monkey (Ea-
cott & Gaffan, 1991; Walsh & Butler, 1996). Single-cell recordings reported
orientation selective cells in the anterior intraparietal area (Murata et al.,
2000). Functional brain imaging demonstrated the involvement of parietal
areas in the processing of spatial features like orientation (Faillenot, Decety,
& Jeannerod, 1999; Faillenot et al., 2001; Fias et al., 2000; Shikata et al.,
2001; Taira et al., 1998). Error rate averaged over subjects was 3.0% (with
a maximum of 6.1%). There was no speed-accuracy trade-off, as indicated
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Figure 2.2: Experiment 2, differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand
responses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit in colour discrim-
ination (red or green). Circles indicate the observed dRTs. The continuous line
depicts the predicted dRTs on the basis of the regression analysis.
by the absence of a negative correlation between RT and number of errors,
computed over 20 data couples (10 numbers, separated for left and right re-
sponses), r(18) = +0.30, p < .30. Mean RTs of correct responses with the
digits 0 to 9 as irrelevant information were, respectively, 453, 452, 457, 467,
468, 465, 454, 455, 445 and 460 ms. The regression analysis of repeated
measures data revealed the following equation (presented in Figure 2.1):
dRT = −0.27− 2.03×magnitude
The significant contribution of number magnitude to the pattern of left
hand - right hand differences (t(23) = -2.91, SD = 3.4, p < 0.005) re-
flects a reliable SNARC effect (with a negative slope observed in 17 par-
ticipants) and shows that the unattended digits were processed semantically.
As Brysbaert (1995) has argued, the semantic coding of the number zero
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might be different than the semantic coding of other numbers. To make
sure that this cannot bias our results, we also provide regression equations
computed on the numbers 1 to 9. This reveals a nearly identical result:
dRT = − 0.22 − 2.03 × magnitude (t(23) = -2.03, p < 0.05).
The fact that there is a majority of negative dRTs does not obstruct the
acceptance of a SNARC effect as it is highly likely that this is a result of the
fact that a large majority of the participants was right-handed, resulting in
overall faster right-hand responses. The SNARC effect shows how this right-
hand advantage is modulated by the magnitude of the presented number.
Experiment 2: colour, red or green In Experiment 2 the relevant fea-
ture was changed to colour. As our parietal cortex is not involved in the
processing of colour (Chao & Martin, 1999; Zeki, 1993) but relies primar-
ily on structures in the ventral stream, less interference from the irrelevant
digits is expected if participants respond to colour as the relevant feature.
In fact, luminance was not controlled. For the present purposes, however,
the difference between colour and luminance is unimportant as the neural
correlates of attentive selection for colour and luminance have been shown
to be essentially the same (Motter, 1994).
Error rate averaged over subjects was 2.5% (with a maximum of 7.7%).
There was no speed-accuracy trade-off, as indicated by the absence of a
negative correlation between RT and number of errors, computed over 20 data
couples (10 numbers, separated for left and right responses), r(18) = -0.02;
p < 1. Mean RTs of correct responses with the digits 0 to 9 were, respectively,
385, 386, 385, 388, 387, 376, 375, 386, 378 and 380 ms. The following equation
was obtained and is presented in Figure 2.2:
dRT = −12.8 + 0.5×magnitude
Magnitude was not reliably different from zero (t(23) = 0.44; SD = 6,
p < 0.3, with a negative slope in 10 participants). Omission of zero from
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Figure 2.3: Experiment 3, differences in RT (dRT) of right and left hand re-
sponses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit in colour discrimina-
tion (light cyan or dark cyan). Circles indicate the observed dRTs. The continuous
line depicts the predicted dRTs on the basis of the regression analysis.
the regression analyses reveals a similar equation: dRT = -14.3 + 0.78 ×
magnitude (t(23) = 0.6; p < 0.25). The direct comparison of the magnitude
slopes in Experiments 1 and 2 revealed a reliably more negative slope in the
orientation task than in the colour task (t(23) = -1.86; p < 0.05). Thus,
whereas a reliable SNARC effect was obtained when orientation was the
relevant feature, the SNARC effect completely disappeared when subjects
attended to colour.
Experiment 3: colour, light cyan and dark cyan Average RTs in
the colour condition of Experiment 1 were considerably shorter than in the
orientation task. Possibly, latencies were simply too short for the number
semantic system to become sufficiently activated to affect performance in
the colour task. In order to evaluate this alternative interpretation, a new
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colour/luminance discrimination experiment was carried out, using less dis-
criminable colours/luminances (light and dark cyan).
Error rate averaged over subjects was 4.5% (with a maximum of 12.9%).
There was no speed-accuracy trade-off, as indicated by the absence of a neg-
ative correlation between RT and number of errors, computed over 20 data
couples (10 numbers, separated for left and right responses), r(18) = 0.47;
p < 0.05. Mean RTs of correct responses with the digits 0 to 9 were, respec-
tively, 499, 513, 505, 492, 494, 492, 481, 500, 489 and 489 ms.
Even when the colours were chosen such that the average latency was
raised considerably (from 382 to 492 ms) up to a level at which a SNARC
effect was obtained in Experiment 1 (457 ms), there was no indication of
an effect of semantic processing of the digit. The following equation was
obtained and is presented in Figure 2.3:
dRT = −8.31 + 1.95×magnitude
Magnitude tended to be positive, the reverse of the SNARC effect, but
was not reliably different from zero (t(23) = 1.5; SD = 6.8; p < 0.1, with
eight participants exhibiting a negative slope). The same was true for the
regressions computed with zero excluded: dRT = -12.45 + 2.8 × magnitude
(t(23) = 1.58; p < 0.1). Inspection of the dRTs for the individual num-
bers suggests a categorical effect of number magnitude. It has been shown
that when precise numerical magnitude is irrelevant to the task, a stimulus
can automatically be classified as small or large without coding the precise
numerical value (Tzelgov, Meyer, & Henik, 1992). This crude small-large
classification has been argued to be essentially different from refined numer-
ical coding (Girelli, Lucangeli, & Butterworth, 2000; Tzelgov et al., 1992).
Further research is needed to test whether the tendency observed here is
a systematic effect and, if so, to explain why crude magnitude information
is associated with spatial coordinates of response codes, opposite to refined
numerical magnitude.
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Figure 2.4: Experiment 4, differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand
responses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit in orientation
discrimination (horizonal and vertical line). Circles indicate the observed dRTs.
The continuous line depicts the predicted dRTs on the basis of the regression
analysis.
Experiment 4: orientation, horizontal or vertical line segment To
enable a direct comparison of the results of Experiment 3 with the same
set of participants, the participants of Experiment 3 were subjected to an
orientation task with lines instead of triangles. The line could be either
vertical or horizontal. An oriented line rather than a triangle was used as a
target to evaluate generality.
Technical failure caused data loss for one participant. Error rate aver-
aged over subjects was 3.5% (with a maximum of 13.3%). There was no
speed-accuracy trade-off, as indicated by the absence of a negative correla-
tion between RT and number of errors, computed over 20 data couples (10
numbers, separated for left and right responses), r(18) = 0.16; p < 1. Mean
RTs of correct responses with the digits 0 to 9 were, respectively, 468, 491,
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479, 475, 509, 471, 468, 485, 466 and 476 ms.
Regression equations were computed in order to test for the presence of
a SNARC effect. The following equation was obtained and is presented in
Figure 2.4:
dRT = −1.48− 3.74×magnitude
Number magnitude was reliably activated, as witnessed by a significant
SNARC effect (t(22) = -3.59; SD = 5.0; p < 0.001 with a negative slope in 18
participants). Without zero, the equation was dRT = 13.0 − 5.13 × magni-
tude (t(22) = -3.67; p < 0.001). The direct comparison of the magnitude
slopes from experiments 3 and 4 reveals a reliably more negative slope in the
line orientation experiment (t(22) = -3.27; p < 0.01), whereas RTs between
the two tasks did not differ (t(22) = 0.76; p < 1).
Experiment 5: shape, circle or square So far, the SNARC effect was
present in those situations where a figure (triangle or line) had to be sepa-
rated from the background. No figure-ground segregation was required in the
colour experiments. To judge the possibility that the SNARC effect results
from this figure-ground segregation process rather than from the overlap-
ping parietal neural structures between orientation and digit processing, the
following experiment was set up. A figure was superimposed on the digit
background, but in a situation where the task does not use parietal pro-
cessing resources. Participants had to discriminate between a circle and a
square. Shape discrimination has repeatedly been shown to rely on IT in
the ventral stream (Desimone & Allbright, 1984; Gross, Schiller, Wells, &
Gerstein, 1967; Tanaka, 1996).
Subjects made an average of 3.9% errors, with a maximum of 15.3% errors
made by one subject. No speed-accuracy trade-off was present, as indicated
by the absence of a negative correlation between RT and number of errors,
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Figure 2.5: Experiment 5, differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand
responses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit in shape discrimi-
nation (circle or square). Circles indicate the observed dRTs. The continuous line
depicts the predicted dRTs on the basis of the regression analysis.
computed over 18 data couples (nine numbers, separated for left and right
responses), r(16) = -.06; p < .40. Mean RTs of correct responses with the
digits 1 to 9 were, respectively, 447, 458, 461, 462, 464, 466, 449, 459 and
495 ms. The regression analysis of repeated measures data resulted in the
following equation (shown in Figure 2.5):
dRT = −18− 0.36×magnitude
No SNARC effect was found as there was no significant contribution of
number magnitude to the pattern of right hand minus left hand differences
(t(19)= -.35, SD = 4.5, p < 0.3; six participants with a negative slope).
This shows that the unattended digits were not processed up to the level of
semantic information.
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2.1.2 Experiment 6: same stimuli, different task
Together, all previous behavioural experiments provided evidence that the
efficiency of feature-based attention critically depends on the degree of over-
lap of neural structures recruited by distractor and target. However, one
potential problem with this series of experiments needs to be eliminated be-
fore the degree of neural overlap can be taken as a strong account of the
observed pattern of results. Up until now, the stimuli were different from
experiment to experiment. In the orientation and shape experiments the
target was superimposed on the digit distractor and both target and dis-
tractor were presented in white. To the contrary, in the colour experiments
nothing was superimposed on the digits and the digit was presented in two
possible colours. In order to exclude the difference in stimulation and its
possible interactions with attention as a possible reason for the observed
pattern of results, we kept all stimulus material constant for all conditions in
the present experiment, while only varying the task. Stimuli now consisted of
digits ranging from 1 to 9, either presented in cyan or light cyan and rotated
to the left or presented upright. This resulted in two conditions, one where
participants had to attend to the colour of the stimulus, and a second were
responses had to be made to the orientation of the digit.
Materials & method
Participants Twenty Dutch-speaking subjects (17 female) participated in
the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision,
and reported to be neuropsychologically healthy. All participants were psy-
chology students.
Stimuli The numbers used ranged from 1 to 9 and were presented centrally





horizontally. The colour of the
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digits could be a light shade of cyan (RGB: 0;52;52), or a darker shade of
cyan (RGB: 0;37;37). Furthermore, the digits could be presented upright or
tilted 10 degrees to the right.
Procedure To give a response, participants had to press one of two re-
sponse keys, depending on the relevant feature. All participants completed
four blocks, two where colour was the task-relevant feature (colour condition)
and two for which orientation was the task-relevant feature (orientation con-
dition). Within every condition, participants did two blocks and key-response
assignment was reversed between these blocks. Block-order was counterbal-
anced over participants.
Before the actual experiment, all participants went through a training
session, consisting of 20 trials with letters instead of digits. During this
training, feedback was given upon erroneous response. For the actual test
session, each block consisted of 108 trials. Each digit (1–9) in each possible
combination of colour and orientation was presented three times. All trials




) presented in the
centre of the screen for 1000 ms. Thereafter, the screen was blanked and
the stimulus appeared immediately. The stimulus remained on-screen until
a response was made, which was registered to the nearest millisecond from
stimulus onset. After a response was given, a blank screen appeared for
500 ms, after which the next trial began. The response modalities were
identical from the previous five experiments. Both speed and accuracy were
stressed and the interval of numbers used was explicitly mentioned.
Results & discussion
Error rate averaged over subjects was 4.9% for the colour condition and
4.7% for the orientation condition (with a maximum of 11.4% and 12.5%
respectively). There was no speed-accuracy trade-off as indicated by the
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Figure 2.6: Differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand responses (right
minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit for the colour condition. Circles
indicate the observed dRTs. The continuous line depicts the predicted dRTs on
the basis of the regression analysis.
absence of negative correlation between RT and number of errors, computed
over 18 data couples (9 numbers, separated for left and right responses),
r(16) = + .38; n.s. (colour condition) and r(16) = +.72; p < .001 (orientation
condition). Mean RTs of correct responses for the numbers 1 to 9 were
respectively 590, 566, 572, 557, 555, 560, 573, 556 and 565 ms for the colour
condition and 561, 538, 632, 549, 572, 599, 554, 592 and 588 ms for the
orientation condition.
The regression analysis of repeated measures data led to the following
equations (presented in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 ):
colour: dRT = 17.05− 0.13×magnitude
orientation dRT = 11.59− 2.56×magnitude
For the colour condition, the slope did not differ significantly from zero
(t(19) = .137; n.s.), which means that the digits were not processed up
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Figure 2.7: Differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand responses (right
minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit in the orientation condition. Circles
indicate the observed dRTs. The continuous line depicts the predicted dRTs on
the basis of the regression analysis.
to the semantic level. With regard to the orientation condition, number
magnitude was reliably activated as witnessed by a significant SNARC effect
(t(19) = 2.47; p < 0.01).
In sum, we found that the task-irrelevant digits were processed seman-
tically (as indicated by the SNARC effect) in the orientation condition but
not in the colour condition. Average reaction times were the same in both
conditions such that dependency of the SNARC effect on elapsed processing
time can be ruled out. This pattern of results excludes unequal stimula-
tion as an account for the data obtained in earlier experiments and provides
further support for the hypothesis that the overlap between neural struc-
tures involved in the processing of relevant and irrelevant information is a
determinant of the efficiency of feature-based selective attention. Digits are
processed semantically in parietal cortex and if the processing of the relevant
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feature is also processed within the parietal cortex (as is the case for orien-
tation), an effect on response times was obtained from the digits magnitude.
There was no effect however, from the irrelevant digit on the processing of
colour, which relies only minimally on parietal resources. This observation
is in line with the view that feature-based attention modulates processing in
feature-specific cortical areas by enhancing their neural activity.
2.1.3 Discussion
In a series of experiments we showed that interference from irrelevant in-
formation on feature-based attention is stronger if the relevant feature is
processed by the same neural structures as the irrelevant feature. Irrelevant
information was the same in all experiments and consisted of digits. Dig-
its are processed semantically in the parietal cortex (Chochon et al., 1999;
Pesenti et al., 2000). When processing of the relevant feature depended on
parietal cortex, as is the case for orientation processing (Experiments 1, 4
and 6), there was an effect of the digit’s magnitude on response times. Con-
versely, there was no effect of the irrelevant digit on the processing of colour
(Experiments 2, 3 and 6) or shape (Experiment 5), which relies only mini-
mally on parietal resources.
Importantly, alternative accounts can be ruled out. Firstly, there was no
dependency of the effect on elapsed processing times. In Experiments 3
and 5 conditions were created such that no SNARC effect was observed
with similar or even longer response times than those observed in condi-
tions which elicited a reliable SNARC effect (Experiment 1). Furthermore,
the RT levels for the colour and orientation condition of Experiment 6 were
not different but showed the same pattern of SNARC effects just the same.
Secondly, in contrast with Humphreys and Boucart (1997), mechanisms in-
volved in object-based attention cannot account for the pattern of semantic
influences in our experiments, with number as irrelevant information. In-
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deed, the SNARC effect did not depend on whether the relevant information
consisted of a 2D object. With a 2D object as a target against the numeri-
cal background a SNARC effect was observed in an orientation identification
task, but not in a shape discrimination task. Importantly, the 2D objects
were of equal complexity in both tasks. Thirdly, there was no difference in
dimensional overlap between the experiments (Kornblum et al., 1990; Zhang,
Zhang, & Kornblum, 1999): neither the processing of colour, shape or orien-
tation involves stimulus or response representations that are related to the
numerical value represented by a digit. Fourth, a perceptual confound can
also be ruled out because in Experiment 6, identical stimuli were employed
for both the colour and orientation condition (only the task varied), but still
there was only a SNARC-effect present for the orientation condition.
Having excluded alternative explanations, we can conclude that the effi-
ciency of feature-based attention is determined by the neural structures that
are involved in the processing of both relevant and irrelevant information. If
the processing of target and distractor make use of (partly) shared neural cir-
cuits then feature-based attention is less efficient compared to the situation
where the processing of target and distractor is mediated by distinct circuits.
These observations are in line with the view that feature-based attention
modulates processing in feature-specific cortical areas (Chawla et al., 1999;
Corbetta et al., 1990, 1991; McAdams & Maunsell, 2000; Pinsk et al., 2000;
Treue & Trujillo, 1999). Our results show that this relative enhancement
is less efficient when there is neural overlap between target and distractor
processing. Whether relative enhancement is accomplished by facilitation or
by inhibition cannot be distinguished with the present paradigm.
Our current task —aimed at studying feature-based attention, naturally
also implies a motor component: participants had to associate the visual
information with either a left-hand or right-hand response. This type of
task involves learning an arbitrary rule to convert visual information into
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a motor command, as opposed to the more straightforward rules that un-
derlie visually guided motor processing. Toni and Passingham (1999) have
suggested that the former type of processing is regulated primarily by pre-
frontal cortex, whereas parietal cortex would be more involved in visually
guided motor processing (Rushworth, Nixon, & Passingham, 1997). Thus, it
may seem surprising at first that we find interference on parietal processing
at all in our task with arbitrary visuo-motor associations. However, con-
sidering the fact that we kept the response dimension constant in all our
experiments, it becomes clear that the SNARC effects must have emerged at
a stage of information processing before motor control, that is, while encod-
ing perceptual/cognitive representations. Representations of line orientation
would compete with representations of number magnitude in parietal cortex.
Consequently, the SNARC effect would already be implied in the neural code
that prefrontal cortex receives from parietal cortex to compute the appro-
priate response. This leads us to the speculative assumption that stronger
SNARC effects might be obtained if the response programming itself also
takes place in parietal cortex, in a visually guided motor task. Before future
research tests this hypothesis, however, we can already conclude from the
present data that neural overlap between target and distractor processing
in parietal cortex contaminates response times even in tasks with arbitrary
stimulus-response association rules. With “neural overlap” we imply that the
signal-to-noise ratio of the information coded by a neural unit, be it a single
neuron or a cell assembly, can be directly affected by irrelevant afferents.
For instance, the tuning curve of a neuron to a relevant feature (e.g. up-
ward orientation) may be affected —flattened or even sharpened, depending
on whether task-irrelevant input to the neuron coincides with the relevant
input. Such influences would not occur if the irrelevant information uses a
different neural pathway. This hypothesis borrows the concept of “overlap”
from the dimensional-overlap theory (Kornblum et al., 1990; Zhang et al.,
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1999), but suggests that similarity of neural circuits, rather than similarity
of stimulus and/or response, is the basis of interference. In this sense, it is
an extension of the dimensional-overlap theory: it predicts interference in
all of the cases of dimensional overlap, but also in cases where dissimilar
stimuli and/or responses are processed (at least in part) by the same neural
structures.
Obviously, the present evidence from behavioural experiments can only
indirectly support a hypothesis of neural overlap. We depend on the ex-
isting literature to identify neural circuits involved in discriminating colour,
shape or orientation, and in autonomous number processing. Event-related
functional imaging and/or single-unit study using the present or a similar
paradigm is required to provide direct evidence for our neural-overlap hy-
pothesis. Some preliminary evidence, however, does already exist with pri-
mate prefrontal neurons in visual discrimination tasks (Bichot & Schall, 1999;
Lauwereyns et al., 2001). For instance, Bichot and Schall (1999) showed that
neurons in the frontal eye field coding the saccade target based on one visual
feature (e.g. a red colour) responded more clearly if the irrelevant feature
(e.g. a square shape) indicated the previous saccade target than if it did
not. In other words, an irrelevant stimulus-response association directly af-
fects the signal-to-noise ratio of neurons whose code pertains to the same
response dimension. Analogous processes of neural overlap in parietal cortex
may account for our present data, with semantic influences from the number
on feature processing in the dorsal pathway, but not in the ventral pathway.
Our results also speak to the issue of the automaticity in number pro-
cessing. A number of studies support the claim that numerical processing
automatically progresses to a stage of semantic access, on the basis of the
robust occurrence of semantic effects under conditions that do not require
semantic access for successful task completion (e.g. Dehaene & Akhavein,
1995). The results presented here confirm that automaticity is an important
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characteristic of number processing, because we found a reliable indication of
semantic number processing in the orientation condition despite the fact that
the digits were completely irrelevant to the task. However, the observation
that automatic semantic access depends on the type of relevant feature and
neural structures involved, qualifies and modifies the concept of automaticity,
in the sense that it is subject to conditions imposed by brain organization
and function.
2.2 Part II — Ruling out alternative expla-
nations
According to Kornblum et al. (1999) dimensional overlap is achieved when
relevant and/or irrelevant stimulus sets are perceptually, conceptually, or
structurally similar to each other and/or the response set in the task. All
experiments presented in first part were designed to represent Type 3 en-
sembles with respect to the dimensional overlap taxonomy. This means that
there was always and only dimensional overlap between the irrelevant stim-
ulus dimension and the response dimension. As a result one would predict
that, normally, the irrelevant information presented in all experiments is pro-
cessed similarly irrespective of the relevant task at hand. Nevertheless, this
was not the case: the irrelevant number was processed differently depending
on the type of relevant task that had to be performed. In the previous part,
strong semantic SNARC effects were found when an orientation task was used
(Experiment 1 and 4), but this marker for the semantic processing of the ir-
relevant number was less pronounced in the colour and form experiments
(Experiments 2, 3 and 5). For Experiment 6, similar results were obtained:
responding to the orientation of coloured numbers resulted in larger SNARC
effects compared to responding to the colour of oriented numbers.
To account for these remarkable data we introduced the neural overlap
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hypothesis. This theory proposed that the differences found between orien-
tation tasks on the one side and colour or shape tasks on the other side,
originate at the level of the specific neural circuits involved in the process-
ing of relevant and irrelevant information. This means that the stronger
SNARC effects obtained in the orientation experiments are the result of the
neuro-anatomical similarity between orientation processing and number pro-
cessing, even though the relevant orientation attribute and the irrelevant
number show no dimensional overlap within the visuo-spatial domain.
It is important to see that the neural overlap effect found in the first
part of this chapter is a modulating effect and its impact on the response is
indirect. Neural overlap between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus part
does not affect the response directly, but makes that the irrelevant number
representation reaches a higher level of activation compared to when there
is no neural overlap between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus part. This
higher activation level in turn resulted in a stronger SNARC effect. In other
words, neural overlap affected the activation level of the irrelevant number
representation, which in turn had an effect on the size of the SNARC effect.
Therefore, it makes more sense to assume that neural overlap modulates the
irrelevant S-R transition. The mechanisms underlying this modulation are
straightforward. If neurally similar circuits process the relevant and irrele-
vant stimulus information, this will result in a less efficient inhibition of the
irrelevant information, making it possible for this irrelevant information to
be processed. If, however, neurologically distinct circuits process relevant
and irrelevant stimulus information, inhibition of irrelevant will ensue, and
hence the irrelevant stimulus part will not be semantically processed.
Before accepting the neural overlap theory as a valid explanation for the
results obtained, some issues need further clarification. First, it is necessary
to check if indirect associations between the relevant and irrelevant stimu-
lus attributes, or else, the relevant stimulus attribute and the response can
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alternatively explain the differences between orientation tasks and colour or
shape tasks. With indirect associations we refer to relations between, for
instance, the up-down dimension and left-right dimension. Second, it is also
important to find out if the results are not due to attentional effects. Besides
the fact that colour and orientation use different processing pathways, one
could also argue that the colour task can be easily solved by focusing on
a small portion of the stimulus, circumventing the necessity to process the
whole stimulus and thus reducing or eliminating its semantic effects.
2.2.1 Indirect associations
In all the experiments conducted in the first part of this chapter, we refrained
from investigating the possibility of indirect associations between the stim-
ulus and response set. Consider for instance Experiment 1 were we used
up or down pointing triangles superimposed on an irrelevant number. We
did not check if the up-down dimension was related to the left-right dimen-
sion associated with the number and the response. At first sight there is no
ground to believe that up and down pointing triangles (Experiment 1), ver-
tical and horizontal oriented lines (Experiment 4) or the orientation status
of a number (Experiment 6, orientation condition) dimensionally overlaps
with the irrelevant number or the response. Weeks and Proctor (1990), how-
ever, showed that dimensional overlap is not always as straightforward as is
generally believed. In this particular study Weeks and Proctor (1990) found
that in some situations stimuli presented in the vertical dimension are as-
sociated with responses in the horizontal dimension. More specifically, they
found that participants responded faster with “right” responses to stimuli
presented “above”, while stimuli presented “below” are faster responded to
with a “left” response. According to Weeks and Proctor (1990), this above-
right/below-left advantage cannot be attributed to preferential motor effects
(see Bauer & Miller, 1982), nor to hemispheric activation differences (see
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Cotton, Tzeng, & Hardyck, 1980), but originates from the cognitive coding
at the S-R translation stage. This shows that dimensional overlap is not
restricted to similarities within one dimension, but can also be the result of
orthogonal associations between the up-down and left-right dimension. It
has to be noted though that Weeks and Proctor (1990) only considered spa-
tial S-R compatibility effects between the relevant stimulus dimension and
the response (Umilta´, 1991; Weeks & Proctor, 1991). However, in a recent
study by Nishimura and Yokosawa (in press) participants responded with a
left or right key press to the colour of a stimulus that was positioned above or
below the fixation point. Even though stimulus position was irrelevant, they
observed an above-right/below-left advantage. This shows that orthogonal
S-R effects are not restricted to relevant S-R relations, but even apply to
irrelevant S-R relations and this is referred to as an orthogonal Simon effect.
To account for orthogonal SRC effects (SRC effects between the up-down
and left-right dimension), Weeks and Proctor (1990) proposed the salient
features coding account. According to this account, stimuli and responses
are coded asymmetrically onto their respective dimensions. In the vertical
dimension “above” positions tend to be more salient than “below” positions
resulting in a processing advantage for “above” positions (Chase & Clark,
1971; Seymour, 1974). In the horizontal dimension, right-handed people
code right faster than left (Olson & Laxar, 1973, 1974). Converted to a
polarity dimension, one could say that above and right are of positive polarity
compared to down and left which are of negative polarity. In turn, this
structural polarity assignment applies for both stimuli and responses, which
eventually results in dimensional overlap effects of polarity. This means that
“above” corresponds to “right” because both are positive, while “below”
corresponds to “left” because they are negative.
With regard to our experiments, we want to assure that the stronger
SNARC effect found in the orientation experiments was not the result of an
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obfuscated orthogonal dimensional overlap effect between the relevant orien-
tation attribute at one side and the irrelevant number or the response on the
other side. The problem is that an above-right/left-down relation was only
present in the orientation experiments and not in the control experiments
which used colour or shape instead of orientation. This means that for the
orientation conditions congruency could emerge at two levels. First, between
the irrelevant number and the response (SNARC-congruency) and second,
between the orientation of stimulus and the response (above-right/down-left
advantage). For the colour experiments on the other hand, there was only
one possible level of congruency, namely between the irrelevant number and
the response (SNARC). This difference between both types of conditions
may have enhanced the SNARC effect in the orientation conditions, instead
of neural overlap like we assumed. To rule out this possibility, we conducted
some additional analyses. All effects were analysed at the .05 significance
level.
For Experiment 1 (triangles pointing up or down) we first checked if
there was a preferential mapping between the orientation of the triangle (up
or down) and the location of the response (left or right). Because each par-
ticipant was instructed to use either an up-left/down-right mapping or alter-
natively an up-right/down-left mapping, we simply compared both groups.
Statistically there was no difference between the groups (481 vs 473 ms, re-
spectively and t(22) = .39, p = .70), which means that there is no preferred
mapping of up or down pointing triangles to right or left responses. Besides
this analysis of the irrelevant S-R relation, we also checked for an interaction
at the stimulus level between the orientation of the triangle (up-down) and
the spatial feature connoted with numbers (left-right2), but this was not the
case. Mean RTs for up-right (473 ms), down-left (480 ms), up-left (478 ms)
2numbers smaller than 5 were coded as “left” and numbers larger than 4 were coded
as “right”.
44 Chapter 2
and down-right (479 ms) trials were not different from each other (F < 1).
Subsequently, we looked for similar effects in Experiment 4 (horizontal
or vertical lines). Statistically, there was no difference in average reaction
time between participants of both S-R mapping groups (vertical press right,
horizontal press left, or vice versa). This suggests that there is no pre-
ferred association between the vertical-horizontal stimulus attributes and
the left-right responses (the mean RT for the horizontal-right/vertical-left
group was 477 ms versus 493 ms for the horizontal-left/vertical-right group,
t(18) = 1.36, p = .19). Furthermore, there was no interaction between the rel-
evant stimulus attribute (vertical-horizontal) and the irrelevant spatial num-
ber attribute. The average RTs for horizontal-left (484 ms), horizontal-right
(485 ms), vertical-left (492 ms) and vertical-right (482 ms) did not differ from
each other (F < 1).
Finally, the same set of analyses was conducted for Experiment 6. In this
experiment, all participants performed both S-R mappings, and therefore an
interaction between the orientation status of the number and the response-
side would indicate the existence of an indirect association between both.
However, this was not the case (F (1, 21) = 2.82, p > .05). Similarly, we
looked for an interaction between the orientation of the number and its left
or right connotation, but again, this interaction was not significant (F < 1).
The average RTs were 519 ms for rotated small numbers, 531 ms for rotated
larger number, 539 ms for upright presented small numbers and 545 ms for
upright large numbers.
To summarize, the neural overlap hypothesis still holds. Our scrutiny did
not reveal indirect association effects comparable to the up-left/right-down
advantage found by for instance Weeks and Proctor (1990) or Nishimura and
Yokosawa (in press).
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2.2.2 Different pathways or global dominance?
A second point needing further clarification is whether our results can solely
be explained in terms of different processing pathways, or if they can alter-
natively be explained by the use of global versus local attention strategies.
This question is important because the majority of our experiments that fail
to reveal a SNARC effect were based on a colour-discrimination task (ex-
cept for one shape experiment), which in principle does not requires global
processing of the stimulus.
This topic is closely related to an issue investigated in a series of studies by
Boucart and Humphreys (1992, 1994), Boucart, Humphreys, and Lorenceau
(1995) and Humphreys and Boucart (1997). In these studies, participants
first saw a reference picture that was quickly followed by a display containing
two laterally presented pictures (the target and the distractor). The task of
the participants was to select the side of the picture matching the reference.
This involved the selection of a global (Boucart & Humphreys, 1992, 1994;
Boucart et al., 1995) or a local (Humphreys & Boucart, 1997) part of the
stimulus, and the matching task could be done on the basis of form-features
(orientation, size, shape) or colour. The results of these studies revealed two
main mechanisms, namely (a) global dominance and, (b) cross-dimensional
inhibition. Global dominance refers to the fact that when participants at-
tend global properties of objects (their overall size, orientation or shape) the
semantic representations of these objects are automatically accessed. As a
consequence, this results in semantic interference effects even when doing a-
semantic tasks like physical matching (Boucart & Humphreys, 1992, 1994).
Global dominance is not restricted to tasks requiring to attend global prop-
erties though. In Humphreys and Boucart (1997, Experiment 1A and 1B),
participants had to respond to the orientation of a line segment presented
within the reference target and distractor pictures, making global processing
unnecessary to solve the task. Nevertheless, effects of the semantic relations
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between the stimuli appeared suggesting global processing.
Global dominance is not ubiquitous though. When Boucart and Hum-
phreys (1994) used global colour instead of orientation as the to be attended
feature, all semantic effects were eliminated. This finding was replicated by
Humphreys and Boucart (1997) who used local colour instead. To explain
these results, Humphreys and Boucart (1997) suggested that when it is pos-
sible to use colour information for responding, the form-processing pathway
is inhibited, preventing the objects themselves to be processed semantically.
At first sight, the framework proposed by Humphreys and Boucart (1997)
does not conflict with the neural overlap hypothesis. When the relevant line
segments and the irrelevant pictures surrounding and accompanying these
line segments both appeal to the form-pathway (e.g. Humphreys & Boucart,
1997, Experiment 1A), this is just the same as asserting that both relevant
and irrelevant information show neural overlap. The result of this is that
irrelevant information inhibition is difficult and therefore irrelevant informa-
tion is processed.
The comparison with the neural overlap hypothesis also holds for the
colour experiments presented in Boucart and Humphreys (1994) and Hum-
phreys and Boucart (1997). For these experiments, there is probably less
neural overlap between the relevant feature and the irrelevant information.
The consequence of this is that the irrelevant form-pathway is inhibited effi-
ciently, preventing the activation of their semantic representations.
However, there are some exceptions to the two main principles presented
above. Boucart et al. (1995, Experiment 3) showed that when colour in-
formation is inextricably bound up with the global form of the irrelevant
picture, semantic processing does take place. In this specific experiment, red
and green coloured pixels were randomly distributed along the contours of
the pictures with one of the colours being overrepresented, and participants
had to match the dominant colour to the reference. The fact that in this
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case form was processed was explained by suggesting that when colour is
inherently coupled with form, activation of the form pathway is necessary to
select the spatial area over which colour information is integrated, and hence
the irrelevant objects are processed semantically.
Even though Boucart et al. (1995) showed that performing a colour task
under some conditions will result in (irrelevant) form processing, the ques-
tion remains if this would also apply for the stimuli used in the experiments
presented earlier. Not in the least because there are some important differ-
ences between the procedure used in Boucart et al. (1995) and ours. For
instance, the use of a display containing two pictures combined with the fact
that the position of the target is (evidently) uncertain, promotes attention to
be broad initially. As Navon (1977) pointed out, the attention window only
focuses from global to local information over time, but nevertheless, there is
a chance that global form is processed at the beginning of this operation. In
our studies, both the relevant and irrelevant information were consequently
presented in the centre of the screen, reducing the need for distributed at-
tention. Of course, this does not exclude a broad attentional starting point,
but at least the need to apply this mechanism is not promoted.
Another possible problem with the stimuli used in Boucart et al. (1995) is
that semantic and physical similarity can be confounded (i.e. a dog and a cat
look more alike than for instance a dog and a guitar), at least with some of the
stimuli . In Humphreys and Boucart (1997) this problem was investigated,
and even though extra analyses suggest that this cannot completely explain
the semantic effects found in their matching task, the authors admitted that
this might nevertheless have played some role. The fact that we did not use
a matching task of course excluded this problem for our studies.
To rule out the possibility that the different processing of irrelevant num-
bers as we found earlier with orientation and colour tasks is due to distributed
attention differences we did an additional experiment similar to the one em-
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ployed in Boucart et al. (1995). More specifically we wanted to check if
using a distributed colour task with irrelevant numbers also results in global
form processing and hence semantic effects. According to the framework of
Humphreys and Boucart (1997) the extended integration of colour with form
will result in semantic effects from the irrelevant number. The neural over-
lap hypothesis on the other hand expects no semantic effects for the colour
condition.
2.2.3 Experiment 7: distributed colour
The stimuli, method and procedure employed in this experiment are for the
most part identical to the one used in Experiment 6. The only difference
concerned the way in which colour was represented in the stimuli. For the
present experiment, we used coherence stimuli. Only fifty percent of the
number plane was filled with red and green coloured dots and the distribution
of the different colours over this plane was chosen randomly and individually
for each trial. Using this approach, people had to process the whole number,
which guarantees that the absence of any effects cannot be attributed to a
narrowed focus of attention.
Method
Participants Twenty-four English-speaking persons participated in this
experiment (17 female; 21 right-handed). All participants were students
at the Victoria University of Wellington and their mean age was 21.3 (the
youngest participant was 18 and the oldest 46, SD = 6.37). They all had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported to be neuropsychologically
healthy.
Stimuli All participants had to run through a sequence of two conditions:
a colour condition and an orientation condition. In both conditions, the par-
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ticipants saw Arabic digits ranging from 1 to 9 as stimuli, and these appeared
in one of four possible orientation and colour configurations. Combined, this
led to a total of 36 possible types of stimuli.
All Arabic numbers were presented upright or rotated ten degrees to
the right. Furthermore, the numbers were presented in one of two possible
colour profiles. The colour profiles were made like this: only fifty percent
of the pixels forming the number were randomly filled with red or green
coloured dots. The remaining fifty percent remained black, the colour of the
background. From the coloured pixels, 60% was coloured in one colour and
40% in the other colour. All coloured pixels were randomly distributed over
the plane constituting the number. It was the participant’s task to respond
to the dominant colour.
Procedure The procedure was identical to the Experiment 6, only the
colour task differed slightly. Instead of responding to the colour of the stimuli,
participants now had to respond to the dominant colour.
Results
Technical failure caused the loss of one participant’s data. All trials wrongly
responded to were removed from the analysis. On average participants made
5.6% errors (SD = 3.4). Furthermore, we applied a cut-off value based on
the personal mean plus or minus 3 standard deviations which resulted in the
removal of 7.9% of the remaining data. The average response speed for both
conditions did not differ significantly (F < 1) with the mean reaction time for
the colour condition being 552 ms (SD = 19,88) and 535 ms (SD = 14,74)
for the orientation condition. Mean reaction times for the digits going from
1 to 9 were 552, 554, 550, 553, 552, 552, 562, 547 and 546 ms for the colour
condition, and 534, 524, 546, 528, 529, 541, 531, 536 and 534 ms for the ori-
entation condition. There was no speed-accuracy trade-off as both conditions
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Figure 2.8: Experiment 7, differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand
responses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit for (a) the colour
condition and (b) the oriention condition respectively. Circles indicate the observed
dRTs. The continuous line depicts the predicted dRTs based on the regression
analysis.
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lacked a significant negative correlation between reaction time and percent-
age of errors (computed over 18 data couples, 9 numbers separated for left
and right-hand responses), with r(16) = -0.28, p < 0.27 and r(16) = 0.18,
p < 0.47 for the colour and orientation condition respectively. In the colour
condition, the regression analysis of repeated measures revealed the following
equation (See Figure 2.8):
dRT = −13.87− 0.11×magnitude
The magnitude of the individual slopes did not differ significantly from
zero (t(22) = -0.8, p = 0.94, 12 participants had a negative slope), which
means that magnitude did not contribute to the difference between left and
right responses, and hence no SNARC-effect was obtained. The situation
was different for the orientation condition, where the following equation was
obtained (See Figure 2.8):
dRT = 6.46− 3.12×magnitude
In contrast to the colour condition, the slope was significantly different
from zero (t(22) = -2.26, p < .05, with 14 participants showing a negative
slope). This means that in the orientation condition a SNARC effect was
present.
Importantly, the slopes obtained in the colour and orientation condition
were significantly different from each other (t(22) = 2.03, p < 0.05, one-tailed).
2.2.4 Discussion
Even though colour was inherently coupled with the shape of the irrelevant
number and required global processing of the stimulus (as was the case in
Boucart et al., 1995), no semantic effects were obtained. Performing an orien-
tation task on the same stimuli on the other hand, did result in the semantic
processing of the irrelevant digits. The reason why our colour condition did
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not reveal any signs of semantic activation of the irrelevant information (as
opposed to Boucart et al., 1995) are not clear. Maybe it could have been
the case that the specific stimuli used (vehicles and animals in Boucart et
al., 1995 versus numbers in our experiment) require different amounts of ac-
tivation before they are semantically processed. Whatever the reason is for
this difference, the results of the present study are in line with the neural
overlap hypothesis. Because orientation processing and number processing
rely on similar neural processing regions, inhibiting number processing is
less efficient, and hence a SNARC effect is obtained. Colour processing on
the other hand employs different processing regions compared to orientation
and hence form processing is easily inhibited, resulting in the absence of a
semantic SNARC effect.
Chapter 3
The Simon effect is larger with
spatial relevant information:
a yet unidentified form of
dimensional overlap1
1This manuscript is submitted for publication. Co-authors are Wim Notebaert, Wim
Gevers and Wim Fias
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Abstract
Four experiments were conducted to investigate contextual modulations of
the Simon effect. The results showed that the Simon effect was quantita-
tively different depending on which kind of task needed to be performed.
Importantly, this effect did not depend on the relative processing time of the
relevant dimension, nor on a direct or indirect overlap between the relevant
and irrelevant stimulus part. To account for the data, we suggest that di-
mensional overlap as defined by Kornblum et al. (1990) should be extended
by adding similarity of processing domains as a case of dimensional overlap
3.1 Introduction
When we are trying to act upon the information reaching our retina, this
mostly follows a specific chain of processes. We take up a lot of information,
separate the relevant from the irrelevant information, and subsequently se-
lect the appropriate action. The principles upon which these selection and
translation processes rely are not always as complex as one would expect.
An example of such a basic principle is the similarity of attributes. When
stimuli and responses are in some way compatible, this usually results in
faster responding compared to incompatible stimulus-response (S-R) sets.
Apparently strong S-R compatibility (SRC) effects are obtained when
the spatial dimension is involved (Fitts & Seeger, 1953). In a typical Simon
task for example, people have to respond to a non-spatial attribute (let’s say
colour) of a peripheral stimulus by making a lateralised response. This means
that (for this example at least) subjects have to make a left or right response
to the colour of a stimulus that appears on the left or the right side of the
screen. If the task-irrelevant stimulus location and the lateralised response
correspond, this induces a congruency effect, referred to as the Simon effect
(for a review see Simon, 1990).
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3.2 Stimulus-response compatibility and the
Simon effect
An important model describing stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) ef-
fects like the Simon effect is the dimensional overlap model proposed by
Kornblum et al. (1990). According to this model compatibility effects arise
because of overlap between relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions or
between stimulus dimensions and response dimensions. Dimensional over-
lap was defined by Kornblum and his colleagues as the degree to which sets
of items are perceptually, structurally, or conceptually similar. This means
that dimensional overlap is not restricted to purely perceptual similarities,
but also applies to the internal mental representations of the stimulus and
response sets involved (Kornblum, 1994).
Procedural accounts describing congruency effects between relevant and
irrelevant information start from the assumption that there are two routes
involved in the course from stimulus to response (see De Jong et al., 1994;
Kornblum et al., 1990). On the one hand there is the task-relevant pathway
(also called the conditional route) responsible for the controlled processing
of relevant information. This processing route is subject to the intentions of
the human operator. On the other hand there is the task-irrelevant pathway
(also referred to as the unconditional route) through which the irrelevant in-
formation is processed in an automatic fashion. In terms of cognitive control,
dual-route models assume that relevant stimulus-attributes are processed un-
der conscious control while attributes irrelevant for the task are processed
effortlessly and without conscious control.
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3.3 The orthogonal SRC effect
SRC effects like the Simon effect are not restricted to spatially parallel S-R
correspondences but appear with many S-R correspondences. So, for in-
stance, has it been demonstrated that spatial SRC effects emerge when stim-
ulus and response attributes belong to orthogonal dimensions and as a con-
sequence bear no direct spatial resemblance. Weeks and Proctor (1990) for
example used vertical stimulus and horizontal response sets. In other words,
participants observed stimuli appearing above or below a fixation point and
they had to respond to this location with a left or right key press. They
found that participants responded faster with right responses to stimuli pre-
sented above the fixation point, while stimuli presented below the fixation
point were responded to faster with left responses. According to Weeks and
Proctor (1990), this above-right/below-left advantage cannot be attributed
to preferential motor effects, but originates from the cognitive coding at the
S-R translation stage. A general theory explaining orthogonal SRC effects is
the asymmetric coding account (see for instance Cho & Proctor, 2004, 2005;
Proctor & Cho, 2003) which assumes that dimensional reference frames are
ordered in terms of polarity (i.e. positive and negative). Specifically, this
means that in the vertical dimension “above” is coded as positive and “be-
low” is coded as negative, while in the horizontal dimension, “right” is coded
as positive and “left” as negative. As a consequence, mapping up with right
and down with left results in a structural correspondence of polarities be-
tween the stimulus and response codes and hence an SRC-effect is obtained.
Nishimura and Yokosawa (in press) were the first to systematically in-
vestigate orthogonal SRC in the context of the Simon effect. Contrary to
Weeks and Proctor (1990), they made stimulus position irrelevant by letting
participants respond with a right or left key press to the colour of a stimulus
presented above or below the fixation point. They observed an orthogonal
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Simon effect as indicated by an advantage for above-right/below-left combi-
nations of the irrelevant stimulus position and the response.
3.4 A special case of SRC
Besides indirect correspondences like the orthogonal SRC and orthogonal Si-
mon effects, evidence has been found that other types of correspondence also
can influence the transition from stimulus to response. Fias, Lauwereyns,
and Lammertyn (2001) and Lammertyn et al. (2002) demonstrated that ir-
relevant S-R translations can be modulated by the type of relevant stimulus
attribute, even without a direct or indirect dimensional overlap. In these
studies Fias et al. (2001) and Lammertyn et al. (2002) used the SNARC
effect as a marker for irrelevant information processing. The SNARC effect
is an effect closely related to the Simon effect. Its abbreviation stands for
spatial numerical association of response codes and refers to the apparent
spatial connotation attached to numbers. This effect was first reported by
Dehaene et al. (1993) who subsequently suggested the idea that small num-
bers are associated with left, while large numbers are associated with right.
This implicit association results in relatively fast left hand and slow right
hand responses towards small numbers and vice versa for large numbers.
In the study by Lammertyn et al. (2002) participants had to respond to
either the colour or the orientation of a centrally presented number. Ac-
cording to dual-route accounts, the task-irrelevant number and its associ-
ated spatial information should be processed equally fast and automatic in
the colour and orientation condition. Furthermore, there was no dimensional
overlap for both the orientation and the colour condition between the relevant
and irrelevant stimulus attributes and hence, the size of the SNARC effect
should be similar for both conditions. The evidence is otherwise however:
the SNARC effect in the colour condition was significantly smaller compared
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to the SNARC effect in the orientation condition and this difference did not
depend on temporal processing differences between both conditions. This
assumes that the irrelevant numbers were processed qualitatively different
for both conditions. The challenge is now to fit these results within a di-
mensional overlap framework. The fact that modulatory effects were found
in the absence of a dimensional S-S overlap urges for a broader definition
of dimensional overlap. For instance, it could be the case that dimensional
overlap does not only result from direct associations within a dimension (i.e.
SRC) or indirect associations from different dimensions converging onto a
third dimension (i.e. orthogonal SRC), but also from associations between
the processing domains that are involved (the “neural overlap hypothesis”,
see Fias et al., 2001 and Lammertyn et al., 2002). This means that if two
dimensions belong to the same processing domain (e.g. they are both spa-
tial), this should also be considered to be a kind of dimensional overlap, as
opposed to when there is no such “domanial overlap” (e.g. spatial versus
colour).
3.5 The present study
One of the reasons we wanted to conduct this study is to find out if the
differential processing of irrelevant information (as in Fias et al., 2001 and
Lammertyn et al., 2002) is specific for implicit spatial information or not.
Spatial information associated with irrelevant numbers is implicit and al-
though it is generally believed that numerical information is automatically
processed upon the mere exposure to numbers (Dehaene & Akhavein, 1995;
Fias, Reynvoet, & Brysbaert, 2001; Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene,
1999; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Cohen Kadosh & Henik, in press; Van Op-
stal, Moors, Verguts, & Fias, manuscript submitted for publication) it is not
unthinkable that this kind of “inferred” information is more susceptible to
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contextual modulation than would be the case with explicit spatial infor-
mation. Salient spatial features like location have a strong association with
their corresponding response. It is reasonable to assume that this strong as-
sociation is less prone to modulation compared to when a less salient spatial
feature, like the one associated with numbers, is used. Therefore we will
now investigate dimensional overlap between processing domains within the
Simon paradigm.
In addition, the choice of using the Simon paradigm is supported by the
fact that Simon stimuli are generally believed to be processed within a dual-
route architecture (Kornblum et al., 1990; De Jong et al., 1994). On top of
that, Gevers, Caessens, and Fias (2005) and Gevers, Ratinckx, De Baene, and
Fias (in press) showed that both the Simon effect and the SNARC effect are
products of a similar dual-route processing architecture. The consequence of
this is that possible differences between the Fias et al. (2001), Lammertyn
et al. (2002) and the present study cannot be the result of basic processing
differences.
The evident question is whether the Simon effect will also be modulated
by the relevant task information. Our prediction is that the Simon effect
will be different when the relevant and the irrelevant stimulus information
belong to the same processing domain as opposed to when there is no such
kind of S-S consistency. If this is indeed the case, this would imply that
the definition of dimension overlap should be extended with similarity at the
level of the processing domains involved.
3.6 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, just as in the Fias et al. (2001) and Lammertyn et al. (2002)
studies, two conditions are employed: a colour condition and an orientation
condition. The prediction is that the size of the Simon-effect will depend
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on the similarity of processing domains between the task being performed
attentively and spatial character of the irrelevant stimulus position. This
should result in a larger Simon effect for the orientation condition compared
to the colour condition, because both orientation and stimulus position are
spatial while no such overlap exists for the colour condition.
In 1993, Hommel demonstrated that irrelevant activation decays over
time, resulting in larger Simon effects for fast responses in comparison to slow
responses (see also Burle, Possamai, Vidal, Bonnet, & Hasbroucq, 2002 and
Ridderinkhof, 2002). Based on this observation, another prediction would be
that the decaying process demonstrated by Hommel (1993) will commence
later or will be slower for the orientation condition than for the colour con-




Twenty Ghent University students enrolled for this experiment. Their mean
age was 21.5 years (SD = 5.7), 13 of them were female and 15 of them were
right-handed. All the participants gave informed consent and after they
had finished the experiment they were paid e 7.5. All the participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and they were na¨ıve with respect to
the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus & stimuli
A Pentium PC with a colour VGA display (resolution of 800×600 pixels and
a vertical refresh rate of 70 Hertz) was used for controlling the experiment,
showing the stimuli and timing the responses. Responses were registered
with millisecond (ms) precision using response devices made by the faculty
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technical staff. The experiment was programmed in C using the Tscope li-
brary (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, in press). For
the orientation condition we used white filled equilateral triangles (RGB-
value [230;230;230]). The triangle could be oriented upwards or downwards.
For the colour condition we used red and green filled circles (RGB-values
[230;0;0] and [0;230;0] respectively). All stimuli measured 1.2 visual degrees
both horizontally and vertically. The vertically centred stimuli always ap-
peared 2.9 visual degrees to the left or to the right from the midpoint of the
screen.
For both the colour and orientation condition we used a 2 (feature sta-
tus) × 2 (stimulus position) design and for each cell 50 observations were
administered. Eventually, this resulted in a total of 200 trials per condition.
Procedure
Each trial started with a white fixation point (a filled circle with a 3 pixel
radius). After 1500 ms the fixation point was replaced by a blank screen.
Another 350 ms later the stimulus appeared on the screen, either to the left
or to the right of the midpoint of the screen. The response deadline was set
to 1000 ms. After the participants responded to the orientation or to the
colour of the stimulus the screen went blank and after an inter trial-interval
of 1000 ms the next trial was initiated. Responses were made by using the
index fingers of both hands on two vertically aligned buttons which were
horizontally separated by approximately 13 cm.
Every 50 trials a break was inserted and the participants ran through the
blocks at their own pace. On average a session lasted 35 minutes, breaks in-
cluded. At the beginning of each condition the participants received a short
description of the task they had to do and before the participants began with
the experimental session they did a practice session of 20 trials. During the
practice session, participants received immediate feedback about the accu-
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racy of their response. The order of conditions (first colour, then orientation
or vice versa) as well as the stimulus response-mapping was counterbalanced
over participants.
3.6.2 Results
First, we checked if the participants responded differently depending on the
specific stimulus-response mapping they had to use for the relevant task.
This was not the case (F < 1, for both the orientation and colour condition
separately). Furthermore, the orientation data were also checked for an or-
thogonal SRC effect between relevant and irrelevant stimulus information.
Without result however: response times for congruent trials (triangles point-
ing up presented right or triangles pointing down presented left) were not
responded to faster than incongruent trials (triangles pointing up presented
left or triangles pointing down presented right), t(19) = .07 and p = .94.
Before running a 2 (Task) × 2 (Congruency) × 5 (Bin) within factors
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on our data, we removed trials on which the
reaction time was faster than 200 ms or slower than 1000 ms. This resulted
in the removal of 1.3% of the data. After this we also removed those trials
to which the participants had made the wrong response. This resulted in the
removal of another 3% of the data. Mean RTs and error rates are presented
in Table 3.1.
The reaction time data revealed the following results. There was a main
effect of task (F (1, 19) = 41.5, MSe = 440 and p < .001) as well as a
main effect of congruency (F (1, 19) = 65.7, MSe = 427 and p < .001).
There was an interaction between task and congruency (F (1, 19) = 6.9,
MSe = 107, p < .05) and planned comparisons showed that the Simon effect
(congruent versus incongruent trials) was significant for both the colour and
the orientation condition separately (F (1, 19) = 28.8, MSe = 342, p < .001
and F (1, 19) = 98.4, MSe = 192, p < .001 respectively). Importantly, this
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Table 3.1: Mean reaction times (in ms) for Experiment 1 and 2. The percentage
of errors is presented between parentheses.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Orientation Colour Orientation Colour
Congruent 397 (.02) 373 (.01) 413 (.022) 450 (.025)
Incongruent 440 (.05) 404 (.03) 455 (.048) 462 (.029)
Simon effect 43* (.03*) 31* (.02*) 42* (.024**) 12*** (.004)
*p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .05)
Simon effect was larger for the orientation condition than for the colour
condition (t(19) = -2.6, p = .01). For the error data the results followed a
similar pattern except for the fact that the task by congruency interaction
failed to reach significance (F (1, 19) = 3, MSe = .000381, p ≈ .098).
Next, a distribution analysis was done (see Figure 3.1) using vincentized
averaging for each bin (for more details see Ratcliff, 1979). This analysis
resulted in a marginally significant three-way interaction between task, con-
gruency and bin (F (4,76) = 2.4, MSe = 132, p ≈ .06). When looking at each
bin separately, the congruency effect was not statistically significant for bin 5
of the colour condition (although it was marginally so with F (1, 19) = 3.71,
MSe = 1264, p ≈ .07). For all the other bins of both conditions, the Simon
effect was highly significant (all p < .01).
3.6.3 Discussion
Two important findings suggest that the automatic processing of the task-
irrelevant information was modulated by the type of task being performed
attentively. First, there was the observation that the Simon effect was statis-
tically larger in the orientation condition compared to the colour condition.
Furthermore, the bin-analysis confirmed that this difference has no temporal
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Figure 3.1: Bin-analysis for the colour condition (left) and the orientation con-
dition (right) of Experiment 1. Each point represents the average reaction time of
the corresponding quintile. Solid lines are used for the congruent condition and
dotted lines for the incongruent condition.
restrictions: the Simon effect stays larger for the orientation compared to
the colour condition both for fast, medium and slow RTs. Second, Hommel
(1993) demonstrated that irrelevant activation decays over time, resulting in
larger Simon effects for fast responses in comparison to slow responses (see
also Burle et al., 2002 and Ridderinkhof, 2002). Overall, our data show that
the RTs for the colour condition are faster than for the orientation condi-
tion. Based on the temporal characteristics of the Simon effect, normally
one would expect a larger Simon effect in the colour condition. However, the
reverse was true.
Together, these results point to a modulation of the Simon effect based
on the dimensional overlap between the processing domains involved. How-
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ever, before elaborating further upon possible mechanisms underlying this
effect, we want to be sure that the interaction is not simply induced by the
significant slower response times for the orientation condition. Therefore the
current experiment was replicated making the colour condition more difficult
in order to obtain better comparable RTs.
3.7 Experiment 2
In an attempt to increase the RTs for the colour condition we repeated Ex-
periment 1 using colours that are more difficult to distinguish in the colour
condition. The predictions remain identical as for Experiment 1: we expect a
larger Simon effect for the orientation condition than for the colour condition.
3.7.1 Method
Subjects
For this experiment 16 students of the Ghent University enrolled (mean age
was 21.4 years, SD = 1.9). Twelve of them were female and fifteen were
right-handed. All the participants gave informed consent and after they
had finished the experiment they were paid e 7.5. All the participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and they were na¨ıve with respect to
the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus, Stimuli & Procedure
The same equipment and procedure were used as in Experiment 1. However,
to make the colour condition more difficult the distinction between the two
colours was now less salient compared to Experiment 1. This was done by
setting the RGB values for the first colour to [188;133;43] and for the second
colour to [124;155;44]. The luminance of both colours was 34 cd/m2. The
66 Chapter 3
Figure 3.2: Bin-analysis for the colour condition (left) and the orientation con-
dition (right) of Experiment 2. Each point represents the average reaction time of
the corresponding quintile. Solid lines are used for the congruent condition and
dotted lines for the incongruent condition.
RGB-values of the orientation condition stimuli were set to [145;145;145].
3.7.2 Results
Again we began by removing the outliers (0.8%) and the wrong trials (3.1%
of the remaining data). Average response times and error rates can be
found in Table 3.1. As was the case in Experiment 1, no effect of stimulus
response-mapping could be revealed in the orientation and colour condition
(both F < 1). Also, no up-right/down-left advantage between the orientation
of the triangles and their position was present in the orientation condition
(t(15) = -0.47, p = .65).
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Responses for the colour task were significantly slower than for the ori-
entation task with F (1, 15) = 6.95, MSe = 1129 and p < .05. Over-
all there was a significant Simon effect (F (1, 15) = 42.17, MSe = 273
and p < .001). Planned comparisons revealed that this congruency effect
was significant for both the colour and the orientation condition separately
with F (1, 15) = 8.26, MSe = 141, p < .05 for the colour condition and
F (1, 15) = 62.44, MSe = 221, p < .001 for the orientation condition. Looked
at in more detail, the Simon effect proved to be larger for the orientation
condition than for the colour condition (t(15) = 6.23, p < .001). Also im-
portant, the interaction between the task and congruency also proved to be
significant (F (1, 15) = 38.86, MSe = 89, p < .001).
The pattern of results for the error data was slightly different with
only a marginal effect of task, but a significant main effect of congru-
ency (F (1, 15) = 4.43, MSe = .000264, p ≈ .05 and F (1, 15) = 9.73,
MSe = .000388, p < .01, respectively). Planned comparisons showed that
the congruency effect was only significant for the orientation condition
(F (1, 15) = 9.38, MSe = .006, p < .01).
Just like in Experiment 1 we also performed a bin-analysis (see Fig-
ure 3.2). This analysis showed that with increasing RTs the Simon effect
decreased in strength for the colour condition to completely decease in the
fourth bin, while for the orientation condition the Simon effect remained
present until the last bin. This pattern was supported by a significant bin by
congruency interaction for the colour condition (F (4, 60) = 14.41, MSe = 89,
p < .001), and the absence of this interaction for the orientation condition
(F < 1).
3.7.3 Discussion
Our manipulation resulted in overall slower RTs for the colour condition in
comparison with the orientation condition (456 and 434 ms respectively).
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Based on this information it is not surprising that the Simon effect was
smaller for the colour condition than for the orientation condition. However,
the bin-analysis provides us with reasons to believe that the smaller Simon
effect in the colour condition is not solely attributable to relative slower re-
sponse times because the effect is also smaller with relative fast response
times and at comparable RT levels as in the orientation condition (see Fig-
ure 3.2).
The results of this experiment, combined with the results of Experiment 1
point to an effect of dimensional overlap which is based on similarity of the
processing domains involved. However, it is still possible that the pattern
of effects found in Experiment 1 and 2 is specific for attributes used. To
exclude this possibility it is important to show that the effects found are not
restricted to colour only, but can be extended to alternative ones such as
shape.
3.8 Experiment 3
In this experiment we wanted to extend the findings of Experiment 1 and 2
to other features. More specifically we wanted to use another task-relevant
feature because in the previous experiments this proved to be crucial for the
effect to occur. Therefore shape now replaced colour as relevant attribute.
The reasoning behind this choice is simple: just as colour, shape bears no
processing resemblance with orientation. This means that the same dimen-
sional and neural overlap effects are expected like in Experiment 1 and 2,





Twenty Ghent University students participated in this experiment. Their
mean age was 21 years (SD = 1.8). There were twelve females and 18 were
right-handed. All the participants gave informed consent and after they
had finished the experiment they received e 7.5. All the participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and they were na¨ıve with respect to
the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus, stimuli & Procedure
Again we used the same equipment to control the experiment. The procedure
was also identical to the previous experiments. Only the stimuli were different
in a sense that the colour condition was replaced by a shape condition. The
stimuli in the shape condition could be either a filled square or circle with
identical dimensions as the orientation stimuli. Both the stimuli from the
orientation condition and the shape condition were presented in the same
colour (RGB-values [145;145;145]).
3.8.2 Results
Before analysing the data we removed trials with reaction times below 200 ms
or above 1000 ms (2%). We only considered correctly answered trials and
therefore we had to remove another 2.6% wrong trials (means and error
rates can be found in Table 3.2). No effects were found of stimulus-response
mapping (F < 1, for both the shape and orientation task) and in the ori-
entation condition there was no up/right-down/left advantage between the
vertical orientation of the triangles and their horizontal position (t(19) = .44,
p = .67).
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The reaction time data revealed that responses in the shape condition
were faster than in the orientation condition (F (1, 19) = 8.44, MSe = 2819,
p < .01). Also, congruent trials were faster compared to incongruent trials
(F (1, 19) = 35.69, MSe = 460, p < .001). Unexpectedly, the interaction
between these two factors (task and congruency) was not significant (F < 1).
Planned comparisons showed that there was a Simon effect for both the
orientation condition and the shape condition (F (1, 19) = 26.9, MSe = 337,
p < .001 and F (1, 19) = 33.3, MSe = 221.6, p < .001, respectively). However,
the size of the Simon effect was statistically not different for the shape and
orientation condition (t(19) = .67, p = .51).
However, the picture was different for the error-data. Besides a significant
main effect of both task and congruity (F (1, 19) = 12, MSe = .00028, p < .01
and F (1, 19) = 15.76, MSe = .00097, p < .001 respectively), the interaction
between task and congruity was also statistically significant (F (1, 19) = 4.85,
MSe = .00037, p < .05). There was a Simon effect for each condition
separately (F (1, 19) = 22, MSe = .000625, p < .001 and F (1, 19) = 4.6,
MSe = .0007, p < .05, for the orientation and shape condition respectively)
and importantly, this Simon effect was larger in the orientation condition
than in the shape condition (t(19) = 2.20, p = .04).
The RT bin-analysis showed similar effects for both tasks (see Figure 3.3).
The Simon effect only seemed to last longer in time for the orientation condi-
tion than for the shape condition as shown by the presence of a (marginal) Si-
mon effect for bin 5 in the orientation condition (F (1, 19) = 4.22, MSe = 805,
p ≈ .05) but not so in the shape condition (F < 1).
3.8.3 Discussion
Experiment 3 resulted in two important observations. First, by means of
errors the Simon effect was larger for the orientation condition than for the
shape condition. Second, for the reaction time data there was no difference
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Figure 3.3: Bin-analysis for the shape condition (left) and the orientation con-
dition (right) of Experiment 3. Each point represents the average reaction time of
the corresponding quintile. Solid lines are used for the congruent condition and
dotted lines for the incongruent condition.
between both conditions concerning the Simon effect. This is somewhat odd
because based on the relative faster responses in the shape condition one
would predict a larger Simon effect for the shape condition. The fact that
this expected difference is cancelled out may possibly be the result of an
enhanced Simon effect in the orientation condition which is caused by the
overlap of processing domains between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus
attributes.
Other evidence pointing towards dimensional modulation in the orienta-
tion condition can be found in the bin-analysis. There it is shown that the
Simon effect is longer active for the orientation condition as demonstrated
by the absence of an effect in bin 5 for the shape condition and a marginal
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Table 3.2: Mean reaction times (in ms) for Experiment 3 and 4. The percentage
of errors is presented between parentheses.
Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Orientation Shape Orientation Shape
Congruent 423 (.014) 390 (.01) 409 (.015) 468 (.023)
Incongruent 453 (.051) 417 (.028) 433 (.039) 482 (.017)
Simon effect 30* (.037*) 27* (.018***) 22* (.024**) 14** (-.006)
*p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .05
effect in the orientation condition in bin 5.
Together these results motivated us to further investigate the interaction
of the Simon effect with the type of task-relevant stimulus attribute. To rule
out the temporal dynamics of the Simon effect, Experiment 3 was replicated
using a harder shape condition.
3.9 Experiment 4
In the previous experiment we used squares and circles as shape stimuli.
This resulted in overall faster responses for the shape task compared to the
orientation task. In an attempt to make the shape task slower, we will




For this experiment, 22 Ghent University students signed up. Their mean
age was 24.3 years (SD = 4). Of them, 15 were female and 20 were right-
handed. All the participants gave informed consent and after they had fin-
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ished the experiment they were paid e 7.5. All the participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and they were na¨ıve with respect to the purpose
of the experiment.
Apparatus, Stimuli & Procedure
Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 3 with this difference that for
the shape condition we now used two random 2-dimensional shapes as the
ones introduced by Cooper (1975). To acquaint the participants with the
shapes, a learning phase was introduced just before the practice session of
the shape condition. During this learning phase, the participants had to
make a left or right response to the centrally presented shapes according
to the stimulus response-mapping they were assigned to. Starting from the
tenth trial, the accuracy was registered and the learning phase did not end
before the participant had made a series of at least three correct responses for
each shape. This algorithm set the minimal possible trials for the learning
phase at 16. After the learning phase a normal practice session was run,
followed by the experimental session. The Cooper stimuli we used were sized
1.9 by 1.9 visual degrees and had the same colour as the orientation stimuli
(RGB-values [145;145;145]).
3.9.2 Results
In this experiment we had to remove 0.7% of the trials because participants
responded too fast (RT < 200 ms) or too slow (RT > 1000 ms). Of the
remaining trials we had to remove 2.4% of the data because of erroneous
responses. Stimulus-response mapping did not have an effect on the reaction
time-pattern (F < 1, for both the orientation and shape condition) and just
like in all previous experiments there was no up/right-down/left advantage
in the orientation condition between the orientation of the triangle and its
position (t(21) = .02, p = .98).
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Figure 3.4: Bin-analysis for the shape condition (left) and the orientation con-
dition (right) of Experiment 4. Each point represents the average reaction time of
the corresponding quintile. Solid lines are used for the congruent condition and
dotted lines for the incongruent condition.
The analysis of the reaction time data revealed a main effect of task
(F (1, 21) = 27.8, MSe = 2294, p < .001) and a main effect of congruency
(F (1, 21) = 33.91, MSe = 236, p < .001). Moreover, the interaction between
task and congruency proved to be significant (F (1, 21) = 5.27, MSe = 108,
p < .05). We also found a significant Simon effect for both the shape condition
and the orientation condition (respectively F (1, 21) = 12.14, MSe = 177.5,
p < .01 and F (1, 21) = 38.6, MSe 166.4, p < .001). This Simon effect was
larger in the orientation condition than in the shape condition (t(21) = 2.3,
p = .03)
For the error data, the pattern was similar with a significant effect of task
(F (1, 19) = 8.32, MSe = .000142, p < .01), a marginal effect of
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(F (1, 19) = 3.93, MSe = .000436, p ≈ .06) and a significant interaction be-
tween these two factors (F (1, 19) = 13.8, MSe = .000364, p < .01). Planned
comparisons showed that the congruency effect was significant for the orien-
tation condition (F (1, 21) = 11.62, MSe = .00056, p < .01) but not for the
shape condition (F < 1).
The bin analysis revealed a similar pattern of effects as in Experiment 3
(see Figure 3.4).
3.9.3 Discussion
As opposed to Experiment 3 the RT data analysis revealed an interaction
between task and congruency. It has to be noted though that the participants
performed slower in the shape task compared to the orientation task. This
means that one could simply attribute the smaller Simon effect in the shape
task to the overall slower response. However, the distribution analysis takes
the edge of this argument by showing that this difference occurs even for the
fastest shape-responses.
Besides that, the error data show a clear modulatory effect caused by the
overlap of processing domains between the relevant task and the irrelevant
stimulus attribute. For these data there is no Simon effect in the shape
condition (rather the reverse), while there is a large effect of congruency
in the orientation condition. Together, these data show that dimensional
overlap by domain is not specific for colour, but also applies when shape is
used.
3.10 General Discussion
Four experiments were conducted to explore the boundaries of dimensional
overlap as defined by Kornblum et al. (1990). Kornblum and his colleagues
defined dimensional overlap as a structural, conceptual or perceptual simi-
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larity between the attributes of stimuli and/or responses. It has been shown
before that dimensional overlap can be the result from a direct correspon-
dence between stimulus and response attributes (e.g. SRC), but also from
indirect correspondences between stimulus and response attributes (e.g. or-
thogonal SRC, see Weeks & Proctor, 1990; orthogonal Simon, see Nishimura
& Yokosawa, in press). What’s more, the results of Fias et al. (2001) and
Lammertyn et al. (2002) suggested that dimensional overlap is broader than
direct or indirect correspondences between attributes. More specifically, Fias
et al. (2001) and Lammertyn et al. (2002) demonstrated that if two dimen-
sions belong to the same processing domain (e.g. they are both spatial), this
also results in dimensional overlap effects, as opposed to when there is no
overlap of processing domain (e.g. spatial versus colour). Because the irrele-
vant spatial information in the studies of Fias et al. (2001) and Lammertyn
et al. (2002) was always implicit by nature (see Introduction) the present
study was set up to test the assumption of dimensional overlap based on
similarity of processing domains with explicit spatial information. Location
information is explicit and therefore it is supposed to be automatically trig-
gered and translated into a corresponding response code, leaving less space
for modulation based on the overlap of the relevant and irrelevant processing
domain.
To reach this aim, a typical Simon task set-up was used for all the exper-
iments. In each experiment we combined two conditions which only differed
by the type of relevant information applied. There was always an orientation
condition together with a colour condition (Experiments 1 and 2) or a shape
condition (Experiments 3 and 4). The irrelevant information was always the
position of the stimulus relative to the centre of the screen (left or right) and
responses were made by right or left key presses. This means that, because
the irrelevant S-R relation was identical for all conditions, all differences be-
tween the orientation condition and the other conditions (colour or shape)
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should be attributed to the type of relevant stimulus used.
The most important observation in this series of experiments is the fact
that the way irrelevant information is processed depends on the type of rel-
evant information employed. We observed a larger Simon effect with an
orientation task than with a colour or shape task. Of significance here is
the fact that the different sizes of the Simon effect are not caused by dissim-
ilar time-courses underlying the processing of orientation versus shape, or
orientation versus colour. In Experiment 1, responses for colour trials were
substantially faster than for orientation trials. Although it is systematically
observed that the Simon effect is larger with faster response times (Burle et
al., 2002; Hommel, 1993) this did not result in a larger Simon effect for the
colour condition. Quite the reverse was true: the Simon effect was larger for
the orientation condition. This effect pattern remained the same in Experi-
ment 2, although in this experiment the overall RT was slower for the colour
condition compared to the orientation condition (similar observations were
made in Experiment 3 & 4 with shape versus orientation).
While this is not the first demonstration that the supposedly automatic
S-R conversion of irrelevant spatial information is susceptible to external in-
fluences (Caessens, Notebaert, Burle, & Soetens, 2005), the current findings
are still remarkable. In terms of Kornblum’s dimensional overlap model there
is no overlap between the relevant information (colour or orientation) and the
irrelevant location information. This means that the trials of both conditions
should be classified under the Type-3 denominator, and hence congruency ef-
fects between the irrelevant location of the stimulus and the response should
not be liable to modulations of the relevant stimulus type. The situation
is different when you add similarities of processing domains to the defini-
tion of dimensional overlap. When relevant and irrelevant information bear
some resemblance in terms of the domain they are processed within, this
should also be seen as a form of dimensional overlap. As a consequence, the
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orientation condition differs from the colour and shape condition because it
contains overlap between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus attribute. The
implications of this extended definition of dimensional overlap should not be
underestimated. Our results show that even without direct categorical corre-
spondences, similarities at the processing level can result in the modulation
of congruency effects.
As an alternative explanation of the results, one could argue that the
results found here are related to the orthogonal Simon effect. The relevant
stimuli in the orientation condition were triangles pointing “up” or “down”
which had to be responded to with “left” and “right” responses. While only
half of the participants used the compatible S-R mapping (up press right,
down press left), this could nevertheless have increased the overall Simon
effect found in the orientation condition. However, it should be clear that
the differences obtained between the orientation condition and the colour
or shape condition are not caused by this kind of indirect associations. As
shown in the results sections of all experiments, participants assigned to the
“compatible” up-right/down-left mapping did not respond faster compared
to participants instructed to use the “incompatible” up-left/down-right map-
ping. While this lack of an orthogonal Simon effect seems at odds with pre-
vious work (Weeks & Proctor, 1990; Nishimura & Yokosawa, in press) it is
possible that orthogonal associations only emerge when more salient spatial
features like location are employed. Besides that, there were no orthogonal
S-S effects in the orientation condition which is another indication that or-
thogonal associations cannot be the direct cause of the modulation of the
Simon effect. This observation is also in concordance with a recent study
from Verbruggen, Liefooghe, and Vandierendock (2004). There they used
left or right pointing triangles flanked by up or down pointing triangles and
just as in the present study, no up-right/down-left advantage was obtained
there (Verbruggen et al., 2004, p. 29). Together these results refute the alter-
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native explanation that the differences between the orientation condition and
the shape/colour conditions are the consequence of an indirect association
similar to the up-right/down-left advantage. Rather, the difference should
be ascribed to the overlap of processing domains in the orientation condition.
The concept of dimensional overlap based on processing similarities also
makes sense at the neuro-anatomical level. If you assume that information
belonging to the same domain is more likely to be processed by similar neu-
ral networks, it is not surprising that inhibition of irrelevant information will
be less efficient when it belongs to the same domain as the relevant infor-
mation. Therefore, the idea of modulatory effects caused by domain-specific
similarities (and hence similarity of cognitive processes) is also in concor-
dance with a neural overlap explanation (Fias et al. 2001; Lammertyn et
al., 2002). With neural overlap defined as the similarity of neural processing
structures involved, the same outcome would be predicted. Given the fact
that spatial properties like orientation and the location of the stimulus are
more likely to be processed in similar regions in the brain compared to for
instance colour (see Fias et al. 2001), the neural overlap account assumes a
greater interference between irrelevant and relevant information that is both
spatial compared to when relevant and irrelevant information relies on dif-
ferent visual dimensions. This means that the neural overlap theory extends
the dimensional overlap model by adding to it the possibility of modulatory
effects caused by the similarity of neural regions involved by the processing
of relevant and irrelevant stimulus properties.
To conclude, we can say that no existing model gives a satisfactory ex-
planation for the results obtained here. Therefore we suggest to extend the
definition of dimensional overlap by adding processing similarity, as a case
of dimensional overlap. When relevant and irrelevant stimulus information
belongs to the same processing domain (e.g. they are both spatial attributes)
this should lead to increased congruency effects. It is important to under-
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stand though, that processing similarity as such is not enough to create con-
gruency effects. Assume that participants in our experiments do not have
to press a left or right key, but have to give a (non-spatial) verbal response
to the orientation, colour or shape of the lateralized stimuli. The verbal
response excludes the dimensional overlap between the irrelevant dimension
and the response dimension and as a result no congruency effects will be
observed, even when there is processing similarity between the relevant and
the irrelevant information. It is clear that the mechanisms explained here
do not disprove the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum et al., 1990). At
most we want to add to it the idea of modulatory effects driven by domanial
and thus cognitive processing similarity as a means to explain the results
obtained here.
Chapter 4
Generalizing the neural overlap
hypothesis1
1Parts of this manuscript are prepared for publication. Co-authors are Jan Lauwereyns
and Wim Fias
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Up until now, the neural overlap hypothesis has found support in studies
employing colour, shape and orientation stimuli. In all those experiments,
orientation always served as the feature showing neural overlap with the
processing of the irrelevant feature (numbers or spatial locations). Colour and
shape, on the other hand, were consequently used as control tasks because
relatively spoken, these show relatively less neural overlap with the irrelevant
stimulus part.
The question is now if neural overlap is indeed a general mechanism. If
this is indeed the case, then its scope should not be restricted to specific
features or stimulus material, nor to specific processing regions. For this
reason, this chapter will be dedicated to the investigation of the generality of
the neural overlap hypothesis and we will do so in two series of experiments.
In a first part we will try to find a replacement for orientation, while keeping
the region of neural overlap the same as in previous experiments. In this way,
we hope to find evidence that neural overlap principles also hold for other
features than orientation. In the second part on the other hand, we will look
neural overlap effects within other brain regions (i.e. the ventral processing
pathway) in an attempt to prove that neural overlap is not an specific for
the dorsal pathway.
4.1 Extending the neural overlap hypothesis
at the feature level
4.1.1 Experiment 1: vertical and horizontal motion
versus colour
Broadly spoken, the current experiment was not that much different from
Experiment 6 of Chapter 2 (see also Lammertyn et al., 2002). Stimuli con-
sisted of an irrelevant and relevant part, and the specific features were chosen
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so that in a first condition there was neural overlap between the relevant and
irrelevant part, while in a second condition such a neural overlap was less
pronounced or even absent. In correspondence with the experiments of the
second chapter, numbers served as the irrelevant stimulus part in all condi-
tions. For the condition without neural overlap we once more reverted to
colour as the relevant feature. With regard to the condition with neural
overlap, however, we chose to replace orientation with motion.
Perceiving motion activates an extensive network of motion areas through-
out the human brain (see Figure 4.1), including the human middle temporal
cortex (MT+/V5), the human visual area V3A, the superior temporal sul-
cus (STS) and several regions in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (Culham et
al., 2001; Sunaert, Van Hecke, Marchal, & Orban, 1999; Zeki et al., 1991;
Tootell et al., 1995, 1997; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998;
Orban et al., 2003; Galletti & Fattori, 2003). On top of that, a recent study
by Claeys, Lindsey, De Schutter, and Orban (2003) indicates the existence
of two motion-processing systems: one lower-level system funneling motion
information from MT/V5 and V3A into the IPS and STS, and a higher-level
system represented in the inferior parietal lobule.
Because both low and high-level motion processing activates dorsal pari-
etal regions, it makes a perfect candidate to serve as a neurally overlap-
ping feature with number processing because number processing also relies
substantially on parietal regions (Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, &
Orban, 2003; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003; Rusconi, Walsh, &
Butterworth, 2005). To summarize, there will be two conditions: one mo-
tion condition in which number and motion processing neurally overlap and
another colour condition with supposedly less neural overlap. In line with
the results from Fias et al. (2001) and Lammertyn et al. (2002), our expec-
tations are that a relatively larger SNARC effect will emerge in the motion
condition compared to the colour condition.
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Figure 4.1: This figure shows a lateral view of the left hemisphere. Shaded num-
bered circles indicate the approximate centroid of suggested motion-responsive ar-
eas (adopted from Culham et al., 2001). (1) visual area V1, (2) lingual gyrus, (3)
fusiform gyrus, (4) kinetic occipital (KO) area between MT+ and V3A (Van Oos-
tende et al., 1997), (5) and (6) MT+ cluster, at the junction of the ITS and LOS
(Watson et al., 1993), (7) STS, (8) posterior insular cortex (PIC), (9) parieto-
occipital (PO) cortex, (10) V3A (Tootell et al., 1997), (11)-(14) motion-responsive
IPS regions, (15) SFS. The following abbreviations are used: LOS: lateral occipital
sulcus; STS: superior temporal sulcus; ITS: inferior temporal sulcus; TrOS: trans-
verse occipital sulcus; IPS: intraparietal sulcus; PostCS: postcentral sulcus; CS:
central sulcus; PreCS: precentral sulcus; SFS: superior frontal sulcus; SF: Sylvain
fissure
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Method
Participants Twenty-four students (8 men, 16 women) at the Victoria
University of Wellington (New Zealand) participated in this experiment for
course credit. Their mean age was 20.4 years (SD = 4) and eight of them were
right handed. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
were naive with respect to the purpose of the experiment. One participant
had to be excluded from the analysis because he appeared to be colour-blind.
Stimuli & Material The stimulus material used in this experiment was
very similar to the material employed in Lammertyn et al. (2002), except for
the fact that the numbers were always presented upright. Again Arabic digits
from one to nine served as the irrelevant stimulus part. For the relevant part
we used two features, namely motion or colour. During the motion condition,
participants were required to indicate whether the numbers were moving in
the horizontal or vertical dimension (the stimuli moved back and forward
with an amplitude of 6 pixels and a frequency of approximately 3 cycles
per second). For the colour condition a dominant colour-task was employed
identical to the one used for Experiment 7 in Chapter 2.
The stimuli were presented on a 21-inch CRT-screen (vertical refresh rate
85 Hz; resolution of 1024×768 pixels). The participants were seated on a
comfortable viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. All responses were
registered to the nearest millisecond using a response device produced by
the technical staff from the psychology faculty at the Ghent University. The
response box was placed at a comfortable position in front of the partici-
pant and he controlled the device by using the index fingers of both hands.
The response buttons on the response box were situated 4 cm to the left
and and 4 cm to the right of the middle of the device. The experiment
was programmed in Tscope (Stevens et al., in press) and controlled using a
Pentium PC.
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Procedure The procedure was not different from the one in used in Lam-
mertyn et al. (2002). Each participant completed a colour and motion con-
dition and the order of the conditions was counterbalanced over participants.
Results
All wrong trials were removed before analyzing the data (4.7%). Those trials
with response times falling outside the range subtending the grand average
plus or minus three standard deviations were also discarded (7.3%).
A 9 × 2 × 2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was con-
ducted on correct RTs with number magnitude, task and response-side as
within-subject variables. There was a main effect of number-magnitude and
the mean RTs of correct responses were 559, 543, 538, 539, 549, 551, 552,
546 and 546 ms for the numbers 1 to 9 in ascending order (F (8, 176) = 4.27,
p < .001). There was no main effect of task (colour 538 ms and motion 556 ms,
F (1, 22) = 1.57, p > .05), nor an effect of response side (545 ms for right
and 549 ms for left responses, F < 1). Moreover, none of the aforementioned
variables interacted (all F ’s < 1).
To find out if the irrelevant digits were processed semantically we eval-
uated the size of the SNARC effect (Dehaene et al., 1993). The SNARC
effect stems from an association between the position of numbers on a left-
to-right oriented number line and the response side. If this is indeed the case,
this predicts a negative relation between number magnitude and the RT dif-
ference between right and left responses. The presence of a SNARC effect
was investigated by using a regression analysis of repeated measures data as
described by Lorch and Meyers (1990). This method includes the following
steps. First, to investigate the presence of the above-mentioned negative rela-
tion between number magnitude and the RT difference between right and left
responses, average RTs of the correct responses are computed for each sub-
ject and this separately for left and right responses. Based on these means,
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Figure 4.2: Experiment 1, differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand
responses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit, for (a) the colour
condition, and (b) the motion condition. Circles indicate the observed dRTs. The
continuous line depicts the predicted dRTs based on the regression analysis.
88 Chapter 4
differences in RT (dRTs) are computed by subtracting the average RT for
the left hand from the average RT for the right hand. In a second step, a
regression equation has to be computed per subject with number magnitude
as predictor variable. And finally, in a third step, t-tests are performed to
test whether the regression weights of the group deviate significantly from
zero (the advantages of adopting this method are previously described in Fias
et al., 1996).
The regression analysis of repeated measures data revealed the following
equations (see Figure 4.2):
colour : dRT = 9.21− 3.5×magnitude
motion: dRT = 12.32− 2.6×magnitude
The slopes obtained from the regression analysis with digits as predictor
proved to be marginally different from zero and this was the case for both
the colour and the motion condition (colour : t(22) = 1.76, p = .09; motion:
t(22) = 1.95, p = .06). In absolute terms the slope for the colour task was
steeper than the slope in the motion task, but a paired t-test showed that
the slopes obtained for both tasks did not differ significantly from each other
(t(22) = .45, p = .66).
Discussion
The results of this experiment are not straightforward. A (marginal) SNARC
effect emerges for both the condition with and without neural overlap. This
does not refute the neural overlap hypothesis, because statistically spoken
there was no difference between both conditions. However, this null ef-
fect downgrades all attempts to pinpoint the reasons behind this absence
to ad hoc explanations and speculation. Nevertheless, to be able to avoid
this in future experiments it might be interesting to reflect on possible rea-
sons for this failure to obtain neural overlap effects. One reason may be that
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neural overlap is not a general mechanism. This could mean that the results
from Fias et al. (2001) and Lammertyn et al. (2002) should be explained
by the specific feature used, signifying that neural overlap only arises with
orientation as relevant feature. On the other hand, it is also possible that
the implementation of motion in the current experiment was not ideal. Two
types of motion were used, namely vertical and horizontal movement. This
may have enhanced the saliency of the numbers even in the colour task be-
cause the horizontal movements from the left to the right and vice versa are
associated with the same structural dimension as numbers (Dehaene et al.,
1993; Seron, Pesenti, Noel, Deloche, & Cornet, 1992; Brysbaert, 1995; Fias,
2001; Fias et al., 1996; Ratinckx & Brysbaert, 2002, but see Ito & Hatta,
2004). This hypothesis was also confirmed by an additional ANOVA where
task, SNARC compatibility2 and motion dimension (horizontal versus ver-
tical) served as within-subject variables. Overall, this analysis revealed a
main effect of motion dimension (558 ms for horizontal versus 539 ms for
vertical trials; F (1, 22) = 37.78, p < .001) and an interaction between task
and motion dimension (F (1, 22) = 22.78, p < .001). Important for our case
however is the fact that the (marginal) SNARC effect obtained in the colour
task is primarily due to the horizontally moving numbers (see Figure 4.3).
Planned comparisons in the colour condition show that the SNARC effect is
significant for the horizontal dimension (F (1, 22) = 5.04, p < .05), while it is
not for the vertical dimension (F < 1).
While the mechanisms behind these differential effects for horizontal and
vertical moving numbers are not fully understood, it is clear that they should
better be avoided. To rule out this latter explanation we designed a new
experiment, but this time however, only using vertical moving stimuli.
2left responses to numbers smaller than five and right responses to numbers larger than
five are considered SNARC compatible, while left responses to numbers larger than 5 and
right responses to numbers smaller than five are considered as SNARC incompatible
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Figure 4.3: Experiment 1 data split up for trials with horizontal and vertical
moving numbers
4.1.2 Experiment 2: up/down motion versus colour
In Experiment 1 we used motion in combination with numbers to create the
neural overlap condition. The implementation of motion in this experiment
may not have been ideal though. Because we used motion in both the ver-
tical and horizontal dimension, the horizontal moving stimuli followed the
same orientation as the mental number line, touching upon its characteris-
tics directly rather than indirectly. To avoid this possible source of undesired
interference in the colour condition, only vertical motion will be used in this
experiment. This means that subjects will have to identify the direction of
an up or downward moving digit. All other details of this experiment are
kept identical to the previous experiment.
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Method
Participants Eighteen students (13 women, 5 men) from the Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington (New Zealand) participated in this experiment to re-
ceive course credit. Their mean age was 20.2 years (SD = 3.2) and one of
them was left handed. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were naive with respect to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli, Material & Procedure There was only one difference between
the present experiment and Experiment 1. Motion was now restricted to the
vertical dimension. The motion-path extended twenty pixels up or down,
starting from the centre of the screen and with a velocity of 10 pixels per
second. Subjects responded to the direction of the moving stimuli during the
motion condition and did so with a right or left key press. The stimulus-
response mapping was counterbalanced over participants.
Results
First, 7.9% of the trials had to be excluded from the analysis because they
fell well outside the range of the grand average plus or minus three standard
deviations. On average, the participants made 11.7% errors.
A 2 × 9 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with task, number magnitude
and response side as within-subject variables only revealed a main effect
of task. Response times of trials belonging to the motion condition were
statistically faster than colour condition trials (387 ms versus 471 ms respec-
tively, F (1, 17) = 52.5, p < .01). The main effect of number magnitude was
marginally significant. The average RTs for the digits 1 to 9 were, respec-
tively, 434, 430, 431, 429, 422, 423, 435, 429 and 429 ms (F (8, 136) = 1.73,
p ≈ .09). There was no difference between left or right hand responses, and
no interactions between any of these variables (all F ’s < 1).
Differences in response time between right and left hand responses as a
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Figure 4.4: Experiment 2, differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand
responses (right minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit, for (a) the colour
condition, and (b) the motion condition. Circles indicate the observed dRTs. The
continuous line depicts the predicted dRTs based on the regression analysis.
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function of number magnitude for both the colour and motion condition are
presented in Figure 4.4. The regression analysis of repeated measures data
revealed the following equations:
colour : dRT = 12.47− 1.72×magnitude
motion: dRT = −3.58 + 0.57×magnitude
The slopes from both the colour and motion condition were statistically
not different from zero (colour : t(17) = -1.56, p = .14; motion: t(17) = .75,
p = .47). The difference between the slopes from the colour and motion
condition was statistically not different (t(17) = 1.51, p = .15), although
in absolute terms the motion slope was positive as opposed to the negative
colour condition slope.
Discussion
It has been shown before that motion and number processing share similar
neural processing circuits while this is less the case for colour and number
processing. Departing from this knowledge and in line with the neural over-
lap hypothesis, we predicted more interference from the irrelevant numerical
information (and hence a larger SNARC effect) when motion discrimination
was the main task, compared to when a colour task had to be performed.
The results of this experiment do not confirm these predictions. The sole use
of vertical motion, instead of combining vertical and horizontal motion (as
in Experiment 1) did not alter the results. Once more, no SNARC effects
were obtained for both conditions. More importantly, however, the slopes
obtained for the colour and motion condition were not different from each
other. This means that also in this experiment, no evidence is found for the
neural overlap hypothesis.
The results may have been biased however by the relative speed difference
between the colour and motion condition: the response times for the colour
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condition were much faster than for the motion condition. This is a factual
problem since it has been shown before that the SNARC effect increases
as a function of the time that is needed to respond (e.g. Gevers et al.,
2005). Actually, this means that the failure to obtain a difference between
the colour and the motion condition may be totally attributed to the relative
speed difference.
For this reason, it is necessary to follow up this experiment and try to
equalize the RT levels of both conditions.
4.1.3 Experiment 3: vertical and horizontal motion
versus colour
The current experiment has the same objectives as the previous experiment.
This time however we will try to keep the RT levels for all conditions equal by
making the colour task harder by using less distinguishable colour patterns.
Besides that, we will also try to maximize chances for a SNARC effect to
develop. For this purpose, only small and large numbers will be used. This
strategy has been used before and evidence supporting its utility to obtain
large SNARC effects can be found in studies by Gevers et al. (2005, in press).
Again, our predictions are in line with the neural overlap hypothesis:
we expect a larger SNARC effect for the motion condition compared to the
colour condition. However, if this is not the case and no SNARC effects are
obtained in none of the conditions, we need to elaborate further upon the
probability of irrelevant digit effects within a motion paradigm.
Method
Participants Twenty first-year psychology students (18 women, 2 men) at
the Ghent University participated in this experiment to gain course credits.
On average they were aged 18.25 years (SD = 0.55). Two participants were
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left handed and all of them had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The
participants were naive with respect to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli, Material & Procedure Exactly the same procedure was used
as in Experiment 2. Only at the level of the stimuli some changes were carried
out. First, the set of numbers used was now restricted to the extreme values
1, 2, 8 and 9. Secondly, we lowered the proportion of dominant coloured
pixels to slow down colour trials and make them RT-wise more comparable
to motion trials.
Results
Before doing the analysis we removed 0.6% fast (< 200 ms) or slow (> 1000 ms)
outliers. On average, participants made 3.6% errors.
A 2 × 4 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the correct
RTs using three within-subject variables, namely task, magnitude and side of
response. There was only a significant main effect of response hand. Right-
hand responses were faster than left-hand responses (477 ms versus 498 ms,
F (1, 19) = 10.22, p < .01). Reaction times for colour trials were slightly
slower than for motion trials, but this difference failed to reach significance
(colour: 492 ms; motion: 483 ms, F < 1). The main effect of digits was
marginally significant (F (3, 57) = 2.39, p ≈ .07) and the average RT for the
numbers 1, 2, 8 and 9 were respectively 492, 485, 489 and 486 ms.
The regression analysis of repeated measures data revealed the following
equations (see Figure 4.5):
colour : dRT = −14.18 + 0.51×magnitude
motion: dRT = −31.48 + 0.39×magnitude
The positivity of the slopes obtained for both the colour and motion
condition indicates that no SNARC effect was present. Furthermore, these
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Figure 4.5: Differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand responses (right
minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit, for (a) the colour condition, and
(b) the motion condition. Circles indicate the observed dRTs. The continuous line
depicts the predicted dRTs based on the regression analysis.
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positive slopes did statistically not deviate from zero: colour : t(19) = .44,
p = .67; motion: t(19) = .56, p = .58. Important for our case however was
the fact that the slopes obtained for both tasks did not significantly differ
from each other, as witnessed by the paired comparison between the two
(t(19) = .1, p = .92).
Discussion
In this experiment we tried to find evidence for the neural overlap theory
by opposing a neural overlap condition against a condition lacking neural
overlap. Building on the previous experiment we changed two elements.
First, we succeeded in leveling the RT level between the two conditions and
this was achieved by making the colour condition harder and thus slower.
Secondly, we employed ideal conditions for a SNARC effect to emerge. This
manipulation did not have an effect however since there was no SNARC effect
in both conditions. This finding combined with the results of Experiment 1
and 2 raises questions about the mere possibility of obtaining a SNARC
effect with moving numbers. Another issue concerns the question if attention
can be selective for the colour of a moving object without processing the
object itself, as this possible selection inefficiency might have wiped out the
differences between the two conditions.
In order to solve the colour or motion task, tracking the moving object
is obligatory. Decoupling features like motion and colour is infeasible when
they are properties of the same object. This, because it is probably impossi-
ble to derive the colour from a moving target without updating its position
in time and space (e.g. Tsal & Lamy, 2000; Sohn, Chong, Papathomas, &
Vidnyanszky, 2005). This is directly related to the binding problem (Treis-
man, 1996) because this means that to be able to respond to the colour of
a moving object, one has to synchronize the position of the object and the
attended feature belonging to this object both in time and space. A possible
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side effect of having to track the object in time and space while deriving
its colour is that this makes it almost impossible to efficiently inhibit the
identity of the moving object. Even more, it is probably harder to inhibit
the identity of a moving object while trying to find out its colour than to
ignore its identity while detecting the direction it is moving in. Deriving the
direction of a moving object in a two-dimensional space does not necessarily
require to track the object because the changes of luminance are not only
bound to the place were the object is, but also to where it has been before.
Although no direct evidence is obtained for this in our experiments, attend-
ing local luminance changes on a local part of the display often is a more
parsimonious way to tell the direction of a moving object, especially when
only two directions are employed and you have to ignore another irrelevant
feature belonging to the same object simultaneously.
To summarize, while it is not totally clear why there was no difference
of SNARC effects between the two conditions, attentional differences might
have played a role. Therefore, to avoid problems with object-tracking or local
attention solutions we conducted the next experiment.
4.1.4 Experiment 4: dot motion versus colour
In all of the previous three experiments we implemented motion by making
the irrelevant object (an Arabic digit) move by itself. Some would argue
that this type of motion requires the object to be identified and represented
as a whole, which undermines our intention to keep the object irrelevant.
To circumvent this possible critique we will now revert to stationary digits.
Motion will be implemented by making dots move within the outlines of the
irrelevant digit.
Our predictions regarding the neural overlap hypothesis do not change:
for the neural overlap hypothesis to be generalized we should obtain a larger
SNARC effect in the motion condition compared to the colour condition.
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The base for this difference lays in the relation of processing regions, which
is relatively larger for numbers and motion compared to numbers and colour.
Method
Participants Sixteen Ghent University students (10 women, 6 men) en-
rolled for this experiment and received a e 7.5 participation fee after they
had finished the experiment. Their mean age was 25.3 years (SD = 6.1) and
three of them were left handed. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naive with respect to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli & Procedure In this experiment we used stationary outlined
numbers as irrelevant information. For the motion condition the inner plane
of the digit was filled with moving dots (n = 600). Seventy-five percent
of these dots moved in a starfield-like fashion, which means that they were
either moving from the centre outwards, or alternatively, from the border
towards the center. The remaining 25% of the dots followed a random path
starting from a random position in the presentation field. Combining orderly
and randomly moving dots made it impossible to solve the motion task by
focussing attention to a small local part of the stimulus. None of the moving
dots changed direction during one trial. The participants were told to press
a left or right key depending on whether the majority of moving dots moved
towards them or away from them. Care was taken that the participants fully
understood the instructions, and this was explicitly checked after the practice
session. The colour condition was similar to the previous experiments. The
number was filled with red and green coloured dots of which one colour was
overrepresented and participants had to indicate the dominant colour by
pressing a left or right key.
This time, number 1 and 9 were left out of the number set, because pilot
tests showed that the narrow body of number 1 hinders the perception of
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the motion direction. To maintain an equal number of digits at each side of
the number 5, we also left out number 9 of the stimulus-set. There were no
procedural differences with the previous experiment.
Results
Before analyzing the data trials with responses faster than 200 ms or slower
than 1000 ms were excluded (0.7%). On average the participants made 5.3%
errors.
A 2 × 2 × 7 repeated measures ANOVA with task, response side and
number magnitude as within variables resulted in main effects for all three
variables. Responses in the colour condition where faster than in the mo-
tion condition (420 ms versus 513 ms, F (1, 15) = 47.92, p < .01), right
hand responses were faster than left hand responses (456 ms versus 477 ms,
F (1, 15) = 8.87, p < .01) and finally, the reaction times varied depending on
which number was presented (F (6, 90) = 5.6, p < .01). Mean RTs of correct
responses with the digits 2 to 8 as irrelevant information were respectively,
472, 465, 465, 459, 469, 474 and 461 ms. None of the interactions between
the three variables reached significance (all F ’s < 1).
In Figure 4.6 you will find the difference for the colour condition between
right and left hand responses as a function of number magnitude. The related
regression weights resulted in the following equation:
dRT = −16.9− 0.69×magnitude
For the motion condition, the regression analysis of repeated measures
data revealed the following equation:
dRT = −21.2 + 0.005×magnitude
Again, the slopes obtained from the regression analysis with digits as
predictor were not different from zero and this for both the colour and the
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Figure 4.6: Differences in RT (dRT) between right and left hand responses (right
minus left) as a function of the irrelevant digit, for (a) the colour condition, and
(b) the motion condition. Circles indicate the observed dRTs. The continuous line
depicts the predicted dRTs based on the regression analysis.
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motion task (colour : t(15) = -.46, p = .65; motion: t(15) = 0, p = 1). In
absolute terms the slope from the colour task was negative and the slope from
the motion task positive, but a paired t-test showed that the slopes obtained
for both tasks did not differ significantly from each other (t(15) = 0.3, p = .8).
Discussion
The results of this experiment failed to confirm our assumptions. We found
no evidence that neural overlap between the processing regions of relevant
and irrelevant stimulus information modified the processing of the irrelevant
stimulus-part. However, it is clear from the reaction differences between
both conditions that the motion task was harder compared to the colour
task. Maybe this was caused by a high level of perceptual load involved in
the present motion task (Lavie & Tsal, 1994). This may have exhausted
the available processing capacity, which in turn may have decreased the ex-
tent to which the irrelevant distractor was processed (Rees, Frith, & Lavie,
1997). Further investigation is needed however, to evaluate this speculative
assumption.
The fact that no SNARC effect was found whatsoever, not in the current
experiment and not in the previous three experiments, raises questions about
the actual possibility to process irrelevant numbers in a paradigm like this
where motion has to be attended. We will return to this problem in the
general discussion.
4.2 Searching for neural overlap effects in the
ventral pathway
If the neural overlap mechanism is indeed a general cortical property that
modulates and influences the way in which relevant and irrelevant infor-
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mation is cognitively processed, then this mechanism should also be engaged
elsewhere in the brain than in those regions along the dorsal processing path-
way. With this idea kept in the back of our mind, we planned to use emotion
expressed by faces in the next series of experiments. Faces expressing an
emotion seem to be a promising candidate for the role of irrelevant stimuli
because of the following reasons. First, emotions expressed by faces seem to
interfere with responses to relevant tasks. Particularly, it has been shown
earlier that the mere presentation of irrelevant fearful faces can interrupt the
processing of the relevant stimulus part, resulting in slower responses com-
pared to when happy or neutral faces are used (e.g. Hartikainen, Ogawa, &
Knight, 2000; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Burton et al.,
2005). In the experiments presented here we will try to turn the interruption
effect of fearful faces into our advantage. Secondly, it is well known that pro-
cessing of faces mainly takes place in the fusiform face area, situated in the
ventral pathway (see for instance Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997).
The emotion expressed by faces is an attribute primarily processed by the
(right) amygdala, which receives projections from the ventral fusyform face
area and V1. Furthermore, there are indications (Vuilleumier, Richardson,
Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004) that the amygdala not only receives in-
puts from ventral visual cortical pathways, but also sends connections back
to virtually all processing stages along the ventral visual system, including
primary visual cortex (area V1) (Vuilleumier, 2005). This observation pro-
nounces the strong ventral base (or neural overlap if you like) of face and
emotion processing.
These properties of emotional face processing allow us to investigate neu-
ral overlap effects in the ventral processing pathway. We will present faces
expressing emotions with tasks that are proportionally processed more or
less within the ventral pathway. Indications pointing in the direction of neu-
ral overlap effects when processing irrelevant emotional faces were suggested
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by two inspiring studies of Vuilleumier et al. (2001) and Pessoa, McKenna,
Gutierrez, and Ungerleider (2002). In these studies the authors tried to find
an answer to the question if emotional faces need to be attended in order to
be processed. Earlier reports suggested that neural processing of emotional
stimuli happens automatically, meaning that subjects can exhibit fast, invol-
untary autonomic responses to emotional stimuli (Globisch, Hamm, Esteves,
& O¨hman, 1999) and this may even take place without conscious awareness
(O¨hman, Esteves, & Soares, 1995).
The study by Vuilleumier et al. (2001) seemed to confirm this. In their
displays they presented two pairs of houses and faces and the subjects had
to make a same/different judgment on just one of the stimulus pairs. The
behavioural results showed that responding to houses was interfered rela-
tively more by fearful faces than neutral faces. More specifically, reaction
times were slower with fearful irrelevant faces than with neutral ones, and
this observation seemed to corroborate the assumption that faces are auto-
matically processed even when they are irrelevant for the task at hand, and
hence unattended. Pessoa et al. (2002) on the other side, disagreed with
this assumption because they found no different effects of fearful and neutral
faces. Of course, there were some differences between the task used by Pes-
soa et al. and the picture matching task from Vuilleumier and his colleagues.
First of all, in the study by Pessoa et al. (2002) the faces were presented
centrally on the screen, accompanied by two lateral oriented lines. In a first
condition the subjects had to keep attention on the central face and judge if
it belonged to a man or a woman. In the second condition on the other hand,
subjects had to direct their attention towards the lateral lines and perform a
same/different judgment on their orientation. The results contrasted those of
Vuilleumier et al. (2001) in that no difference in reaction time was observed
as a function of the emotional content of the unattended face during the line
orientation task.
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Pessoa et al. (2002) attributed the different outcome of their and Vuilleu-
mier’s study to the fact that their bar task exhausted processing capacity,
leaving no resources for the irrelevant stimulus information (i.e., the face and
it’s emotion) to be processed. This in contrast with the matching task used
by Vuilleumier et al. (2001) which they believed was not as attention con-
suming as the bar orientation task, leaving enough bandwidth to process the
irrelevant faces as well.
While the attention-based explanation for the erratic results is a viable
one, it is clear that there are also differences between both tasks at the
level of neural overlap. As indicated by the imaging data of both studies,
orientation processing is relatively less related to emotional face processing,
in comparison with processing pictures of houses. It could be the case that
ignoring irrelevant faces is easier with a neurologically more distant task than
with a relatively closer one. In the next couple of studies we will try to find
an answer to this question by varying the neural relatedness of the main task
with emotional face processing while keeping the irrelevant (face) material
identical in all conditions. In line with the neural overlap account, we expect
that emotional faces will interfere when doing a neurologically related task,
as opposed to a smaller or absent effect when performing a neurologically
less related task.
4.2.1 Experiment 5: gender versus colour
In a first experiment, the size of emotional face interruption will be compared
between a gender classification and a colour discrimination task. Interrup-
tion effects of irrelevant fearful faces have been demonstrated earlier when
performing a gender related task, which is not surprising because both gen-
der discrimination and emotion processing depend on face processing. This
gender task will be compared to a colour task. While colour processing also
relies in large parts on ventral processes (Chao & Martin, 1999; Zeki, 1993;
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Motter, 1994), it is functionally not related to face processing. In terms of
neural overlap this means that processing the gender of a face is proportion-
ally more related to facial emotion processing that colour processing. As a
result, larger interruption effects are expected to occur when doing a gender
task, compared to the colour task.
Method
Participants The number of participants was twenty-four and they all
were students at the Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand) par-
ticipating for course credits. Eighteen were female and three of them were left
handed. The average age of the participants was 23.25 (SD = 7.27). Each
one of them had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and they all were naive
with respect to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli Stimuli were frontal face pictures belonging to the Karolinska Di-
rected Emotional Faces set (KDEF, see Lundqvist, Flykt, & O¨hman, 1998).
From this set, we selected 60 persons (30 men and 30 women) and from each
person, pictures representing three emotions (fearful, happy and neutral)
were added. This set of 180 pictures was subsequently doubled by making
two versions of each picture: one version was blended with red and one with
green. All pictures were manually edited so that only the face remained visi-
ble (no hair, shoulders, or background). The procedure for selecting practice
stimuli from the KDEF-set was similar, but care was taken that none of the
pictures was also selected for the experimental set. The faces were presented
in the middle of the screen on a black background and they subtended an
area of approximately 5.2 by 3.8 visual degrees.
Materials & Procedure All stimuli were presented on a 21-inch CRT-
screen with a vertical refresh rate of 85 Hz and a resolution of 1024 by
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768 pixels. The participants were seated so that the viewing distance was
approximately 60 cm. The left and right responses were registered to the
nearest millisecond using a response device produced by the technical staff
from the psychology faculty at the Ghent University. The response box was
placed at a comfortable position in front of the participant and she controlled
the device by using the index fingers of both hands. The response buttons
on the response box were situated 4 cm to the left and and 4 cm to the right
of the middle of the device. The experiment was programmed in Tscope
(Stevens et al., in press) and controlled using a Pentium PC.
There were two conditions, a gender condition and a colour condition. In
the gender condition, the task was to decide what the gender was belonging
to the face-picture appearing on the screen. For the colour task, participants
had to indicate the colour of the face they saw. Each participant ran through
both conditions, but the order of the conditions was counterbalanced over
participants.
Before each block, the participants received instructions for the current
condition. Next and after the participant declared to understand the in-
structions, a practice block of 20 trials was initiated. During this practice
block the participants received feedback about the correctness of their answer
immediately after they had given a response. Once the practice block was
finished, the experimental block was started up. In this experimental block,
breaks were included after every sixtieth trial.
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation point (a three-pixel
wide white disc). After 1500 ms the fixation point was replaced by a face-
stimulus. This target was removed from the screen after 200 ms and responses
were registered until 1500 ms had passed by. Then a new trial began.
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Figure 4.7: Experiment 1, average response times for each of the three emotional
expressions used. The solid line depicts the colour condition, and the dashed line
the gender condition.
Results
Less than one percent of the trials had to be removed because they were
faster than 150 ms or slower than 1500 ms. On average, participants made
8.5% errors (SD = 3).
A 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA was run on the data using type of
emotion (fearful, happy or neutral) and task (gender or colour) as within-
subject variables. This resulted in a main effect of task and emotion (see
Figure 4.7). Colour trials were faster than gender trials (424 versus 511 ms)
with F (1, 23) = 47.45, MSe = 5655, p < .001. Moreover, RTs also varied
as a function of the emotion expressed on the faces: average RTs for trials
with fearful, happy and neutral faces were 471, 464 and 467 ms respectively
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(F (2, 46) = 3.72, MSe = 157, p < .05). Furthermore, the interaction between
type of emotion and task was also significant (F (2, 46) = 4.19, MSe = 64,
p < .05).
Post-hoc comparisons for the gender task showed that fearful faces were
responded to slower than happy faces (F (1, 23) = 9.33, MSe = 175, p < .01).
Fearful trials were also marginally slower than neutral trials (F (1, 23) = 3.4,
MSe = 140, p ≈ .08). No such differences between the types of emotion
emerged for the colour task (all F ’s < 1).
Finally, we also conducted a distribution analysis with vincentized bins
for each quintile on both conditions (see Ratcliff, 1979; Van Zandt, 2000).
Although no three-way interaction was present between the three within-
subject variables task, emotion and bin, planned comparisons revealed some
different patterns in the colour and the gender task (see Figure 4.8). Present-
ing fearful faces during the gender task resulted in significantly slower RTs
than presenting happy faces, and this was true for all bins (Bin 1: p ≈ .07;
Bin 2: p < .01; Bin 3: p < .001; Bin 4: p < .001; Bin 5: p < .05; all one-
tailed pairwise comparisons). On the opposite side, none of these pairwise
comparisons were significant for the colour condition (all p’s > .1).
Discussion
It is clear that the emotional expression affected RTs in the gender task but
not in the colour task. However, the different overall RT-levels cast serious
doubts on the reliability of these differences. To further investigate this, an
analysis of distributed RTs (bin analysis) was conducted. This showed that
the origin of the emotion effects is not attributable to the differences in RT.
For the gender task, effects of emotion are present throughout the whole RT
range, while for the colour task these differences do not appear at any point
in the distribution.
Together the results are more or less consistent with the hypothesis of
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Figure 4.8: Experiment 1 distribution analysis showing vincentized RTs for each
quintile
neural overlap: effects are present from the irrelevant emotion in the (neural
and functional) closely related gender task, while this is not the case for the
less related colour condition. However, even though the distribution analysis
proved that the different effects between both tasks are not the result of
the overall temporal processing difference, this still is a problem. Because
slowing down performance in the colour task is no option (we already worked
with highly similar colours) we conducted the next study.
4.2.2 Experiment 6: orientation versus colour
For this experiment we are reverting to the colour and orientation tasks
used previously (see for instance Lammertyn et al., 2002). Because colour
processing is neuro-anatomically closer related to face processing than orien-
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tation processing (both colour and face processing largely ventral functions,
while orientation processing is a predominantly dorsal function), the neural
overlap hypothesis predicts larger interruptions of fearful faces in the colour
condition compared to the orientation condition. These expectations are also
supported by the assumption that inhibition of irrelevant information is be-
lieved to be more efficient when there is no neural overlap. When relevant
and irrelevant information do overlap on the other hand, inhibiting the ir-
relevant information would counteract the relevant task which is processed
along similar pathways. Therefore, inhibition of irrelevant information is
anticipated to be less profound in the case of neural overlap.
Method
Participants Twenty-three psychology students from the Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington (New Zealand) took part in this experiment in return for
course credit. Five of them were male, and four were left-handed. Their av-
erage age was 20.43 years (SD = 3.46) and they all had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. No one was informed about the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli The stimuli of the present experiment where in some aspects differ-
ent from the previous experiment. This time, the stimulus display contained
a central black and white picture of a face, accompanied by two vertically
aligned grating stimuli, one at each side of the face. The grating stimuli
were red or green discs (each with a diameter of 1 visual degree) filled with
a grating that was oriented either close to the vertical or horizontal axis
(see Figure 4.9 for some examples). The faces that we used were the same
as in the previous experiment (180 pictures; 30 men and 30 women, each
expressing two types of emotion and a neutral face).
Exactly the same face stimuli were shown in the orientation and the colour
condition. In each condition, all faces were presented twice: once with the
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Figure 4.9: Examples of the displays used in Experiment 2. The colours repre-
sented in this picture are illustrative and may deviate from the exact colours used
during the experiment.
same colour (or orientation) and once with a different colour (or orientation).
Procedure & Material The procedure and material used for this exper-
iment were identical to the previous experiment, except for the fact that
a different task was used. In the colour condition, the participants had to
indicate with a left or right key press whether the discs had the same or a
different colour. In the orientation condition participants had to judge if the
orientations of the two gratings were both close to the vertical or horizontal
axis, or if the orientations differed (one close to the vertical and another close
to the horizontal axis).
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Figure 4.10: Experiment 2, average response times for each of the three emo-
tions used. The solid line depicts the colour condition, and the dashed line the
orientation condition.
Results
Before analyzing the data we removed trials with RTs faster than 150 ms and
slower than 1500 ms (0.69%) and four participants with an overall error rate
exceeding 10%. The average percentage of errors was 3.22% (SD = 2.39).
A 3 × 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with emotion, task and response
congruence (whether the same/different judgments for both the orientation
and the colour task in one trial were identical or not) as within-subject vari-
ables revealed nothing but an effect of task (see Figure 4.10). On average,
colour trials were 163 ms slower than orientation trials (F (1, 18) = 47.06,
MSe = 32214, p < .001). Response congruency had no effect on response speed
(congruent trials 620 ms and incongruent trials 623 ms; F < 1), nor did emo-
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tion (622, 624 and 618 ms for fearful, happy and neutral faces; F < 1). Fur-
thermore, planned comparisons for the two conditions separately revealed no
differences between trials with fearful, happy and neutral faces (all p’s > .1).
Discussion
The effects obtained in this experiment do not reveal anything to support
the neural overlap hypothesis. The fact that there was a major task-effect,
combined with the lack of emotion effects for each task separately makes us
conclude that our manipulation has failed. However, based on these results
it is impossible to make judgments about the neural overlap theory.
4.3 General Discussion
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the general character of the
neural overlap hypothesis. The evidence reported so far in earlier studies
(Fias, Lauwereyns, & Lammertyn, 2001; Lammertyn et al., 2002; Lammer-
tyn, Notebaert, Gevers, & Fias, manuscript submitted for publication) always
employed the same type of stimuli, and hence similar processing regions were
recruited for all of them. More specifically, because we consequently used
orientation discrimination combined with either irrelevant number or spatial
location processing as the critical condition for neural overlap, all the effects
found in these studies rely heavily on processes situated along the dorsal
pathway.
Two strategies were used in this chapter to investigate if the neural over-
lap hypothesis is indeed a general neuro-cognitive mechanism. A first part
concentrated on the level of the feature. Up until now orientation was always
the critical feature for the neural overlap condition. However, neural overlap
effects should not be restricted to one specific feature and therefore an alter-
native feature was searched for orientation. Eventually motion was selected,
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because just like number processing, motion also projects to dorsal process-
ing regions more compared to colour (which was the relevant feature for the
non-neural overlap condition). In a second part we looked for evidence that
neural overlap effects are not specific for information processing along the
dorsal pathway. To reach this aim we introduced an irrelevant interruption
stimulus (faces expressing fear) that is supposed to be processed relatively
more ventral. The question was now if the performance on a task would be
affected more by the irrelevant interruption stimulus if the processing path
of the relevant task also relies more on ventral systems compared to when
this was not the case.
The outcome was surprising. First, none of the experiments using motion
as the relevant feature did reveal any sign of neural overlap effects. There
were no differences between the condition with neural overlap between rel-
evant and irrelevant information, and the condition without neural overlap.
For the second part, where irrelevant faces expressing emotions were used,
the results were somewhat ambiguous. In one experiment, indications direct-
ing to neural overlap were found, but this was no longer true for the second
experiment. Summed up, our strategy to find converging evidence for the
neural overlap hypothesis did not work out. There were some minor indica-
tions, but overall nothing was found to support the generality of the neural
overlap hypothesis. The question is now what possibly may have caused this
failure to obtain neural overlap effects. Because most of the time no effects
were found, formulating explanations for this inadequacy are ad hoc.
With regard to the motion experiments it is unclear why no neural overlap
effects emerged. There is no reason to assume that motion is less suitable to
obtain neural overlap effects compared to for instance orientation.
In the first face-experiment we did find indications of neural overlap ef-
fects when performing a gender task versus a colour task . This is not so
surprising because it is obvious that a great deal of functional and neural
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overlap exists between the gender task and the irrelevant emotion (both are
carried by the same medium, i.e. the face). The implications for the neu-
ral overlap case should be minimized though because the RT levels were in
no way equal between the two conditions. Regarding the second emotional
face experiment, a possible reason for the failure to find a neural overlap
effect might be related to the neuro-functional distances between the tasks
used. The features and tasks employed in this experiment may have been
just too far away from each other (both anatomical and functional) to overlap
neurally. Matching the features and tasks employed in neural overlap exper-
iments is a recurrent problem, since we completely rely on the literature at
hand. We will elaborate further on this problem in the General Conclusions
part of this dissertation.
For now, the implications for the neural overlap hypothesis are minimal.
It is important to understand that although no evidence has been found
supporting the neural overlap hypothesis, the outcome of the experiments did
not directly oppose the neural overlap hypothesis neither. In the first part for
instance, it was never found that the condition without neural overlap (i.e.
the colour condition) had a statistically larger SNARC effect compared to
the condition with neural overlap (i.e. the motion condition). By themselves
each individual study showing a null-effect presented in this chapter may be
harmless for the neural overlap theory. Yet, the repeated finding of such null-
effects makes it difficult to deny that there is a problem. For this reason we
may conclude that the question regarding the generality of the neural overlap




In general, this thesis contributed to the field of irrelevant information pro-
cessing. More specifically, the scope of this thesis was to investigate the
effect of relevant information processing on the quality of irrelevant informa-
tion processing. To be able to account for our initial results, we introduced
the “neural overlap” hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that the trans-
lation from stimulus to response is not only influenced by the similarity of
the mental codes associated with relevant and irrelevant information and re-
sponses (e.g. the dimensional overlap model; Kornblum et al., 1990), but also
by the similarity of the neural regions that are involved in processing of the
stimuli and responses. This similarity at the neural level was named “neural
overlap” (in analogy of dimensional overlap), which is defined as the cortical
and functional proximity of the processing regions of relevant and irrelevant
information. Subsequently, the generality of this neural overlap hypothesis
was scrutinized in a series of studies. Together, the ambiguous data gathered
by these experiments question the feasibility of the neural overlap hypothesis.
118 Chapter 5
5.1 Overview of the present experiments
The following paragraphs will give an overview of the studies presented in
the present thesis.
The origin of the neural overlap hypothesis
The neural overlap hypothesis was proposed after we conducted a series of
experiments to investigate the impact of irrelevant information on the pro-
cessing of different types of relevant information. We compared a condi-
tion using colour discrimination as the main task, with a condition in which
an orientation discrimination task was performed. The irrelevant stimulus
consisted always of one-digit numbers, and the extent by which these were
processed was investigated by looking at the size of the SNARC effect.
According to the dimensional overlap taxonomy of Kornblum et al. (1990),
no differences could be expected between the different conditions because all
trials in both conditions should be denominated as Type 3 ensembles (only ir-
relevant S-R consistency). Nevertheless, a larger SNARC effect was observed
in the orientation discrimination condition compared to the colour condition
meaning that the influence of the irrelevant information on the performance
of the main task was different depending on the task that needed to be exe-
cuted. To exclude alternative explanations we conducted a number of control
experiments (see below).
First, we ruled out accounts in terms of relative speed differences. Because
the RT level in our first pair of experiments was significantly lower for the
colour condition than for the orientation condition, this may have induced the
size difference in the SNARC effect. In an attempt to increase the RT level
for the colour task, we repeated the colour experiment with colours that were
harder to discriminate. As a result, the average RT for the colour condition
was enhanced to the same level as the average orientation condition RT.
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However, this manipulation did not alter our previous results: the SNARC
effect in the colour condition was still smaller compared to the orientation
condition.
Second, we ruled out stimulus-specific effects by replacing the oriented
triangles by oriented lines, and in a later experiment, we also replaced the
colour task by a shape identification task. Despite all these changes, the
pattern of results remained the same: The SNARC effect was larger for the
orientation task than for the colour and shape task.
Third, all comparisons in the previous experiments were made between
conditions containing different kinds of stimuli. For instance, in our first
set of experiments we compared a condition containing coloured numbers
with a condition incorporating uncoloured numbers with an oriented trian-
gle superimposed on it. To avoid possible visual confounds we conducted
an experiment in which the stimuli were identical for both conditions while
only the task varied. Again, we found that the condition in which an orien-
tation task had to be performed resulted in a larger SNARC effect from the
irrelevant numbers, compared to the colour condition.
Fourth, another possible confound in the colour versus orientation ex-
periments was the fact that, strictly spoken, participants did not have to
attend to the whole stimulus to be able to solve the task. Instead, they
might have focused on a smaller part of the coloured number to derive its
colour. Of course, this approach could have made it much easier to inhibit
the irrelevant number information in the colour condition compared to the
orientation condition in which the position of the whole number had to be
attended to. To find out if this was the reason for the larger SNARC effect in
the orientation condition, we developed a new colour task (see Experiment 7
of Chapter 2). Instead of filling up the inside of the numbers completely with
one solid colour we now only filled up a part of the number with coloured
dots. Additionally, the task of the participants was to decide which of two
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colours was dominant. Because the coloured dots were randomly distributed
over the whole number, it was impossible to derive the dominant colour by fo-
cusing on a small part of the stimulus. Nevertheless, the resulting RT pattern
remained unchanged. The SNARC effect was still larger for the orientation
task than for the colour task.
In sum, these series of control experiments are strongly in favour of the
“neural overlap” hypothesis. No explanation except from neural overlap
could account for the modulated processing of irrelevant information. The
next step in our research was to broaden the scope the neural overlap mech-
anism, because up until now it was only studied within very specific circum-
stances.
Attempt to generalize the neural overlap hypothesis
The strategy in all the experiments conducted so far was to compare two
conditions. With the exception of one experiment, we always compared a
colour condition with an orientation condition. Furthermore, we always used
numbers as irrelevant information and therefore the neural overlap condition
always contained irrelevant numbers combined with a relevant orientation
task, while the condition lacking neural overlap consisted of an irrelevant
number combined with a colour or shape task. However, to be able to con-
clude that neural overlap is a general processing mechanism of the human
brain, more evidence has to be gathered. Moreover, the strength of this con-
verging evidence would be stronger if it would be obtained by using different
paradigms and stimuli. Three strategies were followed to find additional
evidence for the neural overlap hypothesis.
A first strategy was to use another type of irrelevant stimulus informa-
tion. Whereas in the previous experiments the irrelevant numbers activated
implicit spatial codes (i.e., the spatial mental location associated with num-
bers), we now chose to use explicit spatial locations. More specifically, we
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employed the Simon effect instead of the SNARC effect. Again we compared
colour with orientation tasks, and again we found the same pattern of effects
as in the SNARC experiments. Conditions with neural overlap resulted in a
larger Simon effect than conditions with a smaller degree of neural overlap.
A second strategy to find a more general basis for the neural overlap hy-
pothesis was to replace the orientation feature by motion. We chose to use
motion because in this way the experimental differences were only minimal.
In terms of neural or dimensional overlap, the situation was not different from
the SNARC experiments because motion was also considered to exert dorsal
activations just like orientation. Unluckily this approach was unsuccessful,
and we repeatedly failed to find a difference between the neural overlap con-
dition and the condition without neural overlap.
A final attempt to obtain more evidence for the neural overlap hypothesis
consisted of inducing neural overlap effects in the ventral pathway instead
of the dorsal pathway. This was done by using stimuli consisting of facial
emotions for which it is well-known that these are processed along the ventral
pathway. However, a neural overlap effect observed in the ventral processing
pathway using emotional face processing was only present in one experiment
and even there its origin was ambiguous.
Why the generalization failed
It is clear that our efforts to generalize the neural overlap hypothesis failed.
Especially the repeated observation of a null-effect found when using motion
raises questions about the validity of a general neural overlap mechanism.
But before drawing premature conclusions, we will consider post-hoc what
possibly may have caused this disappointing results.
First, it could be the case that the effects of neural overlap obtained in
Chapter 2 and 3 are specifically related to the use of an orientation task.
Only in this task we unambiguously found a modulation of the SNARC or
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Simon effect. However, simply assigning the effect to the use of a specific
feature is not enough. One must also be able to tell why this specific task
causes an effect while other tasks do not. One reason for this apparent task-
specific modulation could have been completely unrelated to neural overlap,
but rather to an indirect or non-evident association between orientation and
numbers or between orientation and the response. However, re-analysis of
our data revealed that the modulation found in orientation tasks does not
originate from associations of this kind (see part II of Chapter 2 and the
result sections of Chapter 3).
Second, another possibility is that neural overlap is a mechanism exclu-
sively engaged in the dorsal pathway. At first glance, this seems unlikely
because neural overlap is conceived as a mechanism that extremely depends
on the spreading of activation within a highly interconnected cortical net-
work, which is generally believed not to be restricted to specific parts of the
brain. On top of that, although an exclusively dorsal focus of neural overlap
effects might explain why there were no overlap effects ventrally, this possi-
bility is not in concordance with the failure to obtain dorsal neural overlap
effects while using motion.
Third, a more likely assumption is that neural overlap effects are much
easier to observe within the dorsal pathway. The reason for this possibility is
that dorsal (parietal) regions are considered as an interface between planned
actions and the actual motor programs (e.g. Mattingley, Husain, Rorden,
Kennard, & Driver, 1998; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997). Because of
the intimate relation between the dorsal processing pathway and the actual
motor regions, effects of neural overlap rooted within the dorsal pathway may
be reflected stronger in the reaction time pattern compared to neural overlap
effects originating in the ventral processing pathway. Although this might
be a valuable explanation, it is not in line with the repeated finding of a
null-effect with the motion stimuli which were employed as an alternative to
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orientation. This takes us to the question why the motion task did not elicit
effects from the irrelevant information. Ad hoc, one could blame the absence
of irrelevant information effects to the fact that motion stimuli are more
difficult to discriminate. This possibly left insufficient attentional resources
to process the irrelevant information (Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Rees et al., 1997).
However, judging by the RT levels from the motion condition and the colour
conditions this was probably not the case. In some of the motion experiments,
the RT level was faster than for the colour task, which assumes that the
motion task was easier. Of course, this argument only holds if our assumption
that perceptual difficulty positively correlates with reaction time is correct.
Fourth, we might raise the question whether the correct control tasks
were used. According to some studies, colour is also processed (partially) in
the parietal cortex (Claeys et al., 2004). This issue needs more elaboration,
especially because it is not clear if the effects obtained in this study could
alternatively be attributed to attentional of response selection factors.
Fifth, a more general critique on all of the studies presented in this thesis
concerns the fact that our selection of tasks was completely determined by
what we know from literature. If this information is incorrect this may of
course have had strong repercussions on our results. By using the data pro-
vided in literature, our experiments emphasized anatomical distance above
functional distance. With regard to functional and also anatomical distance,
we made a distinction between the dorsal and ventral processing pathway.
Possibly, this differentiation may have been to sketchy to allow a clear dis-
crimination of the neural overlap effects we were looking for. The ventral
and dorsal processing stream may be anatomically different, but functionally
they may not have been as independent as we have supposed.
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5.2 Third party neural overlap research
The ambiguous results presented in this thesis raise doubts about the basic
neural overlap idea. However, recent studies have shown that effects of neural
overlap are not implausible. I will now discuss two studies that strongly refer
to or depend on the idea of neural overlap.
Neural overlap predicts interference
The key question in the study by Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, and Dehaene
(2004) was how comparative judgments are performed in the human brain
(see also Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005; Fias et al., 2003). To do so, the authors
scanned the participants by using fMRI while they were comparing stimuli
for size, luminance or magnitude. The authors took care that performance
was equated for each task and that identical stimuli consisting of Arabic
digits varying in physical size, numerical size and luminance were used in
all three blocks. The regions that are involved for comparing the different
type of information were identified by criteria such as task-related activation,
presence of a distance effect and interference of one dimension with another.
What they found was a considerable amount of overlapping regions between
the three comparison tasks, but importantly, the amount of overlap allowed
to predict the amount of cross-dimensional interference and this both for the
behaviour and imaging data. For instance, in the case of the distance effect
they showed that the pattern of overlap matched the pattern of interference
in response times. Neurally, number and size both recruited the anterior
part of the horizontal segment of the intraparietal sulci (HIPS), while size
and luminance overlapped in the posterior IPS and ventral occipito-temporal
cortex. However, no posterior overlap regions were obtained between number
and luminance. This was also reflected in the RT data. Interference was
observed between number and size, size and luminance, but not between
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luminance and number. Just like we have done before (see Chapter 2 and 3),
Pinel et al. (2004) concluded that these results corroborate the hypothesis
that the anatomical proximity between the neural structures activated by the
relevant and irrelevant dimensions correlates with the amount of behavioural
cross-dimensional interference.
Neural overlap between working memory and attention
In a review of the literature, Awh and Jonides (2001) concluded that there
is a considerable amount of overlap between attention and working memory
systems. More specifically, they gathered evidence which suggests that both
spatial working memory and spatial attention processes rely on neural net-
works extending back from the frontal lobes into the primary sensory cortices
(LaBar, Gitelman, Parrish, & Mesulam, 1999; Klingberg & Roland, 1997; Lu-
cas & Lauwereyns, manuscript submitted for publication). This overlap is a
possible explanation for the interference which occurs when delayed spatial
working memory tasks and immediate spatial-attention tasks are performed
concurrently (e.g. Awh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998).
The idea of neural overlap causing specific interference between working
memory and attention was further examined in studies by Lauwereyns, Wis-
newski, Keown, and Govan (2005) and Lucas and Lauwereyns (manuscript
submitted for publication). Inspired by Awh et al. (1998), these papers
used a dual-task paradigm with an immediate feature-based attention task
embedded within a delayed feature-based working memory task. More specif-
ically, participants first had to memorize a feature of a stimulus (colour or
shape). Next, and while keeping the feature of the first stimulus in memory,
they had to select and compare a predefined feature (colour or shape) of two
newly presented stimuli. Finally, the memorized colour or shape had to be
compared with a subsequent presented stimulus.
In the Lauwereyns et al. study, it was shown that the relevant feature
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in the working memory task primed the relevant features of the attention
task. More specifically it was shown that the comparison task between the
relevant features of the two stimuli presented during the attention task was
easier when they belonged to the same dimension of the memorized relevant
feature. Lucas and Lauwereyns (manuscript submitted for publication) took
this one step further by investigating the potential effects of relevant features
in working memory on irrelevant features in an attention task. Three displays
were presented in each trial. The first display contained one stimulus of which
the colour or shape had to be memorized. After some time, two new stimuli
were presented for which the relevant colour (or shape) had to be matched,
while the irrelevant shape (or colour) had to be ignored. After this was done,
a final stimulus appeared and its colour or shape had to be matched with
the memorized feature. The resulting data contained substantial congruency
effects including faster responses in trials in which irrelevant on-line features
pointed to the same response as the relevant on-line features, compared to
when the irrelevant on-line features primed a different response than the
relevant on-line features. This shows that the irrelevant features are difficult
to ignore when they are simultaneously prioritized in working memory (Lucas
& Lauwereyns, manuscript submitted for publication).
In their respective studies, Lauwereyns et al. (2005) and Lucas and Lauw-
ereyns (manuscript submitted for publication) proposed that neural overlap
between working memory and attention could best account for the results.
Furthermore, they suggested that holding information in working memory
implies attentional processing of that information, which actually means that
attention functions as a subroutine of working memory.
Together the results of these specific studies show that by itself the neural
overlap hypothesis is a valuable concept, although the results presented in
this thesis have weakened the initial positive stance to some degree. There-
fore, it is necessary and worthwhile to continue investigating the neural over-
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lap hypothesis.
5.3 Contribution to the field of numerical
cognition
Although the topic of this dissertation implied irrelevant information process-
ing, part of it was picked up by the field of numerical cognition. A standing
discussion in this field concerns the supposed automatic activation of num-
ber semantics. Consider for instance a task in which participants have to
compare two numbers, for instance 2 and 3. At first sight, one would think
that the comparison process is based on perceptual differences. The Arabic
digit 2 and 3 are physically so different that there is no need to transform the
symbols to their semantic meaning to be able to say that they are different.
However, when the reaction time needed to compare 2 and 3 is opposed to
the time needed to compare 2 and 7, it is invariably found that the latter
comparison is faster. Because, 2 and 3 are semantically spoken more similar
than 2 and 7 the former comparison process takes longer than one would
expect on the basis of physical comparison alone. This “distance effect”
(first described by Moyer & Landauer, 1967) is taken as an indication that
numbers are indeed, automatically, converted into their semantic magnitude
(Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Dehaene & Akhavein, 1995; Temple & Posner,
1998; Dehaene, 1992).
Another effect pointing to this “comprehension reflex” as Dehaene (1997)
called it, is the size congruity effect. In 1982, Henik and Tzelgov let partici-
pants decide which of two Arabic digits was physically largest. They showed
that, although numerical size did not matter for the task at hand, it ap-
parently did influence the response time. More specifically, they found a
congruency effect between numerical and physical size indicating automatic
processing of number meaning. If the physical larger number was also the
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numerically larger (e.g 3 9), this resulted in faster responses compared to
when physical and numerical size were incongruent (e.g. 3 9).
However, a problem with all these and other experiments proving the
automatic character of magnitude coding is that they all involve numbers as
relevant stimuli or tasks that require the semantic attributes of numbers. For
instance, even for experiments showing semantic number-effects when using
a parity task (which is considered to be asemantic), it cannot be denied
that they are embedded within a numerical context. Therefore activation of
number semantics is not necessarily automatic in the sense that it commences
always and without restrictions. Rather, this may as well mean that the
activation of number semantics is conditional and depends on the context in
which the numbers are presented.
Our experiments using numbers as irrelevant information were different
(see Chapter 2 and 3). Here, numbers were truly irrelevant. The informa-
tion to which the responses had to be made was never numerical (colour,
superimposed shapes, or orientation), nor were the tasks. Nevertheless we
found semantic number effects (a SNARC effect) in some of the conditions.
It was for this reason that the numerical cognition community picked up our
experiments as the ultimate proof that numerical information is activated
automatically and without contextual provocation (see for instance Gevers,
Reynvoet, & Fias, 2003; Nuerk, Iversen, & Willmes, 2004; Reynvoet & Brys-
baert, 2004; Turconi, Jemel, Rossion, & Seron, 2004; Gevers et al., 2005;
Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005; Ratinckx, Brysbaert, & Fias,
2005; Reynvoet, Gevers, & Caessens, 2005).
The question is now if this is really true. We clearly showed that there
was only a SNARC effect under certain circumstances. More specifically,
our neural overlap hypothesis stated that the size of the SNARC effect is
related to the amount of neural overlap between the processing regions of
the relevant task and the irrelevant numbers. This means that in the case of
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neural overlap, activation of number semantics was modulated by another,
simultaneous process and thus is not automatic but context driven. Appar-
ently, Caessens et al. (2005) were the first to catch this nuance by stating
that the mere existence of long-term shared dimensions across stimuli and
responses is not a sufficient condition for congruency effects to arise. This
remark referred to the fact that the colour experiments in Fias et al. (2001)
and Lammertyn et al. (2002) did not result in a SNARC-effect, while the
orientation experiments did.
5.4 Future directions
The biggest concern of this thesis is the fact that generalizing the neural
overlap hypothesis to other parts in the brain failed. Especially the ambigu-
ous results from the emotional face experiments were disappointing in this
regard. However, the differences between emotional faces may have been too
weak to be reflected in the behavioural data. A more apt approach to find
different effects of irrelevant emotional faces while doing a colour or orien-
tation task may have been to use neuro-imaging techniques. This way, it
may have been possible to see if neural overlap between the colour task and
irrelevant emotional faces results in larger amygdala activation, compared to
an orientation condition which is cortically and functionally very well segre-
gated from face processing. In line with Pessoa et al. (2002) and Vuilleumier
et al. (2001), we would predict that neural overlap will cause larger emotion
effect at the level of the amygdala when doing the colour task, compared to
when conducting an orientation task. If this is confirmed, these results would
definitely contribute to the usefulness of the neural overlap hypothesis as a
common neural mechanism.
Another avenue to further investigate neural overlap is the paradigm used
by Lauwereyns et al. (2005) and Lucas and Lauwereyns (manuscript submit-
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ted for publication). They used a dual task procedure to examine the sus-
ceptibility of participants to irrelevant information in an immediate feature-
based attention task as a function of the working memory condition (see also
Jonides, Lacey, & Nee, 2005; Awh et al., 1999; Jonides & Awh, 2003, for a lo-
cation based variant). In these experiments, the emphasis was on examining
the effects of different visual dimensions on the congruency effect. However,
this paradigm could as well be used to investigate the effect of neural over-
lap between attributes kept in working memory and an immediate attention
task. Although a pilot study using this strategy stems us hopeful, more work
is necessary.
5.5 Conclusion
To summarize, the neural overlap hypothesis as it was originally presented
initially proved to be a valuable concept. It allowed to explain data that
was previously difficult to fit within dual route models like the dimensional
overlap model. While intuitively neural overlap seems to be a simple mech-
anism, the failure to generalize it in this thesis shows that it may be more
complex than originally thought. Therefore, this thesis should also be read
as a manifest for further research on this topic. It is only by gathering a bet-
ter knowledge of proximity and functional connectivity of specialized brain




In ons dagelijks leven worden wij constant geconfronteerd met een enorme
stroom van informatie. Continu worden onze zintuigen geprikkeld door sti-
muli die niet altijd even belangrijk zijn voor ons. Het mag dan ook verbazing
wekken dat wij desalniettemin in staat zijn om ons op een georganiseerde
manier voort te bewegen in deze informatiestroom. Wat stelt ons nu in staat
om om te gaan met al deze informatie? Om niet ten onder te gaan aan de
enorme hoeveelheid informatie die onze hersenen bereikt, beschikken deze
over een aantal mechanismen om doelgericht belangrijke informatie te se-
lecteren. Zo zijn wij bijvoorbeeld in staat om onze aandacht heel gericht te
focussen op een klein deel van ons gezichtsveld. Op een gelijkaardige manier
kunnen wij ook onze gevoeligheid voor relevante kenmerken verhogen (facili-
tatie) en de gevoeligheid voor irrelevante kenmerken onderdrukken (inhibitie)
om zo gemakkelijker de aandacht op relevante stimuli te kunnen vestigen.
Alhoewel ons informatieverwerkingssysteem dus kan beschikken over de
nodige mechanismen om relevante en irrelevante informatie uit elkaar te
houden werkt dit niet altijd feilloos. Het is mogelijk dat informatie die niet
relevant is voor de taak die je aan het uitvoeren bent toch binnensluipt in het
systeem. Vaak gaat dit gepaard met interferentie op de eigenlijk uit te voeren
taak. Zo kan het bijvoorbeeld zijn dat je trager tot de juiste respons komt, of
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slechter nog, dat je fout reageert. Een mogelijke vraag is waarom irrelevante
informatie u¨berhaupt wordt verwerkt. Er zijn vele mogelijke verklaringen,
maar het doel van deze thesis was te onderzoeken of “neurale afstand” in
dit opzicht een rol zou kunnen spelen. Met neurale afstand bedoelen we de
afstand tussen de verwerkingsgebieden die instaan voor de verwerking van de
relevante informatie en deze die instaan voor de verwerking van irrelevante
informatie. Het is belangrijk in te zien dat afstand in onze hersenen relatief
is. Zo kan het zijn dat gebieden die in absolute termen ver van elkaar af
liggen toch dichtbij zijn omdat de connecties ertussen heel sterk zijn. An-
derzijds is het ook mogelijk dat gebieden aan elkaar grenzen (bijvoorbeeld
de twee zijden van een sulcus), maar in termen van connecties heel ver van
elkaar zijn verwijderd.
Hoe kan neurale afstand nu een rol spelen bij het al dan niet efficie¨nt
inhiberen van irrelevante informatie? Om dit te kunnen vatten is het belang-
rijk de organisatie en werking van onze hersenen beter te begrijpen. In ons
brein kunnen verschillende regio’s worden onderscheiden die instaan voor de
verwerking van allerlei soorten informatie. Nu is het niet zo dat deze ge-
bieden daadwerkelijk zijn afgegrensd van elkaar. Wel integendeel: de kracht
van ons brein schuilt voornamelijk in de verregaande complexiteit van de
aanwezige connecties tussen zenuwcellen enerzijds en de onderscheiden ver-
werkingsgebieden anderzijds. Wanneer een bepaald type informatie wordt
verwerkt, gaat dit gepaard met de activering van de neuronen in het desbe-
treffende verwerkingsgebied. Een belangrijke eigenschap van deze neuronale
cel-activiteit is dat deze niet beperkt blijft tot de verantwoordelijke zenuw-
cel, maar uitdijt naar dichtbijgelegen zenuwcellen. Men noemt dit fenomeen
“spreading activation” of de zich verspreidende activering. Het is nu onze
veronderstelling dat deze verspreidende activatie ervoor kan zorgen dan neu-
rale afstand bepaalt of irrelevante informatie wordt verwerkt of niet. Probeer
je bijvoorbeeld de situatie in te beelden waarbij het verwerkingsgebied voor
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de relevante informatie zeer dichtbij het verwerkingsgebied van de irrelevante
informatie ligt. Om beter de relevante informatie te kunnen verwerken zal
ons aandachtssysteem normaal gezien trachten de signaal-ruis verhouding
van de relevante verwerkingscellen te verbeteren, om zo te komen tot hogere
activatieniveaus. Echter, indien de relevante verwerkingsgebieden dicht bij
de irrelevante verwerkingsgebieden liggen, zal een verhoogd activatieniveau
leiden tot een sterkere aanvoer van zich verspreidende activatie. Dit kan er
op zijn beurt voor zorgen dat de inhibitie van irrelevante informatieverwer-
king moeilijker zal zijn. Het resultaat hiervan is dat de irrelevante informatie
alsnog wordt verwerkt en een invloed kan hebben op de relevante stimulus-
respons vertaling. De vaststelling dat de mate van interferentie veroorzaakt
door irrelevante informatie afhankelijk is van de afstand tussen relevante en
irrelevante verwerkingsgebieden vatten wij samen in de neurale overlap hy-
pothese.
6.1 Aanzet tot de neurale overlap hypothese
In het tweede hoofdstuk van deze thesis komen studies aan bod die de aanzet
vormden voor de neurale overlap hypothese. Deze hypothese is een uitbrei-
ding van het dimensional overlap model van Kornblum et al. (1990) wat stelt
dat de mate van interferentie die ontstaat tussen de verschillende stimulus-
kenmerken en de respons, afhankelijk is van de onderlinge relaties tussen de
betrokken dimensies. Deze dimensies worden gedefinieerd aan de hand van
enkele parameters. Zo kunnen zij ofwel betrekking hebben op de stimulus
ofwel op de respons. Bovendien kunnen de dimensies al dan niet relevant
zijn voor de huidige taak. Een voorbeeld van een dimensie aan de stimulus-
zijde is kleur. Twee concurrerende stimuli kunnen dezelfde kleur hebben, en
in dat geval is er sprake van overlap binnen de kleurdimensie. Ook aan de
responszijde kan er dimensionele overlap zijn (beide processen leiden bijvoor-
134 Chapter 6
beeld tot een respons “rechts”) en zelfs tussen stimulus- en responsniveaus is
dimensionele overlap mogelijk (de stimulus is bijvoorbeeld een pijl naar links
en de respons is een druk op een knop die zich links bevindt).
De neurale overlap theorie gaat hierop verder en stelt dat niet enkel
een overlap op dimensionaal vlak een rol kan spelen bij het cree¨ren van
interferentie-effecten, maar dat ook de mate van neurale overlap belangrijk
is. Met neurale overlap wordt bedoeld dat de onderliggende neurologische
structuren die nodig zijn voor de verwerking van verschillende stimuli func-
tioneel en/of anatomisch verwant zijn. Concreet werd er in het eerste deel
van Hoofdstuk 2 aangetoond dat er situaties mogelijk zijn waarbij er geen di-
mensionele overlap is tussen de relevante en irrelevante stimuli, maar waar er
toch interferentie ontstaat wanneer beide tegelijkertijd worden aangeboden.
De bepalende factor was in dit geval steeds de mate van neurale overlap. De
keuze voor de stimuli die werden gebuikt in deze studies was vooral gebaseerd
op de gebieden waarin ze worden verwerkt. Zo werden als irrelevante stimuli
steeds getallen gebruikt omdat uit de literatuur bekend is dat getallen spatiale
connotaties hebben en deze in de dorsale verwerkingsstroom verwerkt wor-
den. De irrelevante stimuli werden zo gekozen dat zij ofwel ook dorsaal wer-
den verwerkt (bijvoorbeeld “orie¨ntatie”), ofwel helemaal niet dorsaal, maar
ventraal werden verwerkt (bijvoorbeeld vormherkenning). Op deze manier
werd er een conditie gecree¨erd waarbij er neurale overlap is maar geen dimen-
sionele overlap (beoordelen hoe irrelevante getallen georie¨enteerd zijn) en een
conditie waarbij er noch neurale, noch dimensionele overlap aanwezig is (de
kleur bepalen van een irrelevant getal). De resultaten toonden aan dat de
getallen in de neurale overlap-conditie tot op semantisch niveau worden ver-
werkt, terwijl dit niet zo was voor de conditie zonder neurale overlap. Deze
resultaten kunnen niet worden verklaard aan de hand van het dimensional
overlap model aangezien er in beide condities op geen enkel niveau dimen-
sionele overlap aanwezig was. Vandaar dat wij tot de conclusie kwamen dat
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de enige verklaring voor dit verschil gezocht moest worden in de mate van
overlap van de onderliggende neurale structuren die gebruikt worden voor de
verwerking van de irrelevante getallen en de relevante taak.
In het tweede deel van Hoofdstuk 2 werd nagegaan of alternatieve me-
chanismen aan de basis zouden kunnen hebben gelegen van de eerder gevon-
den effecten. Zo werd bijvoorbeeld onderzocht of de verschillende manieren
waarop aandacht kan worden besteed aan kleur dan wel orie¨ntatie een rol
zou kunnen hebben gespeeld. Meer specifiek zou het bij kleurbeoordeling
mogelijk zijn geweest dat de proefpersonen focusten op een heel klein deel
van het irrelevante getal, om zo het getal zelf gemakkelijker te kunnen negeren
en uit te sluiten van verdere verwerking. Om deze verklaring uit te sluiten
boden we in een volgend experiment getallen aan die waren opgevuld met
gekleurde pixels. De taak van de proefpersonen bestond er in te reageren op
de vaakst voorkomende kleur. Omdat de spreiding van de pixels was geran-
domiseerd over het gehele oppervlak van het irrelevante getal, was het nu
onmogelijk om doelgericht te focussen op een heel klein deel van de stimulus.
De resultaten van dit onderzoek waren in het voordeel van de neurale overlap
theorie: nog steeds werden de irrelevante getallen het sterkst verwerkt in de
conditie met neurale overlap.
Naast het gebruik van irrelevante getallen, onderzochten we in Hoofd-
stuk 3 of neurale overlap-effecten kunnen optreden met een ander soort van
spatiale informatie. Meer specifiek gebruikten we locatie. Eind de jaren
zestig toonde Simon aan dat stimuli die aan de rechterkant worden aangebo-
den ook sneller worden beantwoord met een rechter response (of vice versa
met links), en dit zelfs indien de locatie van de stimulus zelf niet relevant
is voor het uitvoeren van de taak (bijvoorbeeld omdat je op de kleur van
de stimulus moet antwoorden) (Simon & Rudell, 1967). Dit effect werd het
Simon-effect genoemd en kan perfect worden verklaard binnen de taxonomie
van Kornblum (Kornblum et al., 1990). Wanneer een stimulus ons sensorisch
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systeem betreedt worden zowel de relevante als irrelevante kenmerken ervan
gecodeerd. Dit leidt bijvoorbeeld tot de activering van de codes “rechts”
en “groen” (in het geval van een groene stimulus die rechts staat) ook al
is de locatie zelf irrelevant. Indien een groene stimulus vereist dat er een
rechter respons wordt gegeven zal dit gemakkelijk verlopen aangezien de code
“rechts” reeds werd geactiveerd door de irrelevante stimuluspositie. Had de
stimulus links gestaan, dan zou deze dimensionele overlap er niet zijn geweest
en zou er geen versnelde activering van de respons mogelijk zijn geweest. Dit
verschil vertaalt zich in het Simon-effect.
In onze studie wilden we te weten komen of de grootte van het Simon-
effect (of anders, de mate waarin irrelevante positie-informatie wordt ver-
werkt) afhangt van de graad van neurale proximiteit tussen de gebieden die
verantwoordelijk zijn voor de verwerking van de relevante taak en de irrele-
vante positie-informatie. We deden dit door verschillende taken te gebruiken
die in mindere of meerdere mate verwant zijn met positie-verwerking. Ver-
volgens werd gekeken of deze gradaties in neurale overlap een effect hadden
op het Simon-effect. Net zoals in het tweede hoofdstuk waren de resultaten in
overeenstemming met de neurale overlap hypothese. Wanneer de relevante en
irrelevante stimulus-informatie nauwer verwant waren vergrootte het Simon-
effect in vergelijking met wanneer de twee stimulus-attributen neuraal niet
overlapten.
6.2 Generalisatie van de neurale overlap hy-
pothese
Tot nu toe maakten we voor de neurale overlap conditie steeds gebruik van
orie¨ntatie als relevante informatie en getallen of locatie als irrelevante in-
formatie. Indien we de neurale overlap hypothese willen veralgemenen is er
echter meer convergerende evidentie nodig. Om deze doelstelling te bereiken,
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volgden we twee onderzoekslijnen. Een eerste strategie bestond er in neurale
overlap effecten aan te tonen met een andere relevante taak dan orie¨ntatie.
Deze stap was belangrijk om aan te tonen dat de eerder gevonden effecten
niet louter taak- of stimulus-specifiek zijn maar kunnen veralgemeend wor-
den, onafhankelijk van de taak of stimuli die worden gebruikt. Concreet ge-
bruikten we in plaats van orie¨ntatie, bewegingsdetectie als nieuwe “dorsale”
taak. Net als orie¨ntatie kan de verwerking van beweging worden gesitueerd in
de dorsale verwerkingsstroom (Galletti & Fattori, 2003; Orban et al., 2003).
De resultaten waren echter teleurstellend. We vonden geen neurale overlap
effecten en dus was het onmogelijk om op basis van deze resultaten te komen
tot de vooropgestelde veralgemening van het neurale overlap principe.
Een tweede onderzoeksmethode die werd gevolgd om te komen tot de
veralgemening van de neurale overlap theorie, bestond er in dit effect aan
te tonen binnen een ander gebied van de hersenen. In vorige studies was
het altijd zo dat de stimuli die werden gebruikt overlap vertoonden in een-
zelfde belangrijke verwerkingsstroom van onze hersenen, namelijk de dorsale
stroom. De zogenaamde “tegenhanger” van deze dorsale stroom is de ven-
trale stroom, die naast de functionele verschillen ook volledig verschilt op het
gebied van de aangewende neuro-anatomische structuren. Concreet was het
de bedoeling neurale overlap effecten aan te tonen binnen de ventrale ver-
werkingsstroom. Om deze doelstelling te bereiken maakten we gebruik van
emotionele gezichtsstimuli waarvan is geweten dat zij ventraal worden ver-
werkt. Belangrijk voor het huidige onderzoek is de waarneming dat stimuli
die negatieve emoties uitdrukken tot een vertraagde reactie (kunnen) leiden
in vergelijking met neutrale of positieve stimuli. We gingen uit van een studie
van Pessoa et al. (2002) en een studie van Vuilleumier et al. (2001). Beiden
onderzochten in welke mate aandacht nodig is om de emotie die gezichten uit-
drukken te verwerken en beide kwamen tot een verschillende conclusie. Waar
Vuilleumier et al. (2001) vonden dat emotionele uitdrukkingen op gezichten
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automatisch worden verwerkt onafhankelijk van aandacht, kwamen Pessoa
et al. (2002) tot de conclusie dat er wel degelijk aandacht moet worden
geschonken aan een gezicht zodat de valentie ervan zou worden verwerkt.
Het is wel belangrijk te weten dat Vuilleumier et al. (2001) een identifica-
tietaak gebruikten (matching van huizen, met irrelevante gezichten), terwijl
Pessoa et al. (2002) gebruik maakten van een orie¨ntatietaak (matching van
lijnorie¨ntaties met irrelevante gezichten). Als je dit binnen het kader van
de neurale overlap theorie beschouwt, lijken de verschillende uitkomsten ver-
klaard te kunnen worden aan de hand van de verschillen tussen de betrokken
neurale structuren in beide taken. De taak van Vuilleumier et al. (2001)
sluit nauwer aan bij gezichtsverwerking dan de orie¨ntatietaak van Pessoa et
al. (2002). Een eventueel gevolg daarvan is dat emoties gemakkelijker en
zelfs automatisch worden verwerkt in de taak van Vuilleumier et al. (2001)
in tegenstelling tot die van Pessoa et al. (2002). In deze studie wilden we
controleren of deze neurale overlap verklaring inderdaad klopt door beide
taken rechtstreeks tegenover elkaar te stellen.
De resultaten waren ambigu. Waar er in een eerste experiment wel
degelijk effecten werden gevonden die konden doorgaan voor neurale overlap
effecten was dit niet meer het geval in een tweede studie. Bovendien waren er
in het eerste experiment problemen met het gelijk houden van de reactietijd-
niveaus tussen de verschillende condities. Deze temporele verschillen tussen
de twee condities zouden op zich al een verklaring kunnen zijn voor de ver-
schillende mate van irrelevante informatieverwerking, los van neurale overlap.
We kunnen dus samenvatten dat deze experimenten niet toelaten te stellen
dat neurale overlap ook werkzaam is binnen de ventrale verwerkingsstroom.
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6.3 Redenen van mislukken
Het is duidelijk dat onze poging om de neurale overlap theorie te generalise-
ren is mislukt. De vraag is nu wat er mogelijk aan de oorsprong zou kunnen
liggen van deze ontgoochelende resultaten. In Hoofdstuk 5 werd getracht
een antwoord te vinden op deze vraag. Alhoewel een eenduidig antwoord
niet kon worden gegeven is er toch de belangrijke bedenking dat voor de
lokalisatie van de gebruikte taken en stimuli steeds een beroep moest wor-
den gedaan op wat er in de literatuur voorhanden is. Indien deze informatie
onjuist is kan dit nefaste gevolgen hebben gehad voor de resultaten van ons
onderzoek. Door gebruik te maken van locatie-gegevens uit de literatuur, lag
de nadruk van de gebruikte relevante en irrelevante kenmerken voornamelijk
op anatomische afstand. In onze experimenten maakten wij vooral gebruik
van goed bestudeerde opdeling tussen ventrale en dorsale verwerkingsba-
nen binnen onze hersenen. Het is nu mogelijk dat deze dissociatie te vaag
was om duidelijke verschillen in neurale overlap te kunnen bewerkstelligen.
De dorsale en ventrale verwerkingsbanen kunnen dan misschien anatomisch
verschillen, door de vele interconnecties is het functionele onderscheid dan
misschien toch niet zo groot als we steeds veronderstelden.
6.4 Conclusie
Uit initieel onderzoek bleek dat de neurale overlap hypothese een valabel
concept is. We slaagden er echter niet in om de de neurale overlap hypothese
te generaliseren. Het gebruik van andere stimuli en taken die al dan niet
binnen dezelfde regionen worden verwerkt als de eerste experimenten, leverde
geen data op die de neurale overlap hypothese ondersteunen. Aangezien het
nog steeds onduidelijk is waarom onze poging tot generalisatie mislukte, en
fMRI-data verzameld door derden (Pinel et al., 2004) wel degelijk in de
richting wijzen van neurale overlap mechanismen, zouden wij ervoor willen
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pleiten verder onderzoek te voeren naar dit, op het eerste zicht, eenvoudige
principe.
References
Abdullaev, Y. G., & Melnichuk, K. V. (1996). Counting and arithmetic
functions of neurons in the human parietal cortex. NeuroImage, 3,
S216.
Allison, T., McCarthy, G., Nobre, A., Puce, A., & Belger, A. (1994). Human
extrastriate visual cortex and the perception of faces, words, numbers,
and colors. Cerebral Cortex, 4 (5), 544–554.
Awh, E., & Jonides, J. (2001). Overlapping mechanisms of attention and
spatial working memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5 (3), 119–126.
Awh, E., Jonides, J., & Reuter-Lorenz, P. A. (1998). Rehearsal in spatial
working memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Percep-
tion & Performance, 24 (3), 780–790.
Awh, E., Jonides, J., Smith, E., Buxton, R., Frank, L., Love, T., et al. (1999).
Rehearsal in spatial working memory: Evidence from neuroimaging.
Psychological Science, 10 (5), 433–437.
Bauer, D. W., & Miller, J. (1982). Stimulus-response compatibility and the
motor system. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 34A(3),
367–380.
Bichot, N. P., & Schall, J. D. (1999). Effects of similarity and history on
neural mechanisms of visual selection. Nature Neuroscience, 2 (6), 549–
554.
Boucart, M., & Humphreys, G. W. (1992). Global shape cannot be attended
without object identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Hu-
142 References
man Perception & Performance, 18 (3), 785–806.
Boucart, M., & Humphreys, G. W. (1994). Attention to orientation, size, lu-
minance, and color: attentional failure within the form domain. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 20 (1),
61–80.
Boucart, M., Humphreys, G. W., & Lorenceau, J. (1995). Automatic access
to object identity: attention to global information, not to particular
physical dimensions, is important. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception & Performance, 21 (3), 584–601.
Briggs, G. G., & Kinsbourne, M. (1978). Cerebral organization revealed by
multilimb tracking performance. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and communication. London: Pergamon
Press.
Brysbaert, M. (1995). Arabic number reading: on the nature of the numerical
scale and the origin of phonological recoding. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 124, 434–452.
Buckley, P. B., & Gillman, C. B. (1974). Comparisons of digits and dot
patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 103 (6), 1131–1136.
Burle, B., Possamai, C.-A., Vidal, F., Bonnet, M., & Hasbroucq, T. (2002).
Executive control in the Simon effect: an electromyographic and dis-
tributional analysis. Psychological Research, 66 (4), 324–336.
Burton, L. A., Rabin, L., Wyatt, G., Frohlich, J., Vardy, S. B., & Dimitri,
D. (2005). Priming effects for affective vs. neutral faces. Brain and
Cognition, 59 (3), 322–329.
Caessens, B., Notebaert, W., Burle, B., & Soetens, E. (2005). Voluntary and
involuntary control over automatic processing in spatial congruency
tasks: Editors’ introduction. European Journal of Cognitive Psychol-
ogy, 17 (5), 577–590.
Chao, L. L., & Martin, A. (1999). Cortical regions associated with perceiving,
References 143
naming, and knowing about colors. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
11 (1), 25–35.
Chase, W. G., & Clark, H. H. (1971). Semantics in the perception of verti-
cality. British Journal of Psychology, 62 (3), 311–326.
Chawla, D., Rees, G., & Friston, K. J. (1999). The physiological basis of at-
tentional modulation in extrastriate visual areas. Nature Neuroscience,
2 (7), 671–676.
Cho, Y. S., & Proctor, R. W. (2004). Influences of multiple spatial stimu-
lus and response codes on orthogonal stimulus-response compatibility.
Perception & Psychophysics, 66 (6), 1003–1017.
Cho, Y. S., & Proctor, R. W. (2005). Representing response position rel-
ative to display location: influence on orthogonal stimulus-response
compatibility. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58A(5),
839–864.
Chochon, F., Cohen, L., Moortele, P. F. van de, & Dehaene, S. (1999).
Differential contributions of the left and right inferior parietal lobules
to number processing. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 11 (6), 617–
630.
Claeys, K. G., Dupont, P., Cornette, L., Sunaert, S., Van Hecke, P., De Schut-
ter, E., et al. (2004). Color discrimination involves ventral and dorsal
stream visual areas. Cerebral Cortex, 14 (7), 803–822.
Claeys, K. G., Lindsey, D. T., De Schutter, E., & Orban, G. A. (2003). A
higher order motion region in human inferior parietal lobule: evidence
from fMRI. Neuron, 40 (3), 631–642.
Cohen Kadosh, R., & Henik, A. (in press). A common representation for
semantic and physical properties: a cognitive-anatomical approach. Ex-
perimental Psychology.
Cohen Kadosh, R., Henik, A., Rubinsten, O., Mohr, H., Dori, H., Ven, V.
van de, et al. (2005). Are numbers special? the comparison systems
144 References
of the human brain investigated by fMRI. Neuropsychologia, 43, 1238–
1248.
Cooper, L. (1975). Mental rotation of random two-dimensional shapes.
Cognitive Psychology, 7, 20–43.
Corbetta, M., Miezin, F. M., Dobmeyer, S., Shulman, G. L., & Petersen,
S. E. (1990). Attentional modulation of neural processing of shape,
color, and velocity in humans. Science, 248 (4962), 1556–1559.
Corbetta, M., Miezin, F. M., Dobmeyer, S., Shulman, G. L., & Petersen, S. E.
(1991). Selective and divided attention during visual discriminations
of shape, color, and speed: functional anatomy by positron emission
tomography. Journal of Neuroscience, 11 (8), 2383–2402.
Cotton, B., Tzeng, O. J., & Hardyck, C. (1980). Role of cerebral hemi-
spheric processing in the visual half-field stimulus-response compatibil-
ity effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception &
Performance, 6 (1), 13–23.
Culham, J., He, S., Dukelow, S., & Verstraten, F. A. (2001). Visual motion
and the human brain: what has neuroimaging told us. Acta Psycho-
logica, 107 (1-3), 69–94.
Dehaene, S. (1992). Varieties of numerical abilities. Cognition, 44 (1-2), 1–42.
Dehaene, S. (1997). The number sense: how the mind creates mathematics.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Dehaene, S., & Akhavein, R. (1995). Attention, automaticity, and levels of
representation in number processing. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 21 (2), 314–326.
Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., & Giraux, P. (1993). The mental representation
of parity and number magnitude. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 122, 371–396.
Dehaene, S., & Cohen, L. (1995). Towards an anatomical and functional
model of number processing. Mathematical Cognition, 1, 83–120.
References 145
Dehaene, S., Piazza, M., Pinel, P., & Cohen, L. (2003). Three parietal
circuits for number processing . Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20 (3–6),
487–506.
De Jong, R., Liang, C. C., & Lauber, E. (1994). Conditional and uncondi-
tional automaticity: a dual-process model of effects of spatial stimulus-
response correspondence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception & Performance, 20 (4), 731–750.
Desimone, T. D., & Allbright, C. G. (1984). Stimulus-selective properties of
inferior temporal neurons in the macaque. Journal of Neuroscience, 4,
2051–2062.
Deutsch, J. A., & Deutsch, D. (1963). Attention, some theoretical consider-
ations. Psychological Review, 70, 80–90.
Duncan, J. (1980). The locus of interference in the perception of simultaneous
stimuli. Psychological Review, 87 (3), 272–300.
Duncan, J. (1984). Selective attention and the organization of visual infor-
mation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 501–517.
Eacott, M. J., & Gaffan, D. (1991). The role of monkey inferior parietal
cortex in visual discrimination of identity and orientation of shapes.
Behavioral Brain Research, 46 (1), 95–98.
Faillenot, I., Decety, J., & Jeannerod, M. (1999). Human brain activity
related to the perception of spatial features of objects. NeuroImage,
10 (2), 114–124.
Faillenot, I., Sunaert, S., Van Hecke, P., & Orban, G. A. (2001). Orienta-
tion discrimination of objects and gratings compared: an fMRI study.
European Journal of Neuroscience, 13 (3), 585–596.
Fias, W. (2001). Two routes for the processing of verbal numbers: evidence
from the SNARC effect. Psychological Research, 65 (4), 250–259.
Fias, W., Brysbaert, M., Geypens, F., & d’Ydewalle, G. (1996). The im-
portance of magnitude information in numerical processing: Evidence
146 References
from the SNARC effect. Mathematical Cognition, 2, 95–110.
Fias, W., Dupont, P., Reynvoet, B., Raiguel, S., Mortelmans, L., & Orban,
G. A. (2000). A dissociation between ventral and dorsal visual streams
reflecting the nature of the cognitive task. Society for Neuroscience
Abstracts, 26, 1842.
Fias, W., Lammertyn, J., Reynvoet, B., Dupont, P., & Orban, G. A. (2003).
Parietal representation of symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude. Jour-
nal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15 (1), 47–56.
Fias, W., Lauwereyns, J., & Lammertyn, J. (2001). Irrelevant digits affect
feature-based attention depending on the overlap of neural circuits.
Cognitive Brain Research, 12 (3), 415–423.
Fias, W., Reynvoet, B., & Brysbaert, M. (2001). Are Arabic numerals pro-
cessed as pictures in a Stroop interference task? Psychological Research,
65 (4), 242–249.
Fitts, P. M., & Deininger, R. L. (1954). S-R compatibility: correspondence
among paired elements within stimulus and response codes. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 48 (6), 483–492.
Fitts, P. M., & Seeger, C. M. (1953). S-R compatibility: spatial char-
acteristics of stimulus and response codes. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 46 (3), 199–210.
Galletti, C., & Fattori, P. (2003). Neuronal mechanisms for detection of
motion in the field of view. Neuropsychologia, 41 (13), 1717–1727.
Gevers, W., Caessens, B., & Fias, W. (2005). Towards a common processing
architecture underlying Simon and SNARC effects. European Journal
of Cognitive Psychology, 17 (5), 659–674.
Gevers, W., Ratinckx, E., De Baene, W., & Fias, W. (in press). Further ev-
idence that the SNARC effect is processed along a dual-route architec-
ture: Evidence from the lateralized readiness potential. Experimental
Psychology.
References 147
Gevers, W., Reynvoet, B., & Fias, W. (2003). The mental representation of
ordinal sequences is spatially organized. Cognition, 87 (3), B87–95.
Girelli, L., Lucangeli, D., & Butterworth, B. (2000). The development of
automaticity in accessing number magnitude. Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology, 76 (2), 104–122.
Globisch, J., Hamm, A. O., Esteves, F., & O¨hman, A. (1999). Fear appears
fast: temporal course of startle reflex potentiation in animal fearful
subjects. Psychophysiology, 36 (1), 66–75.
Goodale, M. A., & Milner, A. D. (1992). Separate visual pathways for
perception and action. Trends in Neuroscience, 15 (1), 20–25.
Gross, C. G., Schiller, P. H., Wells, C., & Gerstein, G. L. (1967). Single-
unit activity in temporal association cortex of the monkey. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 30 (4), 833–843.
Hartikainen, K. M., Ogawa, K. H., & Knight, R. T. (2000). Transient
interference of right hemispheric function due to automatic emotional
processing. Neuropsychologia, 38 (12), 1576–1580.
Hasbroucq, T., & Guiard, Y. (1991). Stimulus-response compatibility and the
Simon effect: toward a conceptual clarification. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 17 (1), 246–266.
Henik, A., & Tzelgov, J. (1982). Is three greater than five: The relation
between physical and semantic size in comparison tasks. Memory &
Cognition, 10, 389–395.
Hommel, B. (1993). The relationship between stimulus processing and re-
sponse selection in the Simon task: Evidence for a temporal overlap.
Psychological Research, 55, 280–290.
Hommel, B., & Prinz, W. (1997). Theoretical issues in stimulus-response
compatibility: Editors’ introduction. In B. Hommel & W. Prinz (Eds.),
Theoretical issues in stimulus-response compatibility (pp. 3–8). Ams-
terdam: North Holland/Elsevier.
148 References
Hubbard, E. M., Piazza, M., Pinel, P., & Dehaene, S. (2005, Jun). Inter-
actions between number and space in parietal cortex. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 6 (6), 435–448.
Humphreys, G. W., & Boucart, M. (1997). Selection by color and form
in vision. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception &
Performance, 23 (1), 136–153.
Ito, Y., & Hatta, T. (2004). Spatial structure of quantitative representation
of numbers: evidence from the SNARC effect. Memory & Cognition,
32 (4), 662-673.
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt.
Jonides, J. (1981). Voluntary versus automatic control in the mind’s eye’s
movement. In J. B. Long & A. D. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and
Performance, Vol. XI (pp. 187–203). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Jonides, J., & Awh, E. (2003). What is the source of activation for working
memory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26 (6), 741–742.
Jonides, J., Lacey, S., & Nee, D. (2005). Processes of working memory in
mind and brain. Current directions in psychological science, 14 (1), 2–5.
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face
area: a module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face per-
ception. Journal of Neuroscience, 17 (11), 4302–4311.
Kinsbourne, M., & Hicks, R. E. (1978). Functional cerebral space: A model
for overflow, transfer, and interference effects in human performance. In
J. Requin (Ed.), Attention and Performance, Vol. VII (pp. 345–362).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Klingberg, T., & Roland, P. E. (1997). Interference between two concurrent
tasks is associated with activation of overlapping fields in the cortex.
Brain Research: Cognitive Brain Research, 6 (1), 1–8.
Koechlin, E., Naccache, L., Block, E., & Dehaene, S. (1999). Primed
numbers: Exploring the modularity of numerical representations with
References 149
masked and unmasked semantic priming. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Human Perception & Performance, 25 (6), 1882–1905.
Kok, A. (2004). Het hie¨rarchish brein. Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum.
Kornblum, S. (1994). The way irrelevant dimensions are processed depends
on what they overlap with: The case of Stroop- and Simon-like stimuli.
Psychological Research, 56, 130–135.
Kornblum, S., Hasbroucq, T., & Osman, A. (1990). Dimensional overlap:
cognitive basis for stimulus-response compatibility — a model and tax-
onomy. Psychological Review, 97 (2), 253–270.
Kornblum, S., & Lee, J. W. (1995). Stimulus-response compatibility with
relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions that do and do not over-
lap with the response. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception & Performance, 21 (4), 855–875.
Kornblum, S., & Stevens, G. (2002). Sequential effects of dimensional over-
lap: Findings and issues. In W. Prinz & B. Hommel (Eds.), Attention &
Performance, Vol. XIX (pp. 9–54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kornblum, S., Stevens, G. T., Whipple, A., & Requin, J. (1999). The
effects of irrelevant stimuli: 1. The time course of stimulus-stimulus and
stimulus-response consistency effects with stroop-like stimuli, simon-
like tasks, and their factorial combinations. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 25 (3), 688–714.
LaBar, K. S., Gitelman, D. R., Parrish, T. B., & Mesulam, M. (1999). Neu-
roanatomic overlap of working memory and spatial attention networks:
a functional MRI comparison within subjects. Neuroimage, 10 (6), 695–
704.
LaBerge, D. (1995). Attentional processing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Lammertyn, J., Fias, W., & Lauwereyns, J. (2002). Semantic influences on
feature-based attention due to overlap of neural circuits. Cortex, 38.
150 References
Lammertyn, J., Notebaert, W., Gevers, W., & Fias, W. (manuscript submit-
ted for publication). The Simon effect is larger with spatial relevant
information: a yet unidentified form of dimensional overlap.
Lauwereyns, J., Koizumi, M., Sakagami, M., Hikosaka, O., Kobayashi, S.,
& Tsutsui, K. (2000). Interference from irrelevant features on visual
discrimination by macaques (Macaca fuscata): a behavioral analogue of
the human Stroop effect. Journal of experimental psychology: Animal
Behavior Processes, 26 (3), 352–357.
Lauwereyns, J., Sakagami, M., Tsutsui, K., Kobayashi, S., Koizumi, M., &
Hikosaka, O. (2001). Responses to task-irrelevant visual features by
primate prefrontal neurons. Journal of Neurophysiology, 86 (4), 2001–
2010.
Lauwereyns, J., Wisnewski, R., Keown, K., & Govan, S. (2005). Crosstalk
between on-line and off-line processing of visual features. Psychological
Research.
Lavie, N., & Tsal, Y. (1994). Perceptual load as a major determinant of
the locus of selection in visual attention. Perception & Psychophysics,
56 (2), 183–197.
Lorch, R. F., & Meyers, J. L. (1990). Regression-analysis of repeated mea-
sures data in cognitive research. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 16, 149–157.
Lucas, C., & Lauwereyns, J. (manuscript submitted for publication). Selec-
tive working memory disables inhibition of visual features.
Lundqvist, D., Flykt, A., & O¨hman, A. (1998). The Karolinska Directed
Emotional Faces (KDEF). Department of Neurosciences, Karolinska
Hospital, Stockholm.
Mattingley, J. B., Husain, M., Rorden, C., Kennard, C., & Driver, J. (1998).
Motor role of human inferior parietal lobe revealed in unilateral neglect
patients. Nature, 392 (6672), 179–182.
References 151
McAdams, C. J., & Maunsell, J. H. (2000). Attention to both space and
feature modulates neuronal responses in macaque area V4. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 83 (3), 1751–1755.
McLeod, P. (1977). Parallel processing and the psychological refractory
period. Acta Psychologica, 41, 381–391.
Meyer, D. E., & Kieras, D. E. (1997). A computational theory of execu-
tive cognitive processes and multiple-task performance: Part 1. Basic
mechanisms. Psychological Review, 104 (1), 3–65.
Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The visual brain in action. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Motter, B. C. (1994). Neural correlates of attentive selection for color or
luminance in extrastriate area V4. Journal of Neuroscience, 14 (4),
2178–2189.
Moyer, R. S., & Landauer, T. K. (1967). Time required for judgements of
numerical inequality. Nature, 215 (109), 1519–1520.
Murata, A., Gallese, V., Luppino, G., Kaseda, M., & Sakata, H. (2000).
Selectivity for the shape, size, and orientation of objects for grasping
in neurons of monkey parietal area AIP. Journal of Neurophysiology,
83 (5), 2580–2601.
Naccache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2001). Unconscious semantic priming extends
to novel unseen stimuli. Cognition, 80 (3), 215-229.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The presedence of global features in
visual perception. Cognitive Psychology, 9, 353-383.
Nishimura, A., & Yokosawa, K. (in press). Orthogonal S-R Compatibil-
ity effect emerges even when the stimulus position is task-irrelevant.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.
Norman, D. A. (1968). Toward a theory of memory and attention. psycho-
logical research, 75, 522–536.
Nuerk, H.-C., Iversen, W., & Willmes, K. (2004). Notational modulation of
152 References
the SNARC and the MARC (linguistic markedness of response codes)
effect. Quarterly Journal of Experimentak Psychology, 57A(5), 835–
863.
O¨hman, A., Esteves, F., & Soares, J. J. F. (1995). Preparedness and preat-
tentive associative learning — electrodermal conditioning to masked
stimuli. Journal of Psychophysiology, 9 (2), 99–108.
Olson, G. M., & Laxar, K. (1973). Asymmetries in processing the terms
“right” and “left”. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 100 (2), 284–
290.
Olson, G. M., & Laxar, K. (1974). Processing the terms right and left:
a note on left-handers. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 102 (6),
1135–1137.
Orban, G. A., Fize, D., Peuskens, H., Denys, K., Nelissen, K., Sunaert, S.,
et al. (2003). Similarities and differences in motion processing between
the human and macaque brain: evidence from fMRI. Neuropsychologia,
41 (13), 1757-1768.
Pashler, H. (1994). Dual-task interference in simple tasks: data and theory.
Psychological Bulletin, 116 (2), 220–244.
Pashler, H. (1998). The psychology of attention. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Pesenti, M., Thioux, M., Seron, X., & De Volder, A. (2000). Neuroanatomi-
cal substrates of arabic number processing, numerical comparison, and
simple addition: a PET study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
12 (3), 461–479.
Pessoa, L., McKenna, M., Gutierrez, E., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2002). Neural
processing of emotional faces requires attention. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 99 (17),
11458–11463.
Petersen, S. E., Fox, P. T., Posner, M. I., Mintun, M., & Raichle, M. E.
References 153
(1988). Positron emission tomographic studies of the cortical anatomy
of single-word processing. Nature, 331 (6157), 585–589.
Pinel, P., Piazza, M., Le Bihan, D., & Dehaene, S. (2004). Distributed and
overlapping cerebral representations of number, size, and luminance
during comparative judgments. Neuron, 41 (6), 983–993.
Pinsk, M. A., Kastner, S., Desimone, R., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2000). Ex-
pectation of color or face stimuli differentially modulates activity in
human visual cortex. Society of Neuroscience Abstracts, 26, 952.
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 32 (1), 3–25.
Posner, M. I., Petersen, S. E., Fox, P. T., & Raichle, M. E. (1988). Localiza-
tion of cognitive operations in the human brain. Science, 240 (4859),
1627–1631.
Posner, M. I., Sandson, J., Dhawan, M., & Shulman, G. L. (1989). Is word
recognition automatic? A cognitive-anatomical approach. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 1 (1), 50–60.
Proctor, R. W., & Cho, Y. S. (2003). Effects of response eccentricity and
relative position on orthogonal stimulus-response compatibility with
joystick and keypress responses. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 56A(2), 309–327.
Puce, A., Allison, T., Bentin, S., Gore, J. C., & McCarthy, G. (1998). Tem-
poral cortex activation in humans viewing eye and mouth movements.
Journal of Neuroscience, 18 (6), 2188–2199.
Ratcliff, R. (1979). Group reaction time distributions and an analysis of
distribution statistics. Psychological Bulletin, 86 (3), 446–461.
Ratinckx, E., & Brysbaert, M. (2002). Interhemispheric stroop-like inter-
ference in number comparison: evidence for strong interhemispheric
integration of semantic number information. Neuropsychology, 16 (2),
217–229.
154 References
Ratinckx, E., Brysbaert, M., & Fias, W. (2005). Naming two-digit arabic nu-
merals: evidence from masked priming studies. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human, Perception & Performance, 31 (5), 1150–1163.
Rees, G., Frith, C. D., & Lavie, N. (1997). Modulating irrelevant motion
perception by varying attentional load in an unrelated task. Science,
278 (5343), 1616–1619.
Reynvoet, B., & Brysbaert, M. (2004). Cross-notation number priming inves-
tigated at different stimulus onset asynchronies in parity and naming
tasks. Experimental Psychology, 51 (2), 81–90.
Reynvoet, B., Gevers, W., & Caessens, B. (2005). Unconscious primes
activate motor codes through semantics. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 31 (5), 991–1000.
Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2002). Activation and suppression in conflict tasks:
Empirical clarification through distributional analysis. In W. Prinz &
B. Hommel (Eds.), Attention & performance XIX: Common mecha-
nisms in perception and action (pp. 494–519). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (1997). Parietal cortex: from sight
to action. Current opinion in neurobiology, 7 (4), 562–567.
Rusconi, E., Walsh, V., & Butterworth, B. (2005). Dexterity with num-
bers: rTMS over left angular gyrus disrupts finger gnosis and number
processing. Neuropsychologia, 43 (11), 1609–1624.
Rushworth, M. F., Nixon, P. D., & Passingham, R. E. (1997). Parietal cor-
tex and movement. I. Movement selection and reaching. Experimental
Brain Research, 117 (2), 292–310.
Sanders, A. (1980). Stage analysis of reaction processes. In G. E. Stelmach
& J. Requin (Eds.), ”Tutorials in motor behavior” (pp. 331–354). Am-
sterdam: North-Holland.
Seron, X., Pesenti, M., Noel, M. P., Deloche, G., & Cornet, J. A. (1992).
References 155
Images of numbers, or when 98 is upper left and 6 sky blue. Cognition,
44 (1–2), 159–196.
Seymour, P. H. (1974). Asymmetries in judgments of verticality. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 102 (3), 447–455.
Shikata, E., Hamzei, F., Glauche, V., Knab, R., Dettmers, C., Weiller, C.,
et al. (2001). Surface orientation discrimination activates caudal and
anterior intraparietal sulcus in humans: an event-related fMRI study.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 85 (3), 1309–1314.
Simon, J. R. (1969). Reactions toward the source of stimulation. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 81 (1), 174–176.
Simon, J. R. (1990). The effects of an irrelevant directional cue on hu-
man information processing. In R. W. Proctor & T. G. Reeve (Eds.),
Advances in Psychology, Vol. 65: Stimulus-response compatibility: an
integrated perspective (pp. 31–86). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Simon, J. R., & Rudell, A. P. (1967). Auditory S–R compatibility: The
effect of an irrelevant cue on information processing. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 51, 300–304.
Sohn, W., Chong, S. C., Papathomas, T. V., & Vidnyanszky, Z. (2005).
Cross-feature spread of global attentional modulation in human area
MT+. Neuroreport, 16 (12), 1389-1393.
Sternberg, S. (1969). The discovery of processing stages: Extensions of
Donders’ method. In W. G. Koster (Ed.), “Attention & performance
II (pp. 276–315). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Stevens, M., Lammertyn, J., Verbruggen, F., & Vandierendonck, A. (in
press). Tscope: a C library for programming cognitive experiments on
the MS Windows platform. Behavior Research Methods.
Sunaert, S., Van Hecke, P., Marchal, G., & Orban, G. A. (1999). Motion-
responsive regions of the human brain. Experimental Brain Research,
127 (4), 355-370.
156 References
Taira, M., Kawashima, R., Inoue, K., & Fukuda, H. (1998). A PET study
of axis orientation discrimination. Neuroreport, 9 (2), 283–288.
Tanaka, K. (1996). Inferotemporal cortex and object vision. Annual Review
of Neuroscience, 19, 109–139.
Temple, E., & Posner, M. I. (1998). Brain mechanisms of quantity are similar
in 5-year-old children and adults. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America, 95 (13), 7836–7841.
Toni, I., & Passingham, R. E. (1999). Prefrontal-basal ganglia pathways are
involved in the learning of arbitrary visuomotor associations: a PET
study. Experimental Brain Research, 127 (1), 19–32.
Tootell, R. B., Mendola, J. D., Hadjikhani, N. K., Ledden, P. J., Liu, A. K.,
Reppas, J. B., et al. (1997). Functional analysis of V3A and related
areas in human visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 17 (18), 7060-
7078.
Tootell, R. B., Reppas, J. B., Kwong, K. K., Malach, R., Born, R. T., Brady,
T. J., et al. (1995). Functional analysis of human MT and related
visual cortical areas using magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of
Neuroscience, 15 (4), 3215–3230.
Treisman, A. M. (1960). Contextual cues in selective listening. Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 242–248.
Treisman, A. M. (1996). The binding problem. Current Opinions in Neuro-
biology, 6 (2), 171–178.
Treue, S., & Trujillo, J. C. M. (1999). Feature-based attention influences
motion processing gain in macaque visual cortex. Nature, 399, 575–579.
Tsal, Y., & Lamy, D. (2000). Attending to an object’s color entails attending
to its location: support for location-special views of visual attention.
Perception & psychophysics, 62 (5), 960–968.
Turconi, E., Jemel, B., Rossion, B., & Seron, X. (2004). Electrophysiological
evidence for differential processing of numerical quantity and order in
References 157
humans. Cognitive Brain Research, 21 (1), 22–38.
Tzelgov, J., Meyer, J., & Henik, A. (1992). Automatic and intentional pro-
cessing of numerical information. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 18, 166–179.
Umilta´, C. (1991). Problems of the salient-features coding hypothesis: com-
ment on Weeks and Proctor. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Gen-
eral, 120, 93–86.
Ungerleider, L., & Mishkin, M. (1982). Two cortical visual systems. In D. In-
gle, M. Goodale, & R. Mansfield (Eds.), ”Analysis of visual behavior”
(pp. 549–586). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Van der heijden, A. H. C. (1992). Selective attention in vision. London, UK:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Van Oostende, S., Sunaert, S., Van Hecke, P., Marchal, G., & Orban, G. A.
(1997). The kinetic occipital (KO) region in man: an fMRI study.
Cerebral Cortex, 7 (7), 690–701.
Van Opstal, F., Moors, A., Verguts, T., & Fias, W. (manuscript submitted
for publication). Automatic number processing: a combination of direct
outcome retrieval and algorithm computation.
Van Zandt, T. (2000). How to fit a response time distribution. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 7 (3), 424–465.
Vecera, S. P., & Farah, M. J. (1994). Does visual attention select objects
or locations? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123 (2),
146–160.
Verbruggen, F., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendock, A. (2004). The interaction
between stop signal inhibition and distractor interference in the flanker
and Stroop task. Acta Psychologica, 116, 21–37.
Vuilleumier, P. (2005). How brains beware: neural mechanisms of emotional
attention. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9 (12), 585-594.
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J. L., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2001). Effects
158 References
of attention and emotion on face processing in the human brain: an
event-related fMRI study. Neuron, 30 (3), 829–841.
Vuilleumier, P., Richardson, M. P., Armony, J. L., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J.
(2004). Distant influences of amygdala lesion on visual cortical acti-
vation during emotional face processing. Nature Neuroscience, 7 (11),
1271–1278.
Wallace, R. J. (1971). S-R compatibility and the idea of a response code.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 88 (3), 354–360.
Wallace, R. J. (1972). Spatial S-R compatibility effects involving kinesthetic
cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 93 (1), 163–168.
Walsh, V., & Butler, S. R. (1996). The effects of visual cortex lesions on
the perception of rotated shapes. Behavioural brain research, 76 (1–2),
127–142.
Watson, J. D., Myers, R., Frackowiak, R. S., Hajnal, J. V., Woods, R. P.,
Mazziotta, J. C., et al. (1993). Area V5 of the human brain: evi-
dence from a combined study using positron emission tomography and
magnetic resonance imaging. Cerebral Cortex, 3 (2), 79–94.
Weeks, D. J., & Proctor, R. W. (1990). Salient-features coding in the trans-
lation between orthogonal stimulus and response dimension. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 119, 355–366.
Weeks, D. J., & Proctor, R. W. (1991). Salient-features coding and orthog-
onal compatibility effects: a reply to Umilta`. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 120 (1), 87–89.
Welford, A. T. (1952). The “psychological refractory period” and the timing
of highspeed performance—a review and a theory. British Journal of
Psychology, 43, 2–19.
Yantis, S. (1992). Multielement visual tracking: attention and perceptual
organization. Cognitive Psychology, 24 (3), 295–340.
Zeki, S. (1993). A vision of the brain. London: Blackwell Science, London.
References 159
Zeki, S., Watson, J. D., Lueck, C. J., Friston, K. J., Kennard, C., & Frack-
owiak, R. S. (1991). A direct demonstration of functional specialization
in human visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 11 (3), 641-649.
Zhang, H. H., Zhang, J., & Kornblum, S. (1999). A parallel distributed
processing model of stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-response compati-
bility. Cognitive Psychology, 38 (3), 386–432.
